Davison v R

Circumstances of offending

1. A statement of agreed facts was tendered which the sentencing judge summarised in his remarks on sentence that were delivered on 8 September 2017 ("the first sentencing judgment").
2. At about 1.30am on 15 August 2015, the applicant, together with Mr McGovern and an unknown co-offender, stole a BMW X5 that was parked in the driveway of a Kensington home. A set of keys belonging to the owner was used to start the vehicle and drive it away. Another vehicle that was positioned behind the BMW on the driveway sustained damage to its front left bumper bar as a result of the BMW being driven out. The larceny offence on the Form 1 relates to stealing the car keys to the BMW, the keys being valued at $50.
3. At about 3.10am, the three co-offenders arrived in the BMW at Wolli Creek. The vehicle was reversed onto the footpath outside a vacant shop which contained an automatic teller machine on the front wall. The vehicle was then reversed into the front glass windows of the shop on three occasions. On the third occasion the window had sufficiently shattered to allow entry. The applicant and one of the other co-offenders got out of the vehicle and entered the shop. They unsuccessfully tried to gain access to the ATM. All three co-offenders then fled the scene on foot. CCTV footage captured two of the co-offenders discarding some items into a nearby public bin. Police later found a discarded crowbar and hammer in this bin.
4. When police arrived at the crime scene, the BMW was still in position with the rear portion inside the shop. Damage was sustained to the rear of the ATM and a screwdriver remained wedged in the back of the machine. There was a bloodstain on the back of the ATM containing DNA matching that of the applicant, who was arrested on 8 September 2015.

The sentencing proceedings

1. It is unnecessary to detail all of the sentencing proceedings before the sentencing judge other than to state that there were various adjournments to enable the applicant's suitability to be assessed for entry into the "Balund-a-Program", a residential rehabilitation program for Aboriginal male offenders over the age of 18 years at Tabulam.
2. During the sentencing proceedings on 15 June 2017, the Crown bundle was tendered and a psychological report prepared by Megan Godbee was tendered in the applicant's case. The applicant gave evidence before the sentencing judge. The sentencing proceedings were adjourned and resumed on 8 September 2017 when a Balund-a Assessment Report was tendered, which disclosed that the applicant was assessed as suitable for entry into the program.
3. On that day, the sentencing judge delivered the first sentencing judgment but then adjourned the proceedings to 29 March 2018, pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
4. The terms of the applicant's bail included residing and accepting all conditions of the Balund-a-Program as directed by the manager of the centre including participation in all programs; abstaining from the use of alcohol and illicit drugs; should he leave or be discharged from the centre, he was to go immediately to the officer in charge of police at Tenterfield/Casino and he was to appear at the District Court on 29 March 2018.
5. On 29 March 2018, the applicant's solicitor informed the court that the applicant had discharged himself from the Balund-a-Program after three months, having completed half of the six-month program. He did not report to Casino or Tenterfield Police Station on leaving the program as required by his bail conditions and returned to live between Wollongong and Maroubra with his grandmother and his partner.
6. The applicant was arrested on 3 January 2018 for further offences (of larceny) and for breaches of bail and was remanded in custody. He was granted bail by the District Court on 5 January 2018 in respect of the present offences but remained in custody, bail refused, for the fresh offences.
7. After adjournments to obtain an updated breach of bail report and the sentencing remarks of Judge Williams, the applicant's sentencing proceedings continued on 22 June 2018. On that day, the bail breach report and Judge Williams' draft sentencing remarks were tendered by the Crown as was a curriculum for the Balund-a-Program by the applicant. Submissions were made by the parties on the issue of parity with Mr McGovern's sentence, after which the sentencing judge sentenced the applicant ("the second sentencing judgment").

