Davenport, Trevor v Trade Practices Commission & Anor [1983] FCA 78

Federal Court of Australia|1963-04-12|Before: Northrop J

Trade practices ~- notice prrsuant to section 155 of the Act validity of notice - meaning of 'any such information' - - meanang of 'inay constitute a contravention of whe Act" - sufficiency of descriptions of contraventsons.

TREVOR DAVENPORT ve TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION and RCNAL! MOOR BANNDRUAN

) ) TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) T. No. G5 of 198? ) )

and RONALD H0ORKE BANNERMAN Respondents ORDER CORAN: Norchrop oa. DATE: 12 Apr21l 1983 PLACE: Hobart

BETWEEN: TREVOR DAVENPORT Applicant and TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION and RONALD MOORE BANNERMAN Respondents NORTHROP J. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 12 APRIL 1963

Traée Practices Act 1974, "the Act", was served on Trevor

Davenport, "the applicant". The notice was signed by Lhe Chairman, Trade Practices Commission, and was accompanied hy

a letcer dated 22 October 1982 which read as follows:

As a result of complaints received and Commission observations the Commission is anvestigating whecher recent price increases in the retail price of petrol an the Launceston area have come about as the resulk of conduct in breach of the Trade Practices Act, an particular price collusion by resellers and/or resale price maintenance by an 021 company.

26 The Commission is continuing its invescagattion by way of Further enquiries of certain Launceston petrol resellers and oul company agents anid representatives. The

anformation sought from you is set out in the attached Novice issued under the Trade Practices Act. Any additional anfocmation you may wash to give would be appreciated; likewise anything eise you may wish to say which you think would assist the Commission in deciding what action, if any, 21t should take.

Should you have any queriés about any of the matters raised in the Notice or the Commassion's investigations please do not hesitate to ring me on Canberra 64 2876 or Mr. Barry Newport in the Commission's Hobart Office on 345 345."

The notice was dated 22 October 1982, was directed to

"I, RONALD MOORE BANGERUAN, Chairman of the Trade Practices Commission, having reason to believe that T. Davenport 1s capable of furnishing information relating to matters that may constitute contraventions of sect2ron 45 and seciion 48 of che Trade Practices Act 1974 hereby require you to furnish to the Commission an vriting the anformation specified in the Schedule to this Notice by delivecing the information to Mr. Stephon Wicks or Mr. Adrian iiedwin at the Family Court of Australia, 2nd Floor, TAA Building, Corner Brisbane and Georqe Streets, Launceston on Friday, 5 November 1982 between the hours of 9.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m.

THE MATTERS THAT MAY CONSTITUTE CONTRAVENTTIONS OF SECTION 45 AND SECTION 48

(1) Any arrangement or understanding amonq petrol retailers and o11 companies in the Launceston area to raase the retail price

of super grade petrol during the period 27 September 1992 10 5 October 1982,

(2) Action hy representatives of Shell Australia Pty. Ltd. wo Ancrease the retail price of per.rol at Shell brand sites."

l. Are you aware of any discussions about the retail price of petrol between Launceston petrot retailers during the period 27 September 1982 to 5 October 1982? Did you take part in any dascussions? If so, when and where did they take place, who was involved and what was said? If you were told of the Aiscussions but did not yourse}f take part, who told you and when, what were you told and what did you say in reply?

Did you contact any petrol retailer or oil company representative or agent during the period 27 September 19682 to % October 1982 about the retail price of petrol ain the Launceston area? If so, whom did you contact, when, what did you say and what was said ain

representative or ascent contact you during the period 27 September 1982 to 5 October 1982 about the retail price of petrol in the Launceston area? If so, Who did, when, what were you told and what did you say an reply?"

The applicant brings these proceedings under s.143A of the Act seeking a declaration that he as not obliged to

"155.(1) Where ... the Chairman ... has reason to believe that a person is capable of furnashing anformation ... relating to a

matter that constitutes, or may constatute, a contravention of th1s Act, «-. a member of the

{a) to furnish to the Commission, by writing Signed by that person ... within the time and

aun the manner specified ain the notice, any such information;

A similar power is conferred wath respect to documents. Under sub-section (5) a person who refuses or fails to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) to the extent that the person 2s capable of complying with it, as liabje to a

penalty of $1,000 or imprisonment for three months.

