Interpretation
34In final address, counsel for Mr Dargan reduced his submissions to one issue, the proper interpretation of the phrase in the definition of Total and Permanent Disablement in the policy "...Work for which the Insured Person is reasonably fitted by education, training or experience." If his submission as to its proper construction was correct, Mr Dargan would win because the insurer and the trustee addressed the wrong question and their decisions are void. If his construction was wrong, Mr Dargan would lose. Counsel for United Super and Hannover Life accepted this limitation of issues.
35Counsel said that the words "reasonably fitted" were not used in this area of the law so much as the words "reasonably suited".
36It is true that the phrase "reasonably suited by education, training or experience" appears in policies of insurance covering total and permanent disablement. See, for example, Duncan v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-433, Kylie Rebecca Druery v First State Super Fss Trustee Corporation [2005] NSWIRCComm 255 and the variant "reasonably suited by training, experience or qualification" in McArthur v Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Company Ltd (2001) 11 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-501.
37But the phrase "reasonably fitted by education, training or experience" appears in policies in addition to the policy in this case. See, for example, Edwards v The Hunter Valley Co-op Dairy Co Ltd & Anor (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-113, De Britt v Frew (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-140 and the variant "is fitted by his knowledge training status and abilities" in Giles & Giles v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited (1986) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-751.
38And the phrase "reasonably qualified by education, training or experience" also appears. See, for example, Riley v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited & Anor (1986) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-684, Fernance v Wreckair Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) (1992) 43 IR 300 and Halloran v Harwood Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor [2007] NSWSC 913.
39It was submitted that "reasonably fitted" meant having a qualification of some kind as a prerequisite to employment or experience that allowed a person to undertake the employment where no qualification was needed. The question was whether one had an entitlement to engage in the employment in question.
40It was submitted in opposition to this interpretation that it was a binary one. If any training was required the person was not fitted for the job. If no training was required the person was fitted for the job. It was submitted that this construction left no work to be done by the word "reasonably".
41The criticism of the approach taken by Mr Dargan is not accurate. His interpretation was not put on the basis that it was a question of qualification or no qualification. It was submitted that a person could be fitted for a job requiring no training by past experience enabling the job to be taken.
42It does not seem to me that there is any difference between "reasonably suited", "reasonably qualified" and "reasonably fitted". Policies of insurance are commercial contracts and should be given a business like interpretation ( McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Limited [2000] HCA 65; (2000) 203 CLR 579 at [22]; 589, International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Limited [2008] HCA 3, (2008) 234 CLR 151 at [8]; 160).
43In each case the consideration is whether, by reason of education, training or experience, an insured person is reasonably suited, reasonably qualified, or reasonably fitted, to engage in the work in question.
44The words describe a capacity to undertake a new job based on education, training or experience. They constitute a link between the job and past education, training or experience.
45In my view neither United Super nor Hannover Life addressed the correct question: was Mr Dargan reasonably capable, because of his past education, training or experience, of becoming a taxi driver?
46The question is to be addressed at the end of the six consecutive months mentioned in the policy - 5 January 2008 ( Giles & Giles at 74,529, Fernance at 329, Halloran at [33]-[35]).
47The answer to the question was No. Mr Dargan had not been a taxi driver before his accident. The only way in which he could take work as a self-employed taxi driver was to obtain an ancillary certificate and he could not hold an ancillary certificate unless he successfully completed the Road Transport Training Course. Until he did that he was not reasonably fitted for the work. He did not have education, training or experience that fitted him to be a taxi driver. He did not have the capacity to undertake the work because he lacked the necessary qualification of an ancillary certificate.
48Mr Dargan could only become a part-time taxi driver by completing further education or training. His experience as a truck driver was not sufficient to enable him to take up that work.
49It was submitted that the Road Transport Training Course was de minimis like an induction into a new job. I do not accept that submission. I have set out the content of the course. It appears to be adequate for its purpose. Candidates were not only required to pass theory tests, they were also tested on the road in practice.
50Furthermore, there is a significant difference between an induction and this training course. With an induction the person already has the job. Mr Dargan might have failed the course in which case he would have no job.
51The policy does not call for a qualitative analysis of education, training or experience in the definition of Total and Permanent Disablement beyond that necessary to determine whether the insured has the capacity to take the job.
52Whatever the quality of the education or training in the Road Transport Training Course it was a prerequisite to employment as a taxi driver. And it was given no consideration by United Super or Hannover Life.
53Their decisions are void for failure to address the correct question. The court in those circumstances can make the determinations ( Edwards , Chammas v Harwood Nominees Pty Ltd (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-175, McArthur , Hannover Life Re of Australasia Limited v Sayseng (2005) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 90-123, Halloran ).
54Since the parties accepted the proposition that the determination of the correct interpretation of clause 1.3.1 of the Group Life Policy would determine the proceedings it follows that Mr Dargan is entitled to relief.
55I will hear the parties on the appropriate terms of declarations and orders and I will hear the parties on costs. I direct the parties to bring in short minutes of order reflecting these reasons.