The first sentencing judgment

1. The applicant does not take issue with any of the judge's findings on the objective seriousness of the offences or the applicant's subjective case which his Honour made in the first sentencing judgment. The applicant's complaint is confined to the question of parity with Mr McGovern's sentence which was dealt with by his Honour in the second sentencing judgment.
2. In the first sentencing judgment, the sentencing judge found that the theft of the vehicle from the residential property of the owner with the intention of driving it and using it to commit another crime and in the process damaging it was serious example of an offence contrary to s 154F of the Crimes Act.
3. As to the aggravated break and enter, his Honour assessed the offence as falling a little above the mid-point between the middle of the range and the lower end of the range of objective seriousness. His Honour remarked that "the offence was a serious one".
4. His Honour noted that "both stealing the vehicle and the ram raid offence are to be clearly denounced and sentences for these types of offences need to reflect the importance of general deterrence and the protection of property".
5. The sentencing judge noted that the applicant was 22 years old at the time of the offences and was 24 years old on sentence. His Honour referred to the applicant's criminal history which dated back to when he was 16 years old. Without listing all of the applicant's offences, his Honour recounted that the applicant had convictions for break, enter and steal, and aggravated (knowing persons are there) break, enter and steal, larceny, enter vehicle without consent of owner and damaging property.
6. His Honour said that the applicant's record of repeat similar offending meant that greater weight needed to be given to retribution, personal deterrence and the protection of the community than if such a record did not exist. His Honour referred to the commission of the offences on 19 October 2016 of larceny, damaging property and enter vehicle without consent by the applicant whilst he was on bail for the present offences and for which he was sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment for 3 months in the Local Court. These convictions, his Honour said, may be relevant to the applicant's true remorse and prospects of rehabilitation.
7. The sentencing judge referred in detail to the report from Ms Godbee, forensic psychologist that had been tendered in the applicant's case. Shortly stated, the applicant is of Australian Aboriginal descent whose parents were heroin users and served several prison terms during his early life. His mother was often intoxicated and sometimes disappeared for a few days, resulting in the applicant and his three siblings often living with their grandmother. From the age of 9, the applicant chose to live permanently with his grandmother who provided him with a stable home. He lived with her until the time of his arrest.
8. The sentencing judge recounted that the applicant went to school to around year 8. He had changed school regularly and had experienced racial remarks. He was expelled from one school after fighting and was referred to a psychologist. The applicant acknowledged that he had anger problems. He engaged in several sessions of treatment and was prescribed medication. As a result of his educational difficulties, the applicant has difficulties reading. He has never been employed and had been supported by Youth Allowance and more recently a carer's pension looking after his grandmother.
9. His Honour noted that the applicant planned on release from custody to live with his girlfriend with whom they had their first child in March 2017.
10. His Honour detailed the difficulties that the applicant had with alcohol which the applicant considered had been his main problem for the last two years. He first consumed alcohol at age 11 years and had described himself as a binge drinker.
11. As to the applicant's drug use, his Honour referred to the applicant's first use of cannabis when he was 9 years old and the heavy use of cannabis when he was 16 to 18 years old, but after that period, he reduced his use of cannabis and returned to alcohol. The applicant commenced using heroin after completing the Getting Smart drug and alcohol program.
12. The sentencing judge said that the applicant needed more intensive rehabilitation and referred to the applicant's oral evidence during which the applicant expressed a desire to engage in rehabilitation. The applicant's evidence included his use of heroin a year before the present offences when he became depressed after his grandfather's death and his relapse into heroin and drug use two weeks before he committed the offences on 19 October 2016.
13. His Honour recounted the applicant's evidence that on the day of the offences, he had been using heroin earlier in the day as had his co-offenders. They all wanted money to purchase further drugs. The applicant said the ram raid offences occurred when they were driving around looking for an opportunity when they saw the ATM in the shop. The applicant told his Honour that the crowbar and hammer found by the police in the bin had already been in the BMW. His Honour recounted that the applicant claimed the BMW had not been stolen to commit the ram raid, but simply to drive from A to B and that he was not the driver of the vehicle.
14. His Honour considered that in the circumstances of this case, the applicant's criminality was not any less than the co-offender who drove.
15. In explaining why he did not find that the offence was planned to be an aggravating factor, the sentencing judge said that although the applicant and his co-offenders made use of the car and the implements that were in the car "during the course of their joyride, the thought of committing a ram raid quickly came to them".
16. The sentencing judge said that the applicant's neglect and abuse in childhood, lack of emotional and behavioural regulations, disrupted attachment to his grandmother and his parents modelling substance abuse and violence meant that he considered the applicant's moral culpability for the offences was reduced. It was appropriate, his Honour said, to give the applicant some benefit for his understanding of how serious his conduct had been and for a measure of remorse.
17. His Honour found that the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation and unlikelihood of his reoffending to be guarded "but with some optimistic signs". His Honour explained that the optimistic signs were his relative youth, the support of his partner and grandmother, his positive response to psychological treatment when expelled from school, his current motivation to rehabilitate himself and the availability of a place at the Balund-a-Program. His Honour said that optimism needed to be tempered against his criminal history, his commission of offences after the present offence and the number of unaddressed emotional issues.
18. A discount of 25% for the utilitarian value of the pleas of guilty was allowed.
19. The sentencing judge adjourned the sentencing proceedings under s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act to see how the applicant progressed under the Balund-a-Program. His Honour considered that the adjournment would enable him to properly assess the length of any sentence and the way in which that sentence would be served.

