Cross-examination of Mr De Bortoli
44 In the hearing before the primary judge, Mr De Bortoli acknowledged that he was an experienced share trader who had purchased $20m to $30m of other stocks prior to DBW's acquisition of its shareholding in HIH.
45 Mr De Bortoli also acknowledged that he attempted to follow the market in relation to the stocks he was investing in. Initially, he refused to concede that he kept himself apprised of media commentary in the financial press. However, ultimately he conceded that he read the financial press "sometimes" in 2000, that the Australian Financial Review was delivered to DBW's head office daily and that he "looked at" that publication.
46 Mr F Gleeson SC, who appeared for HIH and the Liquidators at the hearing before the primary judge (and on the appeal to the Full Court) cross examined Mr De Bortoli about the yellow highlighting on the documents upon which Mr De Bortoli claimed to rely. The following exchange took place:
MR GLEESON: That happened in 2009?
MR DE BORTOLI: Correct.
MR GLEESON: It happened after both you and your solicitors had read the HIH Royal Commission Report?
MR DE BORTOLI: I never read the report.
MR GLEESON: Okay, thank you. You - so far as you understood, your solicitor had read the report?
MR DE BORTOLI: My legal representatives, yes.
MR GLEESON: And they were identifying on your behalf what you considered to be misleading statements by HIH in its financial statements?
MR DE BORTOLI: Correct.
MR GLEESON: Okay, and in marking up the documents, nine years later, you were trying to identify those documents which contained misleading statements by reference to the HIH report, weren't you?
MR DE BORTOLI: As I said in the transcripts…
MR GLEESON: Could you please answer the question, Mr De Bortoli?
MR DE BORTOLI: I would say all the documents were misleading.
MR GLEESON: Okay, so we know that's your opinion. What I'm putting to you is, your solicitors on your instructions, were marking up the documents in yellow in 2009 by reference to the HIH Royal Commission Report seeking to agitate your claim of misleading conduct, weren't they?
MR DE BORTOLI: They were stating the more obvious misleading claims, yes.
47 Mr De Bortoli went on to concede that he did not make any markings or notations on the Interim Results document when he read it and that he could not remember the occasion or the circumstances in which he read that document. Nevertheless, he insisted he read the whole of the document, although not necessarily when he received it in March 2000. He said he "would have" read the document: "possibly between March and when I first started purchasing shares, 15 June".
48 Mr Gleeson then asked Mr De Bortoli about the conversation with his broker that preceded the first purchase of shares. He acknowledged that his broker, Mr McCormack of Salomans, told him that there was a rumour that Mr Rodney Adler was purchasing shares in HIH at that time. He also appeared to concede that the information he received from Mr McCormack about Mr Adler, and that there was a potential for a takeover, was a "catalyst" for his first purchase of HIH shares. Mr De Bortoli said that he was also influenced by his view that the shares were undervalued.
49 Ultimately, Mr De Bortoli conceded that Mr Adler's purchase "certainly stimulated my interest" in HIH. He did not concede that the information about Mr Adler was a fact or merely a rumour and that it was not yet public but it is plain from the cross-examination that he knew Mr Adler was a director of HIH.
50 Mr De Bortoli was also asked about the "recommendation downgrade" he received from Salomons dated 6 July 2000. He acknowledged he received the document and that he read the warning in the document that, although the stock appeared extremely cheap, the broker believed it was a greater than average investment risk.
51 Notwithstanding this, Mr De Bortoli went on to insist that during July 2000, the Interim Results of HIH dated March 2000 "gave me some comfort". After several further questions, the following exchange took place:
MR GLEESON: So there was nothing positive in this report, was there?
MR DE BORTOLI: Well, I wouldn't say it's negative either.
MR GLEESON: Okay, so you don't read "high risk" as negative or "recommendation downgrade" as negative?
MR DE BORTOLI: Downgrade but it's not a sell. They've still got it as neutral.
52 Mr De Bortoli acknowledged that when he first gave instructions in August 2000 on behalf of DBW, the financial information contained in the Interim Results, dated as at 31 December 1999, were 8 months old. He agreed that "[s]tale would be a good descriptor" of those results but he refused to concede that stale information was of no value in his investment decision. Rather, Mr De Bortoli said it gave "some context" to the decision.