A number of auvhorities have illustrated the nature and extent of the power conferced by s.155 of the Act. It 1s an anvestigative power, drastic, ajmost inquisitorial, ain nature. It 1s to be given a wade construction and should not be confined narrowly. Tit abrogates the privilege agasnsv self-incrimination whether for a criminal offence or for a penalty. The Chairman must have reason to believe that the recipsent of the notice is capable of furnishing information relating to relevant specified matter, but he does not have need to have reason to believe that the specified matter constitutes or may constitute a4 contravention of the Act.

The word "matter" 2s not to be gaven a technical meaning hui

refexs to any affaar oc thing. The recipsone of the notice

must be able to ascertain from the notice that the Chaarman 1s exercising the power under s.155 of the Act and to ascertain what ais the matter which constitutes or may conslatute a contravention of the Act. The notice must be reasonably construed having regard to the commercial nature

All of these propositions were accepted by counsel for the applicant. Although his submissions were made before

the High Court published its judgment in Pyneboard Pty. Ltd.

v. Trade Practices Commission on 1218 March 1983, the propositions stated are consistent with the opinions contained in that judgment. Counsel based his case on threo

First, he submitted that on the true ceonstrucviisn of s.155, the Chairman mist have reason to believe that the applicant 1s capable of furnishing the particular information specified an the notice. He submitted that at is not sufficient that the Chaarman have reason to belreve that the applicant is capable of furnishing information at lLarae relating to a macter which constitutes or may constitute a

He argued that the words "any such i1nformation" in

paragraph (a) are qualified not only on a wide construction,

by the words "relatina to a matter ..." but also, on a narrow.

construction, by the words "the Chairman has reason to

believe that a person is capable of furnishing" As counsel

"Whereas the paragraph refers to requiring the person to furnish to the Commission any such information, it 1s submitted that the words 'any such anformation' could grammatically bear either of two meanings: any such information could mean any information reiatang to the macter that constitutes, or in Lhe case of this notice may constitute, a contravention. Alternatively, 'any such anformation' cou.id mean any information which ihe Chairman has reason to believe that vhe person is capable of furnishing, heang anformation relating to a matter that may constitute a contravention. In my submission poth of those readings are open as a matter oF grammar."

The notice in the present case did not slate that the Chairman had reason to believe that the applicant wis

capable of furnishing the particular information sought ty

Counsel advanced three reasons why the narre.v construction should be preferred. T£ his submiss.on succeeds the notice need not be answered by the applicenr.

As the first reason, counsel argued that the aarro:! construction as fair to the recipient of Lhe notice. Tn support of this contention counsel postulated a case ,where, he sugrtested, a wide construction vonld be less Fair to wre

recamient of che notice: hecaus. we Chrreman has reis0n ta

believe that a person could answer one question relating to a matter which constitutes oc may constitute a contravention of the Act, he may ask any number of other questions whach related to that maiter whether or not he has any reason vo believe the recipient is capable of answering them. Tndeed, he contended that the Chairman need not even ask that cone question which he reasonably believed that the recipient of the notice could answec; yeu that one question would entitle ham to ask amy number of other questions. He contended, further, that as exculpatory unformation could be sought it would alvays be the case that the Chairman would have a reasonable belief that any person had information relating to a matter which constitutes or may constitute a contravention of the Act; in any case, the person cto whom the notice is addressed would either respond in the affirmative or the

heavier burden would be placed upon the Chairman were the

As the wthird reason, counsel argued that the abolition of the privilege against self-incramination iesads

to the anference that the narrow construction ius to bo

"Where that privileqe has been aholished it is submitted that that 1s a powerful consideration against adopting a construction which means that the Chairman can ask anyone anything at all provaded only that it relates to a ematter which constitutes or may constitute a conLravention."

This proposition has not to my knowledge heen acgued previously before the Court. However, there are passages in the judgment of Smithers J. in Melbourne Home of

Tord Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Pcactaces Commission (No. 2) (1979)

40 F.L.R. 428 which tend to the contrary, but I understand this argument had not been presented to las Honour an thet

The submisszon must be considered having regard un Lhe nature of the power conferred by s.1t55. Por presenv

purposes reference may be made to Melbourne Home of Ford Pir.

Lid. v. Trade Practices Commission (Mo. 3) (1980) 47 F.L.R.

