DHA16 v Minister For Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

Before the Federal Circuit Court 24 The applicant's written submissions raised one ground of appeal before the Federal Circuit Court. It is not relevant to this appeal. The ground was not upheld and the application was dismissed.

Grounds of appeal 25 The grounds that the applicant now seeks to rely upon are as follows: 1. The Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that the IAA failed to give active intellectual consideration to the Appellant's claim or failed to consider all integers of the Appellant's claim in that it: a. Failed to consider that the Appellant belonged to a Particular Social Group, being 'Returned People Smuggler Vessel Captains'. b. Failed to consider that the Appellant would be imputed with pro-Tamil political opinion, and thus failed to consider the effect of such a finding. 2. The Federal Circuit Court erred in not finding that the IAA acted unreasonably, illogically, irrationally, without active intellectual consideration or misapprehending and misapplying the evidence in determining that the chance of the Appellant suffering from torture was remote.

Ground 1(a) 26 The applicant submits that the Authority failed to consider whether the applicant was a member of the group defined as 'returned people smuggler vessel captains'. He submits that the group has specific characteristics, being an increased likelihood of refusal of bail, detention or torture as compared to others, and an imputed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) connection. 27 The applicant submits that even if this point was not put to the Authority, it arose squarely on the material in the manner contemplated in NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [58]. 28 The applicant asserts that 'returned people smuggler vessel captains' is a particular social group as that term was assessed in, relevantly, Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] HCA 25; (2004) 217 CLR 387: [36] … First, the group must be identifiable by a characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group. Secondly, the characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group cannot be the shared fear of persecution. Thirdly, the possession of that characteristic or attribute must distinguish the group from society at large. … 29 To that authority I would add the High Court's detailed consideration of the issue of social groups in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26. 30 The difficulty with the applicant's submission is that the Authority set out the nature of the applicant's protection claim based on the materials before it. It then considered each relevant aspect of that claim. There was no express claim that the applicant sought protection on the basis of being a member of a social group of 'returned people smuggler vessel captains'. 31 There is nothing to suggest that the Authority had before it materials that would have enabled it to assess whether the group to which the applicant now claims to belong is capable of constituting a social group. There is nothing to suggest any submissions were made to that effect before the delegate or Authority. There is nothing to suggest the applicant sought to provide any evidence or country information that would have assisted the Authority. The applicant did not point to any submissions made before the delegate that may have put the Authority on notice of such claim. These matters tell against the submission that a claim based on the purported social group arose clearly from the materials before it. 32 It is not for the Authority to in effect conduct its own investigations. Its role on a Part 7AA fast-track review is constrained by the nature of its statutory task. The task has been described in several authoritative decisions: see eg Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; (2017) 257 FCR 111; and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136; (2017) 254 FCR 534. Importantly, its ability to obtain and rely upon new information is constrained. It was entitled to rely upon the material before it, including the country information. The applicant accepts that nothing in the country information points to the existence of a defined social group as claimed. The country information therefore does not assist in that regard. 33 A judgment that a tribunal has failed to consider a claim not expressly advanced is not lightly to be made: NABE at [68]. In my view, the claim that the applicant was a member of a social group of returned people smuggler vessel captains was not a substantial clearly articulated argument relying on established facts (Dranichnikov at [24]). It did not emerge clearly from the materials. I do not consider a determination that the Authority failed to consider such claim is open having regard to the thresholds required for such determination. 34 The Authority addressed the applicant's claims insofar as they raised his position as a skipper of a boat transporting asylum seekers. In particular, the Authority: (a) specifically referred to, and accepted, the claims that the applicant had been part of a crew that took asylum seekers on a boat bound for Italy in 2002 and that he captained a boat of asylum seekers to Australia in 2012 (paras 6-9); (b) found that the applicant had no LTTE links or other profile that would be of particular interest to authorities in Sri Lanka (para 18); (c) accepted that, as a result of his involvement in sailing/captaining a boat of asylum seekers, the applicant could be charged under s 45C of the I&E Act and that he may be found to have committed an offence under that Act (paras 20-22); (d) accepted that if the applicant was so charged he would be denied bail and that he could be remanded or detained in prison for an extended period (para 24); (e) considered the applicant's claims regarding fear of torture whilst detained or in prison as well as the general conditions that he would face in prison including the country information cited in the submissions provided to the delegate (paras 25-26); (f) found that any treatment that the applicant may face as a consequence of the I&E Act did not amount to persecution (para 26); (g) rejected the claim that he faced a real chance of harm from other people smugglers (para 28); and (h) found that poor prison conditions and the lengthy period of detention that the applicant may be subject to did not, of themselves, constitute significant harm (para 37). 35 Whilst the applicant's membership of the group is itself now propounded as a separate claim, it can be seen that the matters that the applicant says the Authority should have considered in the context of social group claim were in any event addressed. That is, the Authority considered the likelihood of refusal of bail (para 24). It considered there might be detention for a significant period (para 24). It considered the issue of interrogation and torture (para 25). It took into account that the applicant might be asked about the crew (para 28) noting that the CID already had information relevant to that matter. 36 It clearly addressed the claim as made.

