The Judiciary Act
18 However, Mr Lynch raised another jurisdictional question. By s38(c) of the Judiciary Act, 1903 (C'th), the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in "suits by the Commonwealth, or any person suing on behalf of the Commonwealth, against a State, or any person being sued on behalf of a State…" (S38 is expressed to be subject to ss39B and 44. Argument was directed to s39B but, given the view I have formed on this issue, it is unnecessary to deal with it.) There is no doubt that the defendant is caught by that provision, because s103Q of the HBA provides that it is, "for the purposes of any Act, a statutory body representing the Crown." However, there is no such provision in the Defence Housing Authority Act ("DHAA"), and a question arises whether the plaintiff is "the Commonwealth" or a "person suing on behalf of the Commonwealth."
19 Mr Jackman submitted that it is not, and in the course of argument he referred to observations by members of the High Court in Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (1996-97) 190 CLR 410. Mr Lynch had argued in written submissions that it is, but at the hearing of the motion he expressed a preference "in effect to sit on the fence" on the issue, given the tentative and, perhaps, conflicting views expressed by their Honours in that case. I shall examine those views shortly.
20 Guidance is to be found in cases dealing with s75(iii) of the Constitution, conferring original jurisdiction upon the High Court "in all matters in which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party." The basal authority is Bank of NSW v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, in which Dixon J (as he then was) observed (at 363):
There is the strongest presumption that in using the expression "all persons suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth" the framers of the Constitution were not concerned with the Attorney General or any other officer by or through whom the Crown might come or be brought into court… what they were concerned with was amenability to the jurisdiction of persons in whom causes of action were vested, or against whom causes of action lay, but in their official capacity only and as agencies or emanations of the Commonwealth.
21 That case, and the principles to be derived from it, were considered in Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334, in which the status of the respondent bank was in question. Kitto J, who delivered the leading judgment, said (at 337-8):
The decisive question is not whether the activities and functions with which the respondent is endowed are traditionally governmental in character, though their possession of a traditional or generally accepted governmental character may well help in the ascertainment of the legislative intention. The question is rather what intention appears from the provisions relating to the respondent in the relevant statute: is it, on the one hand, an intention that the Commonwealth shall operate in a particular field through a corporation created for the purpose; or is it, on the other hand, an intention to put into the field a corporation to perform its functions independently of the Commonwealth, that is to say otherwise than as a Commonwealth instrument, so that the concept of a Commonwealth activity cannot realistically be applied to that which the corporation does?
22 In State Bank of NSW v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (1986) 161 CLR 639, a case to which I shall return, it was accepted in the judgment of the Court (at 648) that the terms of s75(iii) of the Constitution "have the same meaning as the similar words in s38 of the Judiciary Act." Reference should also be made to the observations of Stephen J in Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of Stamps (S.A.) (1978-79) 145 CLR 330, in which the Court was called upon to consider whether the appellant enjoyed a Crown immunity from certain State stamp duties legislation. His Honour said (at 348):
If a corporation is no more than the passive instrument of the Crown, subject in a high degree to control by the executive, it is appropriate enough that its acts be viewed as those of its master and that it be itself treated as the alter ego of the Crown, enjoying accordingly those immunities and privileges with which the Crown is clothed. If, on the contrary, a statutory corporation is essentially autonomous, its acts being in no sense the outcome of directions by the executive but truly its own, there will be little reason to clothe it with any of those immunities or privileges.
…….
No doubt in practice a statutory corporation will seldom be either a mere passive instrument or wholly autonomous. If the former its creation would scarcely be worthwhile, departmental officers could serve the purpose just as well. If the latter it would savour of Frankenstein's monster, hence the usual retention of some control, even if it be no more than some power of appointment and removal of the members of its governing body, perhaps the existence of an obligation to make periodic reports to Parliament, or, particularly if public funds are in question, the imposition of audit and financial reporting procedures.
23 With these principles in mind, let me turn to relevant provisions of the DHAA. At the beginning of these reasons I referred to the functions of the plaintiff set out in s5. By s6, it is to carry out its functions "in accordance with the policies of the Commonwealth" and "in accordance with sound commercial practice." By s7, it is given wide powers to carry out its functions, such as acquiring and disposing of property, building and renovating houses, entering into contracts and engaging consultants. However, by s7(2), it cannot enter into a contract involving the payment by it of an amount exceeding $6,000,000 without the approval of the Minister. The Minister's approval is also required for the purchases of shares or securities in a company or the formation of a company as a subsidiary (s8), for entering into partnerships (s9) and for participation in a joint venture (s10).