"In the case of a matter that may constiture a contravention, the chairman may not knot the constitutive Facts of a contravention (if there has been one) and he may ultimately ascertain that there has been no contravention an the conduct or transaction which he is investigating. Because his attention has been drawn to a particular act or transaction which Warrants investigalion and because he has reason to believe that the person to whom the notice 1s given is capable of furnishing anformation relating to the matter under unvestigation he is enqaged in a function of anvestigation, not mm a task of proving an Alleqation. Fhe porer conferred by s.155(]}) is in aid of vUhat Sunction Aud 21 a power

wnich authorizes anquiries both wide in scope and iundefinite in subject matter. lt is an unvestigative power which is under consideration hece and it 2s not possibie 10 defane a priori the limits of an investigation which maght properly be made. The power should now. be narrewly confined."

In Pyneboard Pty. Lid. v. Trade Practices Commission, supra,

"Subsection (1) confers a power oan the Commissi1on to require the provision of anformation, the production of decuments or the givang of evidence relating Lo contravention, or possible contravention, of the Act. Tt us s2zonificant that sub-s.(5) makes at an offence for a person to refuse or farl to comply with a notice under sub.s(1) 'to the extent. Lhat the person _s capable of complying wath at' for these words in themselves are quite inconsistent with the exiastence of a privilege entitling the recipient of aA no.rce to xefuse to comply, whether on the qround that compliance might anvolve self-aincrimination or ovrhervwise. Moreover, 2b 2s apparent thal. the purpose of conferring the pover and amvoosing the obligation is to enable the Commission to ascertain whether anv contravention of the Act has taken place, or is taking piace, and to make the information furnished, the documents produced and the evidence gaven admissible in proceedings in respect of contravention of the Act, a purpose which would be defeated aif pravilege were available."

construction would he unfair to a person to whom a notxcee bos

notice 1S constrained in the exercise of his power: the Chairman must possess the requisite reason to believe, there must be a nexus between the anformation to be furnished an? the matcer or body of facts which constitutes or may constitute a contravention of the Act, -the matter must be sufficiently described and the power must be exercised bona fade' and not for a collateral or improper purpose. Moreover, it must be used wath regard to the effect that the exercise of the power vill have upon those affected thereby. It doe- not necessarily appear unfair that, to use the example of counsel, the Chairman should be able co require a verson vO furnish anformation relating to a matter which constitutes or may constitute a contravention of the Act where he has a reason to believe only that the person cen provide some o°% the specific anforcmation requested. Rather, the oorvrar derives its effect and force in that at enables the Charrm:. to elicst information from persons whom he has reason to believe have some information concerning the particula.

Foc the reasons expressed earliec as to the nature of the power conferred by s.155 it is nol necessary to deai with the second and tnsrd limbs of counsel's arcqument Nevertheless, to adopt the narrow construction would have tir. tendency to impose a heavier burden upon the Chairmen. Counsel contended that before the power could be exercised,

the Chairman :mst have a reason to behaeve that the person Lo

vhom the notice is qiven could furnish a class or type of anformation. However, it appears that in some anstances iL might be Gafficult to characterize the Chairman's belief wiil: sufficient accuracy. Were the description of the informatiou to be cast too widely it might be argued successfully that the Chairman did not possess the requisite belief as to tho anformation which might be furnished in reply. Were the description of the informacion to be cast narrowly in accordance with actual] kKaowledge of the Chairman which couid not be challenged, then, the novice would not serve it: anvestigatave Function but couid at best serve only @ corroborative purpose. In my opinion it vas never iantende} that the Chairman could be challenged with resvect to his reasonable belief concerning the capability of the person to whom the notice ais given to furnish the particular anformation with the risk that Lhe notice be struck down as . whole because the description of the Chasrman's belief was

reason of counsel, that the abolition of the pravileae

construction of s.155, 1s one I cannot accept. It seems thar '

at might as easily be anferrec' that the abolition of the

privilege moy support the proposition that the power was

anLended to be a wide one. I express no opiniou concernins

Secondly, counsel submitted that the words "ma, constitute" as used in the notice cannot refer to a matter Which lies wholly an the pasv., that a matter which "may constitute" a contravention 1s a maiter the constitueni. elements of which lie at least in part in the future. Tn ovuher matters that have come hefore the Court, the notice has used the words of the section, namely "that consiitlures, or may constitute". Here the notice uses the words

applicant referred to the dicta of Lockhart J. an W. A. Pane

Pty. Ltd. v. Bannecman 41 F.U-R. 175 at p.188 where H._.-

"The words 'that constitutes or may constitute' a coniravention do not govern or qualify che Commission's belief. Probably

they are antended to draw a Aaistinci3ion between existing or past contraventions ('that constitutes') and prospective contraventions