Ground 1(b) 37 The applicant challenges the Authority's finding that he does not have any LTTE links, a finding made at paras 18 and 25 of the reasons. The applicant submits that the overwhelming majority of Sri Lankan asylum seekers bound for Australia are of Tamil ethnicity, and most claim to have LTTE connections. The applicant submits that the Authority therefore should have had regard to such alleged facts when evaluating whether the applicant had any LTTE links or a profile that would be of particular interest to the Sri Lankan authorities, as it undoubtedly raises the question of imputed political opinion. The applicant also says that undoubtedly his role in facilitating or organising irregular migration of Tamils and LTTE supporters was capable of being regarded as adverse to the State, and that such a conclusion should be inferred. 38 Again, this is not a claim that emerged clearly from the materials. The applicant made no express claim based on any imputed LTTE links. There was no evidence that the applicant's occupation as a skipper might be used by the authorities to impute to him (as a person returning to Sri Lanka who had left the country illegally) an LTTE connection or political opinion. The applicant relies on inference in circumstances where he had the opportunity to advance such a claim before the Authority. It is accepted that political opinion might be imputed from conduct (the applicant referred to V in this regard) but a claim based on such imputed opinion was not clearly raised or revealed by the materials. 39 Again, having regard to the materials that were before the Authority, the country information does not assist the applicant. It does not provide evidence that his role as a skipper might be used to impute to him an LTTE connection or political opinion. The factual assertions upon which the applicant relies are not found in the country material. The country material does address the issue of imputed LTTE links by referring to the UNHCR's 2012 Eligibility Guidelines for Sri Lanka. Those guidelines note that a person's real or perceived links with the LTTE may give rise to a need for international refugee protection and refer to the following links: 1) persons who held senior positions with considerable authority in the LTTE civilian administration, when the LTTE was in control of large parts of what are now the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka; 2) former LTTE combatants or 'cadres'; 3) former LTTE combatants or 'cadres' who, due to injury or other reason, were employed by the LTTE in functions within the administration, intelligence, 'computer branch' or media (newspaper and radio); 4) former LTTE supporters who may never have undergone military training, but were involved in sheltering or transporting LTTE personnel, or the supply and transport of goods for the LTTE; 5) LTTE fundraisers and propaganda activists and those with, or perceived as having had, links to the Sri Lankan diaspora that provided funding and other support to the LTTE; 6) persons with family links or who are dependent on or otherwise closely related to persons with the above profiles. 40 Whilst that list is said to be inclusive, on its face the imputed link relied upon by the applicant does not fall neatly within the items in the list. It is not inconsistent with the Authority's finding of an absence of an LTTE link. 41 Against a backdrop where no claim was clearly revealed based on an imputed LTTE link, no error is apparent in the manner in which the Authority found that the applicant had no LTTE links or other profile that would be of particular interest to Sri Lankan authorities.

