Dale v R

The form 1 procedure

1. Form 1 is a document headed "List of Additional Charges". It bears the notation "Clause 5" at the top of page 1, but it is in fact the form approved by the Minister for the purposes of cl 4 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Regulation 2017 (NSW). (It appears that the form was first approved under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Regulation 2000 (NSW), cl 5, which was repealed in 2005.) Clause 4(1) in the current regulation simply provides that "[a] list of additional charges under s 32 of the Act is to be in the approved form."
2. The additional charges are identified on what is described as the "Back of Form" and in the present case included sequences 5 and 6 referred to above. The front of the form constitutes a notice directed to the offender. The offender was named and described as having been "charged with the offence of Ongoing Supply". The form stated that the list on the back of the form "gives particulars of 2 other offences with which you have been charged but not convicted." The form contains six other paragraphs advising the offender of the procedure and her rights. There is space for signatures of an authorised person and the accused person. There is also a space to be signed by the judge certifying that the offences on the back of the form had been taken into account.
3. Significantly for present purposes, there were three defects in the form, namely, (i) the offender was charged with two offences of ongoing supply and the form referred only to one, without identifying which one; (ii) there was no signature of a person authorised under s 32(5) of the Sentencing Procedure Act; (iii) the certificate had not been completed by the judge as required by s 35(1)(a). It was not in doubt that the judge did take the offences into account (that was the complaint) and it was not alleged that the sentences were bad because the judge had not signed the form stating what he had done.
4. The relevant provisions of the Sentencing Procedure Act read as follows: 32 Prosecutor may file list of additional charges (1) In any proceedings for an offence (the principal offence), the prosecutor may file in the court a document that specifies other offences with which the offender has been charged, but not convicted, being offences that the offender has indicated are offences that the offender wants the court to take into account when dealing with the offender for the principal offence. (2) A list of additional charges may be filed at any time - (a) after the court finds the offender guilty of the principal offence, and (b) before the court deals with the offender for the principal offence. (3) A copy of the list of additional charges, as filed in the court, is to be given to the offender. (4) A list of additional charges - (a) (Repealed) (b) must be signed by the offender, and (c) must be signed by or on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions or by a person, or a person belonging to a class of persons, prescribed by the regulations. (5) A list of additional charges is taken to be signed on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions if it is signed by a person who is authorised to do so by means of a written order signed by the Director of Public Prosecutions or who belongs to a class of persons so authorised. (6) A failure to comply with the requirements of this section does not invalidate any sentence imposed by the court for the principal offence. 33 Outstanding charges may be taken into account (1) When dealing with the offender for the principal offence, the court is to ask the offender whether the offender wants the court to take any further offences into account in dealing with the offender for the principal offence. (2) The court may take a further offence into account in dealing with the offender for the principal offence - (a) if the offender - (i) admits guilt to the further offence, and (ii) indicates that the offender wants the court to take the further offence into account in dealing with the offender for the principal offence, and (b) if, in all of the circumstances, the court considers it appropriate to do so. (3) If the court takes a further offence into account, the penalty imposed on the offender for the principal offence must not exceed the maximum penalty that the court could have imposed for the principal offence had the further offence not been taken into account. (4) A court may not take a further offence into account - (a) if the offence is of a kind for which the court has no jurisdiction to impose a penalty, or (b) if the offence is an indictable offence that is punishable with imprisonment for life. (5) For the purposes of subsection (4)(a), a court is taken to have jurisdiction to impose a penalty for an offence even if that jurisdiction may only be exercised with the consent of the offender. (6) Despite subsection (4)(a), the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeal and the District Court may take a summary offence into account.
5. It is important also to have regard to the consequences of taking additional offences into account, as identified in s 35: 35 Consequences of taking offences into account (1) If a further offence is taken into account under this Division - (a) the court is to certify, on the list of additional charges, that the further offence has been taken into account, and (b) no proceedings may be taken or continued in respect of the further offence unless the conviction for the principal offence is quashed or set aside. (2) This section does not prevent a court that has taken a further offence into account when dealing with an offender for a principal offence from taking the further offence into account if it subsequently imposes a penalty when sentencing or re-sentencing the offender for the principal offence. (3) An admission of guilt made for the purposes of this Division is not admissible in evidence in any proceedings relating to - (a) the further offence in respect of which the admission was made, or (b) any other offence specified in the list of additional charges. (4) An offence taken into account under this Division is not, merely because of its being taken into account, to be regarded for any purpose as an offence of which an offender has been convicted. …