("may constitute' ); For example a pcoposed merger under 3.59 that may be a contravention LF at occurs. Support to this approach .s

given by the Unired States experience of the Antitcust Civil Process Act 1962 (U.S.), s.3 of Which provided for tne 2ssue of a civil investigative demand, a novice servana @ Similar purpose to a notice under s.155(1). Tt was held an United States wv. Unaca O11 Co. (1965) 343 F. 2a 26 by the Court of Apnreals for the Manth Crrenat that a Cavil anvestigative demand could now oroperly he issued under the 1962 Aci to obtaan decunent's redaring tO an anvescination oF a proposed aCoASsLiON as no vaniation of che Law had yer omoneced and the J4¥h? Ack wasn Jamated two

aunvestigations of existing or past violations. The ActL was amended to overcome this difficulty in 1975 by the Hart-Scott - -Rodira Antatrust Improvements Act of 1976 fss.101 and 3102)."

The issue nov raised was nol an 2ssue in that case. In this case, no evidence was presenced as to the United

States' experience nor was the relevant legiskation to Which

Lockhart 3. referred cited or otherwise referred to. My researches indicate that the legislation there referred to is sufficiently different in form to render any comparisons wiih s.155 of the Act of dubious value. Section 3 of tie Antitrust Cavil Process Act 1°62 (U S.) originally provid.

"Wherever the Attorney General or vhe Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Davision of the Department of Justice, has reason to believe that any person under investigation may be in possession, custody or control of any documentary materia] relevant to a civil antitrus. anvesilgation, he may ... ussue in writing and cause to he served upon such person, a civil investigavive Gemand requiring such person to produce such material .-..

(1) State the nature of the conduct constatuting the alleged antilrust violation which 2s under anvestigation and the provision of law applicable thereto ..."

The Hart-Scotti-Rodano Antitrust Improvements Acl of 1976

inserted a nev section 3(h) requiring the demand to state the

"(A) the conduct constituting the alleged antatrust violation, or

consummated, may result in an antitrusl violation ..."

The words ""alieged" and "if consummaled" do not appear u

analogy between the vords "is or 1s likely to .-." and "as ws may ..«-" as used in the Act. Counsei for the applicant b-2 contended that "is or as likely to ..." as used an the Ace oved ils origin to the United States' experience where wU.e legislature has endeavoured to arrest net only aciui antitrust violations which have occurred but also wheat would be irlleqal trusts, conspiracies and mergers in their

ancipiency. I am not persuaded that any analogy should he

belief of the Chairman concerning whether or not a matter

constitutes or may conctiture a contecavention of the AcL 4

arrelevant, thei, ca tag Lhe denrce of baal vige oc rronat r-

Full Court held that it sufficed af the Chairman had reason to «believe that the anformation requested related to a matter. As a matter of Lav, the power to request information 1s validly exercised only where the matter "constitutes or may constitute a contravention of the Act". As was stated in

Melbourne Home of Ford Pry. itd. Ve Trade Practiuces

Comm3ssi20n (No. 1) (1979) 36 F.L.R. 450 by Franti and Northrop JJ. at p.474 the word "matter" in sub-section 155(1' 28 not to be given a technical moaning. It is to Fe consirued in 2Ls Ordinary sense of an affaizr or thing. It 22> not to be constrved es being an the nature of a lis or a

It is apparent what where ian fact there has heen a contvavention of the Act and a notice has been issuce pursuant to sub-section 155(1), the person who has ile reasonable be}Jief that a person is capable of supplying, say. anformation, will invariabiv not know of the whole hody cr concatenation Of material facls thich constitute a parLacu.is contravention. Tu may b2 thet if other fants vere known 21 might be <dascovered thal numerous contraventions hac

oceurced. Tt might also be that the other facts vould enahl

2 Gefence to be moar.) cvctcssFully and chat, henee, +0

contraventzon could be shown to have occurred. The power derives its very force because it enables the Commission Lo