Williams SC DCJ's remarks on sentence in relation to Rory McGovern

1. As the focus of the appeal is the complaint of marked disparity with Mr McGovern's sentence, it is necessary to refer to Judge Williams' sentencing remarks which were delivered on 6 April 2018 before the second sentencing judgment.
2. Mr McGovern pleaded not guilty to two counts. They were identical to the counts to which the applicant pleaded guilty (but did not include the offence on the Form 1). After a four day trial, Mr McGovern was found guilty of each count by the jury.
3. Mr McGovern was 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offences and 20 years old when sentenced. He was born on 2 May 1997.
4. Judge Williams detailed Mr McGovern's prior criminal history which extended "to some 15 pages". His record included offences of aggravated break and enter, drug offences, larceny, taking conveyances, and supply of a firearm. Judge Williams noted that Mr McGovern had served sentences of imprisonment in 2015 for supply of a firearm and for an offence of reckless wounding in company. For that offence, which was committed on 15 July 2015, Mr McGovern had been sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years 6 months commencing on 1 July 2016 and expiring on 31 December 2019 with a non-parole of 1 year 9 months, commencing on 1 July 2016. His Honour remarked that this offence was committed "about a month before the present offence" and "the non-parole period expired last week, although parole has not yet been determined".
5. When referring to a pre-sentence report, Judge Williams said that Mr McGovern's custodial performance had improved significantly since December 2016. He had participated in the EQUIPS aggression program and received positive feedback regarding his participation.
6. As to Mr McGovern's subjective circumstances, the judge recounted that he was a single man who had an unremarkable upbringing. He was diagnosed with oppositional defiance disorder at the age of 14. He had the support of his family. The judge noted that Mr McGovern had started at a conventional school but was transferred to a behavioural school, had completed Year 10 while in juvenile detention and had limited employment since that time.
7. The judge related Mr McGovern's extensive history of drug abuse commencing with cannabis and moving onto heavier drugs including heroin, methamphetamine and cocaine. He had treatment with the methadone program but ceased methadone use in January 2018. The judge observed that the only explanation that Mr McGovern could proffer for his offending behaviour was that it was driven by the need to finance his lifestyle, including his illicit substance use.
8. The judge found that Mr McGovern's ready acceptance of the police facts "in the interview with the correctives officers last week" and an understanding of the impact of his behaviour "on the victim and their family as well as the impact on his own family" demonstrated some insight into his offending behaviour. The judge observed that Mr McGovern was still assessed as having a medium to high risk of reoffending.
9. After reciting the Crown's submissions as to the seriousness of the offences, the judge found that the offences were "around mid-range of objective seriousness". The judge referred to the Crown's submissions as to joint criminal enterprise and culpability and said: "…there is no suggestion there could be any analysis of differentiation between the roles of the offenders and therefore no comparative analysis of their moral culpability, and in that vein there can be no question of parity arising because [the applicant] has not yet been sentenced. The only differentiating act that can be established is that [the applicant] certainly entered the shop and attempted to gain access to the ATM, but that is not of any great significance in the present circumstances."
10. The judge found Mr McGovern's record of prior convictions to be an aggravating factor. The judge rejected the Crown's submission that planning was a factor of aggravation.
11. In relating the Crown's submission that whilst Mr McGovern's relative youth was an important consideration, but should not outweigh the objective seriousness of the offending, the judge accepted that "in the context of a man with a record such as I have described [the Crown's submissions] have considerable validity".
12. The judge took into account that the trial was conducted in a very efficient manner and that much evidence was led by consent so as to limit the issue that went to the jury. The judge took into account Mr McGovern's willingness to facilitate the course of justice.
13. The judge found that Mr McGovern's prospects of rehabilitation were reasonable and the demonstrated need for continued support lead to an uncontested finding that there were special circumstances given Mr McGovern's relative youth, the offences occurring shortly after his 18th birthday, his significant substance abuse problem, the requirement for an extensive period of supervision and that "caution must be taken to prevent the effect of institutionalisation coming into play".
14. After considering the principle of totality, an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 3 years commencing on 6 May 2017 and expiring on 5 May 2020 with a non-parole period of 18 months was imposed. The indicative sentences were: 1. Count 1: 9 months; and 2. Count 2: 2 years 9 months.