Procedural non-compliance

1. The offender entered pleas of guilty to the two offences of supplying a prohibited drug on an ongoing basis, the pleas being entered in the Local Court on 10 September 2020, on the basis of a statement of agreed facts which the applicant had signed on 11 August 2020. The statement identified the lawyers who were representing her. The statement was signed by a solicitor for the Director of Public Prosecutions on 19 August 2020. As to the contents of the statement of agreed facts, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that the statement included reference to the events forming the basis of sequences 3, 4, 5 and 6, so identified.
2. There was no dispute that the sentencing judge took into account the matters on the Form 1. Not only did he state that he did so in the judgment, but he expressly identified the elements of the agreed facts relating to each sequence identified on the Form 1. The question is whether the judge was entitled to take that step in circumstances where he was invited to do so by both the legal representatives of the Director and of the applicant. The submission that he was not so entitled turned on aspects of non-compliance with ss 32 and 33 of the Sentencing Procedure Act.

(1) failing of Director to sign

1. There was only one element of specific non-compliance with s 32, namely the absence of a signature by or on behalf of the Director, as required by s 32(4)(c). Counsel for the applicant noted that, pursuant to s 32(6), a failure to comply with the requirements of s 32 does not invalidate any sentence, but also noted that pursuant to s 101A, such non-compliance "may be considered" by an appeal court, despite the terms of s 32(6). The question in the present case is whether the absence of a signature by or on behalf of the Director precluded the sentencing judge from taking the offences on Form 1 into account pursuant to s 33. For the following reasons, the challenge should be rejected.
2. First, as a legal matter, the fact that failure to comply with some part of s 32 does not invalidate the sentence, should be understood to mean that the form is not invalid, so that there is no error in taking it into account. Secondly, subs 32(4)(a), long since repealed, stated that the list "must be in the form prescribed by the regulations". The removal of that requirement reduces the significance of the form itself. Subsection (4) merely requires a list to be signed by each party.
3. As a practical matter, the signing of the list by the offender is important, because it indicates acknowledgment by the offender not only as to the identity of the additional charges, but as to the consequences, both beneficial and detrimental, of having them taken into account. The form was signed by the offender. The fact that it was not signed on behalf of the Director was of no practical consequence. The Form 1 itself formed part of the prosecutor's bundle of documents which became Exhibit 1 on the sentencing proceeding. That bundle also contained the statement of agreed facts which was signed by a solicitor on behalf of the Director. That statement in turn identified sequences 5 and 6 as being on the Form 1. Neither party in this Court suggested that the Director did not in fact consent to those matters being taken into account on sentencing. There was no merit in the challenge to the sentence on the basis of the non-compliance with s 32(4)(c).

(2) failure to identify the "principal offence"