In my opinion, 2t was not intended that the facts vhich make up the matter should he predetermined. Yet, af the contention of counsel for the applicant were to he accepLed, ail would appear thal, where it has been concedcad that all the facts which make up a parcicular contravention have occurred, they must be apprrent on the face of th: notice and, hence to some exient be predetermined; For, wera ihe notice to be challenged, in order to uphold the validivy of the notice, a Court vould have to be able to determines that the stated mattec or facts or things taken alone and however liberally construed vould, 1£ proven, constrtiuie 2

Further, if, in those circumstances, the matter had

to he described, even un the form of a pleadang, wiih sufficient pariiculars to saiisfy that tesi., the Commission. vould be hampered in its investigative powers; For 1 wouie have to defane the malter in broad terms such that it cou 7

evidence which related to it. lu also would or might have

ithe effeccr of restricting the Commission in lis ability 10

€ seek information which aig enculprtory yn nature ac which

'auld serve to establish thet = person bal a good seFfensc

In my opinion, therefore, the vords "may constitute" enable a Court, at the date of a challenge to the validity of the notice, to judge from the matecial presented an the notice, the "matter" as there denoted, whether if other facts which may or may not have occurcced come to light, that hody of facts would constitute a contravention. In reaching this conclusion I have derived support from the views expressed hy

Brennan J. an W. A. Panes Pty Ltd. v. Bannerman, surra, av

"Whether or now the relevant body of facts consuitutes a contravention 1s a maiter of lav, and thac avestion does not turn upon the perception or Fnovledge of the facrs heid by the Chairman or any other person. But when the section speats of a matter which 'may constituaLle' a contravenison, 2t speaks not of the relevant and entire body of facts as they exist oc have existed - for that body of facts either does or soes not constitute a contravention ~ hut of a body of facts which are nou. fully known and which, iF and when they are fully known, may reveal themselves as constituting a contravention. A 'matter ther may conslatute a contravention' is the facrs being anvesligated, some of which are not known by the Comniss2on, the Chairman or the Deputy Charrman. Vowever, a 'matter vhavc may consiultute a conriraventioen' does not take 31s character from the belier of the Commission, the Chairman ot the Deputy Chairman, bu from the nature and wuality of the facis as they are or have been and as they may reasonabiy he suspected to be orc to heave heen. A matter which 'may consti.ut?' a contravention also, encompasses fulure facts, thar. is, facts which walk oceuc or tre futures occurrence of Which may reasonably be suspected. The character of Lhe matter is determaned objecuively, and if aL covld be shom chat a concravention vould noc be construited by a coucatenation of facts which st or have euystesd and faccs which MRO. FeasOuwali " Tre cuspized ta isl ar ta

would be no ''ma.cter' relatang to which a person could furnish informar.ion etc., as provided for by $.155f1). That is not the present case, as will subsequently appear.

Although the chacacter of a 'matter' in no way depends upon the belief of the chairman, his knowledge of a matter (that is, of past, present or future facts and of facts ihe existence or future occurrence of whach may reasonably be suspected) as material to the belief which he must form if the vower undec s.155(1) as to be validly exercised. That belief is that the person to whom the notice 2s to be given is capable of furaishing anfocmation, producing documents or giving evidence relaling to the facts known or suspected. Tt 2.8 not necessary that he should believe that the information, documents or evidence will establish or tend to establish a contravention, but merely that they relate to che matter. Information, decuments and evidence which tend to negative a suspecred contravention or liability to conviction or whach tend to exculpate a person suspecred to be a parly to a contravention or offence are as much within the ambit of $.155(1) as aunformation documents or evidence which tend an the other 6.reection. Thus, an ainquary under s.155 may relate to a defence or possible defence under 5.85. This is hecause 'the Commission is concerned with contraventions orc possible contraventions of ihe Act and must consider them not oniy from the point of vaev.r of possible civil proceedings, but also from the point of view Whether a prosecution shculd be brought', as Bowen C.J. said in Rilev iickay Pitv. Ltd. v. Bannerman (1977) 31 F.L.R. 129, at p.134. The power conferred by s.155 1s clearly in aid of che performance of the Conmission's Functions, and: 'Because 1t ws part of the Commission's funclLson to be concerned with ranvestigation of contraventions or possibl° contraventions and to be concerned with Getermining whether any proceedings, Civil or cram2znal, should be brought an respect of a contravention, vhe Commission will, quite properly, he interested to know whecher there is a possible defence under 5.85(1) at p-134."