The second sentencing judgment

1. In this judgment which was delivered on 22 June 2018, the sentencing judge gave consideration to the issue of parity with Mr McGovern's sentence. His Honour noted the applicant's submission that he should receive a lesser sentence as he was entitled to a 25% discount for his guilty pleas; the finding of lesser moral culpability and Mr McGovern's more serious prior criminal history particularly having regard to the 2015 convictions for reckless wounding and the supply of firearms.
2. In noting the sentences imposed by Judge Williams, his Honour observed that the offences were committed shortly after Mr McGovern turned 18 years old and whilst Mr McGovern was not contrite, Judge Williams found that he had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.
3. The sentencing judge said: "Whilst there is little difference in moral culpability between a 30 year old and a 34 year old, I consider there is considerable difference in moral culpability between a person having just turned 18 years old and a person who is 22 years old. The following further matters need to be borne in mind. Whilst Mr McGovern ran his trial, Judge Williams took into account the efficient way in which the trial was conducted according to the principles referred to in the case of Doff that his Honour mentioned. Whilst Mr McGovern has the particular offences highlighted by Ms Chant the fact remains they both have extensive and serious criminal histories. In respect of the aggravated break, enter offence committed by [the applicant], there is the Form 1 offence of larceny to be taken into account. Whilst Judge Williams considered Mr McGovern's prospects of rehabilitation were reasonable, I consider [the applicant's] prospects in this regard to be guarded. Whilst I propose imposing a sentence or rather sentences upon [the applicant] paying due proportion between he and Mr McGovern and quite frankly less than I would otherwise have imposed had it not been for the sentence imposed upon Mr McGovern, this should not result in sentences which do not reflect the seriousness of the crimes." (Emphasis added.)
4. His Honour found special circumstances being the applicant's drug and emotional issues and the need for supervision upon release. The sentence was backdated to commence on 2 February 2018 taking into account the time the applicant had spent in custody and the 91 days spent in the Balund-a-Program, which his Honour regarded as "quasi custody".
5. An overall effective sentence of imprisonment was imposed of 3 years 3 months with a non-parole period of 2 years (see [6]-[7] above).

Ground of Appeal: The applicant has a justifiable sense of grievance when his sentence is compared to that imposed on his co-offender [Rory McGovern]

Submissions

1. The applicant accepted that the sentencing judge considered the issue of parity in the second sentencing judgment but it was clear from his Honour's remarks that he regarded the sentence imposed upon Mr McGovern as particularly lenient.
2. The applicant submitted that whilst the co-offender's sentence was lenient, it was not so inadequate as to amount to an affront to the proper administration of justice. Furthermore, whilst not necessarily decisive on the point, it is noteworthy that the Crown did not appeal on any asserted inadequacy of Mr McGovern's sentence.
3. Particular emphasis was placed on the difficulty that arises where the applicant pleads guilty and receives a 25% discount but receives a head sentence equal to, and an overall sentence greater than his co-offender who went to trial. The applicant submitted that such an outcome undermines the intended purpose of the guideline judgment in R v Thomson; R v Houlton. [1]
4. The applicant contended that his guilty plea entitled him to a greater degree of leniency which should have been reflected in a lesser sentence than that of his co-offender. As that did not occur he was left with a justifiable sense of grievance.
5. The Crown contended that the sentencing judge gave express consideration to the principle of parity and made findings that justified the difference in sentence. The Crown argued that the applicant did not have a justifiable sense of grievance.