Ground 2 42 The applicant submits that the Authority's conclusion that 'the applicant's prospects of being subject to torture or other mistreatment is remote,' is unfounded, illogical and unreasonable. 43 As is clear from its reasons, the Authority considered the risk the applicant might face as a result of charges under both s 45 and s 45C of the I&E Act. 44 In reaching that finding, the Authority referred to a DFAT Country Information Report of 18 December 2015. The applicant submits that the Authority's conclusion was 'clearly derived' from para 4.23 of the Report (page 24), which reads: There have been thousands of asylum seekers returned to Sri Lanka since 2009, including from Australia, the US, Canada, the UK and other European countries, with relatively few allegations of torture or mistreatment (see also 'Treatment of Returnees', below). Although DFAT does not routinely monitor the situation of returnees, DFAT assesses that the risk of torture or mistreatment for the majority of returnees is low, including those suspected of offences under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act. Under the previous Rajapaksa government, DFAT assessed that the risk of torture or mistreatment for returnees was greater for those suspected of committing serious crimes, including terrorism offences. This was due mostly to the greater exposure these returnees had to authorities on their return which generally includes extended periods of pre-trial detention. While overall monitoring has reduced under the Sirisena government and general fears about mistreatment have reduced, it is difficult to verify if the intent to improve general conditions has yet led to a lower risk of torture or mistreatment of returnees. 45 The applicant submits that this paragraph was not intended to refer to 'organisers and facilitators' and was restricted only to refer to ordinary returnees. He refers to para 5.35 of the report, which reads: The Attorney-General's Department typically distinguishes between those suspected of being passengers on a people smuggling venture and those suspected of facilitating or organising of irregular migration of people from Sri Lanka. Facilitators or organisers can be charged with an offence under Section 45C of the I&E Act. 46 The applicant relies on the Authority's reference to the DFAT assessment that the risk of torture for people suspected of an offence under the I&E Act is low (para 25) and submits that such assessment cannot relate to facilitators or organisers who, it is accepted, may be charged under s 45C. There are difficulties with the manner in which the applicant seeks to interpret this country information. First, para 4.23 also notes that under the previous government DFAT had assessed the risks of torture or mistreatment for returnees was greater for those suspected of committing serious crimes. Therefore, the clause also contemplates the position for those who may have faced more serious crimes. This supports an inclusive reading of the reference to those suspected of offences under the I&E Act, such that it addresses not only those charged or convicted of offences under s 45 but also under s 45C, and in relation to more serious crimes. That is a reading of para 4.23 that was open to the Authority. Similarly, it does not follow that the DFAT reference to there being 'relatively few allegations of torture or mistreatment' from the thousands of returned asylum seekers is limited to allegations by returnees other than those charged under s 45C or facing other serious charges. The country information can be read without such limitation both sensibly and reasonably. How country information is weighed and interpreted is a matter for the Authority: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]-[13]. 47 In any event, the Authority's conclusion was apparently also based on other country information that is listed in the footnotes to its reasons (fn 11). 48 Furthermore, the Authority quite clearly recognised that the DFAT report distinguishes between those suspected of being passengers on a people smuggling venture and those suspected of facilitating or organising the irregular migration of people from Sri Lanka. So much is apparent from its reasons (para 19) that refer to facilitators or organisers being charged under s 45C. As already noted, the Authority considered the risks that might be faced by the applicant having accepted that he might be charged under s 45C (paras 19-22, 24). 49 Even when one has regard to the sentence from para 4.23 of the DFAT report to the effect that DFAT assessed that the risk of torture or mistreatment for returnees was greater for those suspected of committing serious crimes including terrorism offences, it must be recalled that the context was the position under the previous government. It does not follow that the position would be the same under the subsequent government, or that the applicant would face more than a remote risk of torture in detention or prison. 50 It is also important to recall that the Authority did not accept that the applicant had LTTE links (as addressed with respect to ground 1). Its reasons proceeded on the basis that the applicant did not fit that risk profile. 51 To allege that the Authority acted illogically is to say that it reached a finding which was not open on the evidence, or that there was no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn. The test is to ask whether there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision-maker: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [135]. In my view and having regard to the reasoning process disclosed by the Authority and its reference to country information, the finding as to the applicant's prospects of being subject to torture or other mistreatment was not illogical. 52 'Unreasonableness' is relied upon by the applicant in his proposed grounds to describe a range of matters said to comprise jurisdictional error, but the submissions focussed on the alleged failure to have regard to the applicant's imputed links. I have addressed that issue for the purpose of ground 1 and in the context of illogicality immediately above. Findings might be said to be unreasonable if they manifest extreme illogicality that takes matters beyond where reasonable minds may differ, but that is not the position in this case. 53 The reasons expose why the Authority's discretion was exercised in a particular way. The reasoning provides an evident and intelligible justifiable for the decision, and accordingly there is no apparent unreasonableness. In my view, those reasons demonstrate a justification for the decision that is within the bounds of reasonableness.

Outcome 54 As I noted above, because there is an extension application and an application to rely on new grounds, it has been necessary to consider the proposed grounds at more than simply the impressionistic level generally required on an extension application considered alone. The parties made detailed submissions as to the proposed grounds of appeal. 55 I have formed the view that the proposed grounds of appeal do not have sufficient merit to justify a grant of leave. In the circumstances there is no purpose in the grant of any extension of time. I add that there was no compelling explanation as to the failure to raise the proposed grounds below, but I have not refused leave on that basis but rather on the overarching basis of the lack of merit of the proposed grounds. 56 Costs should follow the event. I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Banks-Smith.