The words "may constivute" are nov. to be construed as being limavted to future contraventions of the Act. Trey unclude the possibality of a contravention occurring oar havang occurred. In passing at should be noted that the Court does not have to determine vhether -a contravention hes ocevrred of will occuc nor would 1t 141ly speculate or draw om amprobable carcumstances to uphold the validity of a notiec. The Court ecxoresses no view on the degree of svecifacit: whach is necessary 10 satisfy a court in any parlacula.r

submissions cf counsel vere not eccented, the macters whic

"may constiture" contraventions are insufficicnily @escribk~3 or not described wath sufficiem clarity. Tu was nok pu that the applicant could nowt idenrifty the information he i. requested to furnish or that the relacionship Yetween the anformation andi the matters as spelled out in the noiizce wr

an doubt. Rather, it was put that it could not be sad o* the matters that they may constitute contraventions of

sections 45 and 48 of the AcL. Some vweaght was placed uo

the views expressed by Smithers J. in Helhourne Home of Fos:

Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Comassion (No. 2), supra, ¢:

. e ¢€ "As andicated above the votire micl contaan aulfacsent anfornation to enable che recipsene

LO pecesive ther the es, isatior oa-sl upon him bY vhe notice are ec lagri.ous chest) mel

properly be cast upon ham according to iav. In the present case he should be ahlie to perceive thet the aunformation and documents which he 2s required to furnish and produce do relate to a matter which consuirutes or may constitute a contravention of the Act."

Sections 45 and 48 of the Act are specifically adverted te. It must be Getermined as a maiter of law 'tvhether possibic

"respectavely" ais not used; however the repetatron of ie

regards he persons involved, "perrol reiarzlers and cri companies", the arcea "Launceston" anit che period, September 1982 to 5 October 1982". Counsel contended chat 75 arrangement or understanding to raise the retail price ~*

supergrade petrol may not consticure a contravention of s-4

(a) make a contract oc arrangqenent, cr arrive at an undersvrmding, Lt -

(2) the proposed contract, arrancement or nnd eriscanarng earlaans qn em aug nee prOVELs ou; ox

(ai) a provision of the proposed contract. arcangement ox undersrianding has the purpose, or would have or be lakely to have the effect, of substantially lessening compet.tions or

(b) gave effect. to a provision of a contcact, arrangement or understanding, whether the contract or arrangement was made, or the understanding was arrived at, before or after the commencement of this section, 2£ that provision -

(2) as an exclusionary provision; or (i1) has the purpose, or has or is iikely to have the effect, of

Section 4%f/. provides, an essence, that a provision shali ec deemed for the purposes of s.45 to have or be likely ro ha 7e the effect of substantially lessening competition 2f thy poovision has the purpose or 1s or 1s likely to have the effect of ""finang, controlling or maintaining ... the price +ee In relation to a service ... to be acquired or suppii-: by the parties ...". JL is apparent thar. only in certs. circumstances could che raising of petrol praces fall waitlin the deeming provision, s.454. However, 1t ws clearly whe Commission's endeavour Lo discover whether the: circunstances have Leanspiced or wilh traaspir-

Accordingly, the motvrer may constitute a contravenizon «7

corporation or other person shall not engage in the practice of resale price maintenance. Section 96 then spells out the

The matter 2ndicates the supplier. 'Shell Australia Pry. Utd.', that the goods are to be sold by retail, the goods 'petrol', but not on the face of at the 'second person'

to which s.S6 refers. Jt 1s amplied, however, that these arr

the petrol retailers who would be selling petrol by ret

at be Merely ancreasiang the retazl price would not of itss)- constitute a contravention. Ti as necessary to establic.,

antec alia, whether or not the supplier had specafred t'-+ ithe petrol was not to be sold at a price Jess than the pri: specified. This 1s a fact yet to be established. m™ factual context has heen given falthough if 1s true no te

period has been supplied) and refeceuce has been meade to +

pacticular section of the Act which may or way not have b

contravened. Section ©6 specifies conduct prohibitent 5.48. The Commission is seeking information relatany oo those matters. The applicant has been given notice of Ln- factual context in which the anvestigation has arisen an€ co look to s.96 to ascertain whal particular action to incre::: the recail peice woul' conscitute a contravention of the Act. He can perceive that the informaiton relales to @ mater.

which may constitute a contecsvention. Therefore, this meri -

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (146 paragraphs)