1. A second challenge arose from the failure of the form to identify with precision the "principal offence" to which the additional offences attached. It is true that, because there were two offences of ongoing supply, there was an ambiguity inherent in the form. That also meant, it was submitted, that s 33 could not be complied with until the ambiguity had been resolved.
2. Although there was an ambiguity in the opening statement on the form, which was not resolved when the offender signed it, there is no reason to suppose that there was any material prejudice to the offender. No doubt the additional offences could have been taken into account in sentencing for either of the offences of ongoing supply, although not of course both. Each covered identical conduct, divided into two consecutive periods. With respect to the operation of s 33, the Director's submissions expressly referred to the Form 1 in the context of sequence 3, [1] and, in the course of oral submissions, counsel appearing for the applicant stated: [2] "Your Honour will see from the inclusion on the Form 1 document which attaches to sequence 3 that Ms Dale accepts responsibility for the offence of participating in a criminal group including by directing the activities of that group …."
3. Although the parties may well have been indifferent as to which offence the Form 1 attached, it is apparent that, as a matter of common understanding, it attached to sequence 3. In indicating the individual sentences which were regarded as appropriate, the judge expressly dealt with the matters on the Form 1 in relation to sequence 3. [3] There was no error in that approach and, to the extent that there may have been ambiguity in the form itself in failing to identify which of the two ongoing supply offences it attached to, that omission was resolved by agreement and had no practical significance. The challenge to the sentence on that basis should be rejected.

(3) failing to question the offender as to her wishes

(a) identifying the issue

1. Turning to the requirements of s 33, counsel for the applicant submitted that s 33(1) required the Court "to ask the offender" whether she wanted the Court to take further offences into account. That, it was submitted, did not happen.
2. The judge obviously thought that it had happened because the second paragraph of the judgment commenced: "The offender also asks that I take into account pursuant to section 32 … two further offences on a Form 1."
3. While the transcript does not suggest that the judge directly put that question to the offender, it is clear from trial counsel's submissions that the Form 1 was expressly acknowledged and was intended to be taken into account. That placed the offender at risk of an increased sentence for that offence but with the substantial advantage that she did not face separate sentences for those offences. It is likely that that outcome was negotiated before the statement of agreed facts was prepared and the pleas entered.
4. There is a separate and related complaint that, for the purposes of s 33(2), the applicant had not admitted guilt to the further offences and had not indicated that she wanted the Court to take them into account. These last submissions assumed that the judge must personally question the offender (despite the fact that she was represented by counsel) and that the offender must personally admit guilt and give a verbal indication to the court as to her wishes.
5. If one had regard only to s 33(2), the contended requirement of personal communication by an offender would carry little weight. Although an accused facing trial on indictment may be expected to enter pleas of not guilty personally, the same practice is not routinely applied on a committal for sentence after a plea in the Local Court; the judge may well ask counsel if the offender adheres to his or plea. In summary proceedings s 182 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) provides for the entry of a written plea of guilty, accompanied by written material.
6. At the commencement of the sentence hearing on 5 February 2021, when Ms O'Neill appeared for the applicant, the following exchange took place when the prosecutor (Ms Roatz) tendered a number of documents: [4] "ROATZ: Ms Dale appears for sentence in relation to two counts of ongoing supply and a number of matters on a Form 1 document. … The Crown formally tenders the Crown sentence summary with a number of annexures, the Form 1 document has now been signed. HIS HONOUR: You've seen all that Ms O'Neill? O'NEILL: I have your Honour there's no objection." It was thus clear from the commencement of the proceedings that the offender sought to have the matters listed on the Form 1 taken into account on sentence. It was also assumed, without express reference, that she adhered to her plea of guilty with respect to the principal offences. Taken in isolation, the tender of the signed statement of agreed facts and the Form 1 signed by the offender would be sufficient to demonstrate admission of guilt to the further offences and provide a sufficient indication that she wished the Court to take the further offences into account. The only basis for considering that to be insufficient is the language of s 33(1), which states that the court "is to ask the offender" whether she wants the matters taken into account.

