Conclusion
29 The defendant in this case emphasised in submissions the fact that the parties chose between April 1990 and January 1993 not to conduct their relationship from a single residence. This failure was linked to the failure of the defendant to take any effective role in the parenting of the plaintiff's children and the separation of their financial affairs to indicate that no defacto relationship existed. On many occasions I have emphasised the importance of the public face of the relationship. In the present case there was little evidence to show a public face of the relationship as being the parties living together as man and wife.
30 I have earlier referred to the decision of Powell J in Roy v Sturgeon (1986) 11 NSWLR 454. At page 458 His Honour had the following to say:-
It seems to me that, to attempt, as Young J appears to have done, to breakdown, into discrete elements, a single phrase intended to describe a single concept, and then to proceed to examine the facts with a view to ascertain whether, in the particular case, each such discrete element can be said to exist, is likely to be productive of error. Thus, while I accept that the concept of a man and woman living together as man and wife does not necessarily imply that the two persons in question are always living together under the same roof (see, eg, Re Fagan (at 464; 822)), it does not necessarily follow that a man and woman, each of whom maintains a separate home, are to be regarded as living together because they are accustomed regularly to spend time together, and even sleep together, in the home of one. So, too, while I accept that, while, in the normal course of events, one would expect to find that a man and woman living together as husband and wife, whether de jure or de facto, were accustomed to provide emotional support to each other, it does not necessarily follow that the presence of such support establishes, while the absence of such support denies, that the basis of their relationship is a bona fide domestic one. Finally, while I accept that the presence, or absence, in a particular case, of one or more of the factors referred to by Young J as "the main guidelines" is a matter to which one might properly have regard in determining whether the relationship under consideration involved a man and woman living together as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic basis, it does not necessarily follow, either, that his Honour's list of "guidelines" is exhaustive of the matters to which regard might be had, or, that the presence of those factors establishes, while the absence of any one of them denies, that the relationship under consideration has, or had, the relevant character.
31 Of interest is His Honour's words where he refers to the question of the parties living together under the same roof. In the present case it is not without significance that the parties commenced to sleep together in 1990 and over a period formulated a plan for the construction of the new house. One might be forgiven for imagining that if there were a defacto relationship one might have found the defendant upon the demolition of the house moving in to live with the plaintiff at her home. That arrangement could well have been beneficial for both of them. That, however, did not occur and the defendant took the step of leasing a property nearby. The evidence did not really explore whether this was because of his part-time work from home or perhaps a desire to be near the site of the demolition and reconstruction. Be that as it may the fact that the parties did not take this step does, I think, have to be taken into account. There would be many factors perhaps why the plaintiff may have left it to the completion of that project before moving such as, for example, the placement of her children at school and local friends. Although the evidence shows some commitment together with the project and some inter-dependence in respect of contributions to that project, I think the appropriate conclusion is that the defacto relationship did not commence until January 1993 when the plaintiff moved in to the completed property in North Curl Curl.