24 By s12, the plaintiff is composed of twelve members, including four members of the Defence Force, an officer within the meaning of the Public Service Act (1922), and a Managing Director. With the exception of the Managing Director, the members are appointed by the Governor General (ss12 and 14, and the definition of "appointed member" in s3.) The tenure of those members is set by ss15 and 16. The Managing Director is appointed by the plaintiff (s47), and conducts the affairs of the plaintiff in accordance with its policies and directions (s46). By s48, he or she holds office during the plaintiff's pleasure, subject to a retiring age. The remuneration of the Managing Director and other members is determined by the Remuneration Tribunal (ss17 and 50). S57 provides that the plaintiff's staff is composed of persons appointed or employed under the Public Service Act and members of the Defence Force.
25 S27 deals with the plaintiff's responsibility to prepare a corporate plan, and by s28(1) it is required to prepare a financial plan which includes "its financial targets for profits, rates of return and dividends…" By s28(2), in setting the financial targets, it is to have regard to :
(a) objectives and policies of the Commonwealth Government known to it, and any directions given to it by the Minister;
(b) the need to earn a reasonable rate of return on assets used
by it;
(c) the need to maintain the extent of the Commonwealth's
equity in it;
(d) the need to establish and maintain a reasonable level of
reserves having regard to:
(i) the estimated future demand for housing
provided by it; and
(ii) the necessity of ensuring that housing provided
by it is of an appropriate standard;
(e) the expectation of the Commonwealth that it will pay a
reasonable dividend on its capital; and
(f) such other commercial considerations as it considers
appropriate.
26 The corporate plan must be supplied to the Minister (s29), who can direct that it be varied (s30). By s31(2), the Minister can give directions to the plaintiff about "the performance of its functions and the exercise of its powers" if he or she is satisfied "that it is desirable in the public interest to do so…" However, apart from that provision and except "as otherwise expressly provided" in the Act, the plaintiff is not subject to direction by or on behalf of the Commonwealth Government : s31(1).
27 S60 provides for the transfer of Commonwealth assets to the plaintiff, and s36 permits the Commonwealth to lend it money. Part V of the Act (ss33 to 44) deals with finance. It provides for a measure of control by the Minister over the plaintiff's finances, including a power in the Minister to direct the payment of a dividend to the Commonwealth (s35) and the requirement of the Treasurer's approval to borrow money otherwise than from the Commonwealth or to raise money otherwise than by borrowing (s37). By s 43, the plaintiff is declared to be "a public authority to which Division 2 of Part XI of the Audit Act (1901) applies", and s44 provides for auditing by the Auditor-General of financial statements of any subsidiary. S63 affords a general exemption of the plaintiff from taxation.
28 In Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (supra) the High Court considered whether the plaintiff is "the Commonwealth" for the purpose of s64 of the Judiciary Act. In the event, that was not a matter which needed to be decided and the observations of the members of the Court on this question are obiter. Brennan CJ (at 428) said no more than that it had been "sufficient to assume" that it is. McHugh J (at 460) asserted that it "plainly" is. Gummow J (at 463) accepted that it "answers the description of the Commonwealth, or a person suing on behalf of the Commonwealth, within the meaning of s75(iii)" of the Constitution, referring to State Bank of NSW v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (supra).
29 Kirby J observed at 501 (omitting footnotes):
…there are also a number of indications in the DHAA which support the general proposition that DHA is an agency or emanation of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, entitled to attract such immunities as the Commonwealth enjoys. Whilst the DHA is declared to be a body corporate (DHAA, s11(1)(a)), there are no corporators. DHA's function is to provide housing for defence personnel, which is a traditional function of government, directly associated with the operations of the Department of Defence and the nation's defence forces. One of the criteria for the performance of the functions of DHA is that it should accord with the policies of the Commonwealth. There are many provisions for the exertion of ministerial control over the activities of DHA. The provisions in relation to ministerial authority and approvals, borrowings, payment of dividends, auditing, the appointment and conditions of office-holders and exemption from taxation are all features of activities kept close to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth. More than in many other statutory corporations or private companies, DHA's severance from the Commonwealth was a limited and contingent one, as befits the particular subject matters to which its functions relate (DHAA, s5).