53 Mr De Bortoli was again asked about media commentary on HIH, in particular about commentary in August 2000. He said he was not aware of headlines that described HIH as struggling, as troubled and as a distressed seller of assets. He would not concede that he read commentary to that effect. The following exchange is instructive:
MR GLEESON: Okay, and so if there were articles The Financial Review concerning HIH, it's likely that you saw them around the time that you were investing in shares in the company?
MR DE BORTOLI: If I actually read the paper, yes.
54 Mr De Bortoli was also asked about his continued purchases of shares in September 2000 notwithstanding the drop in the share price. He said he was aware the price was dropping. His evidence, as revealed in the following exchange with counsel, was that he knew better than the market:
MR GLEESON: But the market was telling you something different, wasn't it? People who were holding shares in HIH were selling them out at prices less than 50 cents throughout September and October?
MR DE BORTOLI: I reiterate, I felt they were exceptionally good value at that time.
MR GLEESON: So you felt you knew better than the market; is that the case?
MR DE BORTOLI: Correct.
MR GLEESON: And you backed your own judgment and your own assessment, didn't you?
MR DE BORTOLI: Correct.
MR GLEESON: And you were prepared to ignore the negative press commentary about HIH and its fortunes, weren't you?
MR DE BORTOLI: The information I was relying on was correspondence with John Clarke, information coming from HIH, and all that information appeared to validate my faith in the company. I never assumed that the accounts were dodgy in the first place, or the directors were dodgy.
55 From 13 September 2000, there was a dramatic fall in the HIH share price, and about the same time there was a rumour that Mr Adler was selling out his holding. Mr De Bortoli agreed that these two events prompted him to contact Mr Clarke.
56 Mr De Bortoli was also cross-examined about an article in the Financial Review dated 15 September 2000 which was headed "The price has slumped another 30 per cent yesterday." Mr De Bortoli said he did not recall seeing it. The following exchange then occurred:
MR GLEESON: Are you seriously suggesting that in circumstances where you had invested a significant sum of money on behalf of the company in HIH shares, the share price drops almost 50 per cent in two days, but you weren't concerned to keep yourself abreast of whatever financial commentary there was about the company in the Financial Press?
MR DE BORTOLI: I would have been following the press releases coming from HIH and ASX statements. I was not necessarily following what was stated in the press.
57 Shortly afterward, Mr Gleeson returned to the subject of the falling share price. He suggested to Mr De Bortoli that the market was saying it did not consider the shares to be worth anything more than the prices they were traded at. After a non-responsive answer from Mr De Bortoli, the cross-examination continued as follows:
MR GLEESON: Please, answer the question, Mr De Bortoli?
MR DE BORTOLI: I have invested in numerous companies where the share price had dropped significantly.
MR GLEESON: Please, answer the question?
MR DE BORTOLI: And I - by taking a longer term view, I've always been correct.
MR GLEESON: So - thank you. Your view in 2000 was that you knew better than the market?
MR DE BORTOLI: Correct.
MR GLEESON: --- and that you are always correct?
MR DE BORTOLI: In hindsight, obviously not.
MR GLEESON: In 2000, your view was, you knew better than the market and you were always proved correct. That's what you have told us?
MR DE BORTOLI: Yes.
MR GLEESON: Okay. And whatever the market was telling you, in terms of the plummeting share price, that would have no effect on you whatsoever. Did it?
MR DE BORTOLI: I just thought the shares offered even better value.
MR GLEESON: Okay, because of this view you had, that you were always correct, and in the long term, you would do better than the market?
MR DE BORTOLI: Well, I was backing my own judgment I had accepted - I had assumed that the directors and the auditors would behave ethically and professionally. And based on that assumption, I - my position was valid.
MR GLEESON: You didn't…?
MR DE BORTOLI: If the accounts were correct and everything was valid, then my assumption was valid.
58 Mr De Bortoli was also asked about other adverse reactions in the market to the fall in HIH's share price, in particular the fact that Merrill Lynch had removed the stock from margin lending prior to 10 November 2000. Mr De Bortoli conceded that Merrill Lynch had informed him of the fact and that he chose to ignore the implicit warning from Merrill Lynch that it was concerned about the equity value of HIH. He said he believed Merrill Lynch was wrong and that he thought that he knew better than that institution.