Consideration

1. A marked disparity between the sentences imposed on co-offenders which gives rise to a justifiable sense of grievance is required before appellate intervention. [2] The applicant must show that a reasonable person, looking at the circumstances of the case, would regard the applicant's grievance as justified. [3] The plurality (French CJ, Crennan, and Kiefel JJ) in Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [4] ("Green") said at [31]: "…The sense of grievance necessary to attract appellate intervention with respect to disparate sentences is to be assessed by objective criteria. The application of the parity principle does not involve a judgment about the feelings of the person complaining of disparity. The court will refuse to intervene where disparity is justified by differences between co-offenders such as age, background, criminal history, general character and the part each has played in the relevant criminal conduct or enterprise." (Footnotes omitted.)
2. It is evident from the sentencing judge's remarks in the second sentencing judgment that he gave careful consideration to the sentence imposed upon Mr McGovern and matters of difference in the respective cases of the two co-offenders. His Honour was well aware of the parity principle and identified the respective ages of the co-offenders, the Form 1 offence, the more optimistic view of Mr McGovern's prospects of rehabilitation and the account taken by Judge Williams of the efficient way Mr McGovern's trial was conducted as matters that went some way to explain the difference in sentence.
3. These differences could not justify an additional 3 months in the applicant's head sentence and 6 months in the non-parole period when compared to the co-offender's sentence. The sentencing judge had assessed the applicant's moral culpability to be reduced because of his deprived background, whereas no such finding was made in Mr McGovern's circumstances, who Judge Williams described as having an unremarkable upbringing. Furthermore, the applicant pleaded guilty at an early opportunity, whereas Mr McGovern had been found guilty by the jury.
4. The sentencing judge had discounted the applicant's sentence by 25% for the utilitarian value of the guilty pleas, whereas Judge Williams had reduced Mr McGovern's sentence under s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act for the efficient way that his trial had been conducted. Whilst the degree to which the administration of justice has been facilitated by an accused during the trial may lessen a sentence that would otherwise be imposed, it is difficult to envisage a trial where the degree of facilitation to the administration of justice could equate to the significant utilitarian benefit of a plea entered in the Local Court.
5. The Form 1 offence was not of much significance in the sentencing exercise as it concerned the theft of the BMW keys valued at $50. Neither judge differentiated between the relative culpability of the co-offenders by the part that each played in the criminal enterprise. Judge Williams, however, found that Mr McGovern's criminal history was an aggravating factor, whereas the sentencing judge did not make such a finding. Although each of the co-offender's had extensive prior criminal histories, the difference might be explained by the commission in 2015 of the serious offence of wounding in company by Mr McGovern.
6. The sentencing judge was plainly concerned about the leniency of Mr McGovern's sentence. During the proceedings on sentence, he described Judge Williams as being "particularly generous" and in the second sentencing judgment said that the applicant's sentence was (see [57] above): "…less than I would otherwise have imposed had it not been for the sentence imposed upon Mr McGovern, this should not result in sentences which do not reflect the seriousness of the crimes".
7. His Honour's concern about the leniency of Mr McGovern's sentence is understandable. Although Judge Williams found that the offences were around the mid-range of objective seriousness and Mr McGovern's prior criminal history was an aggravating factor, Mr McGovern was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 3 years imprisonment with the non-parole period of 18 months.
8. The stolen BMW was driven into the glass windows of the shop on three occasions with the aim of the co-offenders obtaining access to the ATM. The BMW, another vehicle, the shop and the ATM were damaged as a result of the offences. This Court has emphasised that both specific and general deterrence are normally important considerations in sentencing for a "ram-raid" offence: R v Reilly; R v Smith [5] ("Reilly and Smith"). The maximum penalty for an offence contrary to s 113(2) is 14 years imprisonment.
9. Whilst Judge Williams mentioned that the Crown had drawn his attention to Reilly and Smith, the judge's sentence, in my respectful opinion, placed insufficient emphasis on specific and general deterrence and too much weight on Mr McGovern's relative youth.
10. The leniency of Mr McGovern's sentence placed the sentencing judge in a difficult position. His Honour was endeavouring to impose an appropriate sentence and was mindful that the parity principle should not be exercised to reduce an otherwise appropriate sentence to a level which would be an affront to the proper administration of justice. [6] During the proceedings on sentence, after discussing Judge Williams' sentence, his Honour said: "One might ask though, do two wrongs make a right? Then again, the Crown didn't appeal."
11. However, the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge resulted in the applicant who pleaded guilty receiving a longer sentence than his co-offender who went to trial. The disparity in sentence is not explained by the differences in their subjective cases. An objective observer might ask why did the applicant plead guilty when that was the result.
12. I have concluded that the applicant has a justifiable sense of grievance.
13. The question remains whether a reduction in the applicant's sentence would produce a result that is erroneously lenient. This Court is not obliged to intervene where "the sentence imposed upon the co-offender is manifestly inadequate and intervention would produce a sentence disproportionate to the objective and subjective criminality involved". [7]
14. The Crown did not appeal as to the manifest inadequacy of Mr McGovern's sentence but that does not decisively answer the question. In my view, the question must be answered in the affirmative as to Mr McGovern's non-parole period of 18 months which is 50% of the aggregate head sentence. The non-parole period does not itself appropriately reflect the criminality involved in Mr McGovern's offending. [8] However, I do not conclude that the aggregate head sentence of 3 years is manifestly inadequate, although I agree with the sentencing judge that the sentence was "particularly generous".
15. Accordingly, there is some capacity to reduce the applicant's sentence. Nevertheless, given the objective gravity of the applicant's offending and the statutory guideposts of the applicable maximum sentences, the scope for reduction in the applicant's sentence is particularly limited. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh and re-sentence the applicant. [9]
16. As the sentencing judge's findings on the objective seriousness of the offences, the applicant's subjective case, and special circumstances have not been challenged, I will adopt them in the exercise of my sentencing discretion. The individual sentences imposed by the sentencing judge were in my view appropriate but as I propose to reduce the applicant's overall effective head sentence to 3 years with a non-parole period of 21 months, there will be a greater degree of concurrency of the sentences.
17. I recognise that such a marginal adjustment to the sentences might be criticised as "tinkering". However, it is necessary to mitigate the applicant's justifiable sense of grievance in receiving a longer sentence than his co-offender, when he pleaded guilty but his co-offender was found guilty by the jury.

