REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 This contempt proceeding, like that dealt with in Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc. v Farley (No 6) [2010] FCA 391, arises out of proceedings for alleged trade mark infringement, copyright infringement, passing-off and breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Act") which date back to 2003: see Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc. v Farley (No 5) (2009) 262 ALR 53. Over this period the Court made a series of orders which restrained various respondents from engaging in the manufacture, distribution and sale of counterfeit footwear which bore the "Ugg" logo.
2 In Deckers (No 6) I dealt with charges against a number of Respondents who were alleged to have contravened injunctions granted by the Court. While these charges were pending further allegations which were made against one of the Respondents, Mr Josef Vaysman. The Applicant alleged that Mr Vaysman had contravened orders which I made on 27 November 2007 and 21 January 2009.
3 The terms of the 27 November 2007 orders are set out in Deckers (No 6) at [24]. The orders relate to what are described as "the Enjoined Products". That expression is defined in the order in the same terms as appeared in an undertaking given on the same day by other parties. The definition is set out in Deckers (No 6) at [23]. In essence it refers to footwear which bears the "UGG" logo or elements of it. The parts of the 27 November 2007 orders which are of present relevance restrained Mr Vaysman personally, or acting through others, from manufacturing, distributing, disposing of or selling the Enjoined Products or procuring or inducing any other person to do so.
4 On 21 January 2009 I ordered that Mr Vaysman be restrained from approaching within 100 metres of premises at 34 Christensen Street, Moorabbin.
5 By notice of motion and statement of charge dated 10 March 2009 the Applicant alleged that Mr Vaysman had contravened these orders in a number of ways. Not all charges were ultimately pressed. The four which were pursued at trial read as follows:
· Charge 4 - In breach of the November 2007 order, between March 2008 and 23 January 2009, [Mr Vaysman] deliberately and voluntarily manufactured the Enjoined Products at Suite 11, 34 Christensen Street Moorabbin in the State of Victoria (the Christensen Street Factory).
· Charge 5 - Further, in breach of the November 2007 order, between March 2008 and 23 January 2009, [Mr Vaysman] deliberately and voluntarily distributed, disposed of, dealt in, sold and/or exported the Enjoined Products from the Christensen Street Factory.
· Charge 7 - Between March 2008 and 23 January 2009, in breach of the November 2007 order, [Mr Vaysman] has deliberately and voluntarily directed or procured the 23rd Respondent (Sanauria Pty Ltd) to manufacture, distribute, disposed of, deal in, offer for sale, sell and/or export the Enjoined Products at and/or the Christensen Street Factory.
· Charge 12 - In breach of the 21 January 2009 order, on 5 March 2009, [Mr Vaysman] deliberately and voluntarily approached within 100 metres, and indeed entered, the premises at Suite 11, 34 Christensen Street, Moorabbin in the State of Victoria.
6 Mr Vaysman maintained that he was not guilty of any of these charges.
7 The Applicant is required to establish each of the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In Deckers (No 6) I summarised the relevant principles at [128]-[131]. I do not repeat what I there said. I have had regard to those principles in dealing with the present charges against Mr Vaysman.
8 It was necessary, in respect of each of the charges, for the Applicant to prove that:
· The relevant order was made by the Court;
· The terms of the order were clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance;
· The relevant order was served on Mr Vaysman;
· Mr Vaysman had knowledge of the terms of the particular order; and
· Mr Vaysman had breached the terms of that order by acts which he performed deliberately and voluntarily.
See Advan Investments Pty Ltd v Dean Gleeson Motor Sales Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 201 at [31] and [32].
9 Mr Vaysman did not seek to dispute and I am satisfied that each of the orders which I made on 27 November 2007 and 21 January 2009 was made by the Court and that the terms of each of those orders was clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance.
10 Mr Vaysman admitted that a sealed copy of the November 2007 orders had been served on him on 30 November 2007. He also admitted that a sealed copy of the 21 January 2009 orders was personally served on him on 23 January 2009.
11 By mid December 2007 Mr Vaysman was represented by solicitors and counsel appeared on his behalf at a hearing on 14 December 2007. No suggestion was made at that hearing that Mr Vaysman had not been advised of the terms of the November 2007 orders or that he did not understand them. On 5 July 2008 senior counsel representing him in the earlier contempt proceeding advised the Court that Mr Vaysman and his wife had instructed him that they had "never intended to break the [November 2007] orders and certainly intend to abide by the orders of the Court in the future … They are completely prepared to make further undertakings to abide by Court orders." Such instructions could not have been given had Mr Vaysman not been aware of the terms and effect of the 2007 orders. I am, therefore, satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Vaysman had knowledge of the terms of those orders at relevant times.
12 Mr Vaysman admitted that the terms of the 21 January 2009 order had been orally translated to him in his native language (Russian) on 23 January 2009.
13 Mr Vaysman's defence to Charges 4, 5 and 12 was that the Applicant had not proven beyond reasonable doubt that he deliberately and voluntarily performed the acts which constituted a contravention of the terms of the orders. He defended Charge 7 on the basis that the Applicant had not established beyond reasonable doubt that he had performed the alleged contravening acts.