Orders

1. Accordingly, I propose the following orders: 1. Leave to appeal granted. 2. Appeal allowed. 3. Quash the sentences imposed in the District Court of New South Wales on 22 June 2018. 4. For the offence of stealing a motor vehicle contrary to s 154F of the Crimes Act 1900 and taking into account the offence on the Form 1, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 9 months commencing on 2 February 2018 and expiring on 1 November 2018. 5. For the offence of aggravated break and enter with intent to commit a serious indictable offence contrary to s 113(2) of the Crimes Act, the applicant is sentenced to 2 years 9 months imprisonment consisting of a non-parole period of 18 months commencing on 2 May 2018 and expiring on 1 November 2019 with a balance of term of 15 months commencing on 2 November 2019 and expiring on 1 February 2021. 6. The earliest date the applicant will be eligible to be released on parole is 1 November 2019.

Endnotes

1. (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309.
2. Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [1997] HCA 26.
3. R v llbay [2000] NSWCCA 251; R v Kollas and Mitchell [2002] NSWCCA 491.
4. (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49.
5. [2012] NSWCCA 166 at [37].
6. Saraya v R [2015] NSWCCA 63 at [15].
7. Youkhana v R [2011] NSWCCA 37 at [49].
8. R v Hall [2017] NSWCCA 313 at [90].
9. Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 at [35]. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 05 August 2019