(b) whether the judge erred

1. Counsel for the applicant submitted that there was authority in this Court which supported the conclusion that the failure of the judge to put that question to the applicant personally required this Court to intervene. The first of the cases relied upon was R v Felton, [5] in the course of which, after noting that each of three offences in relation to a motor vehicle was accompanied by a Form 1 containing other matters, Howie J continued: "[3] … However, the formalities of s 33(2) were not attended to and the applicant was not asked whether he admitted his guilt to those matters or whether he wished them to be taken into account. Although no point has been taken concerning this irregularity, the criminal courts should be astute to comply with the procedural formalities attending to the steps towards sentencing. They are not empty gestures, but are important safeguards to ensure that the offender is aware of what is taking place and consents to procedures that may have a significant impact upon his freedom or the period during which he will remain in custody."
2. There can be no doubt that formalities should be attended to, whenever appropriate, and the purpose of the provision is to ensure that the offender is aware of what is taking place and consents to the procedures adopted. However, it does not follow that failure to comply with a formality will form a basis for an appeal against sentence, in circumstances where there is no shred of evidence that the applicant did not consent or did not wish the further offences to be taken into account. Indeed, it is not clear that, before resentencing, Mr Felton was asked whether he wanted the further offences to be taken into account, although the Court did so.
3. Purves v R [6] involved a failure to comply with a similar statutory scheme provided in relation to federal offences under s 16BA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). In circumstances where counsel for the Commonwealth Director conceded a procedural error in the sentencing proceedings, there was no discussion as to precisely what steps had been taken in the course of the sentencing, nor as to the proper construction of the statutory provision. It should be accepted, however, that, although not in identical terms to s 33, both the language and purpose of s 16BA reflect the same intention. It will be necessary to return to this case.
4. LS v R [7] illustrated the difficulties which can arise where the judge takes it upon himself to ask questions of the offender as to his or her intentions. In LS there was confusion as to whether the Form 1 offences applied to counts 1 and 2 on the indictment, or to count 3. Contrary to the common understanding of counsel at the hearing that the Form 1 was attached to count 3, the judge asked the offender whether he wished him to take into account the offences on the Form 1 "in sentencing you for the actual offences on the indictment". The offender said "Yes". In this Court, Harrison J observed that "as there was only a single Form 1 document filed in relation to the applicant, the offences listed on it could only be taken into account on a single principal offence, not across multiple offences." [8] Harrison J also observed that, contrary to the agreed position, the judge purported to take the offences into account "across counts 1 and 2, rather than only count 3." [9] The process of oral interrogation of the offender by the judge achieved not only confusion, but error. It failed to ensure transparency, being the avowed purpose of the provision.
5. Contrary to the submissions of the present applicant in relation to the need to identify the principal offence specifically and unambiguously in the Form 1, in LS the failure to take that step, although it would have assisted to resolve the confusion, was not treated as itself constituting irreparable error. Had the agreement of counsel that the offences were to be taken into account on count 3 only been followed, it is apparent that no error would have been upheld.
6. Kabir v R [10] was a further case involving a federal offender. On two appearances in the District Court, Mr Kabir was represented by counsel when a "schedule" under s 16BA and a statement of agreed facts were tendered.
7. Kabir appears to be the first case in which the failure to comply with the literal meaning of the statute was raised in circumstances where no prejudice or unfairness had arisen. As noted by Harrison J: "[23] Mr Kabir was not asked personally at any stage of the sentencing proceedings whether he wished the additional offence to be taken into account. He acknowledges that he signed the s 16BA schedule. Mr Kabir does not complain about the way his Honour dealt with the admitted offence and does not seek to change his position in that regard in the event of resentence. [24] Mr Kabir now contends in these circumstances that his Honour erred in failing to ask him directly whether he admitted his guilt in respect of the additional offence and wished to have it taken into account by the court in passing sentence. Mr Kabir maintains that this procedural error leads to the result that the matter must be remitted to the District Court. Mr Kabir relies upon this Court's decision in Purves v R [2019] NSWCCA 227. [25] In that case, Simpson AJA held in similar circumstances that the failure of the sentencing judge to comply with s 16BA(1) and ask the offender if he admitted guilt for the additional offence and wished to have the matter taken into account by the Court in passing sentence, together with the absence of an affirmative response by him pursuant to s 16BA(2), amounted to a procedural error requiring the matter to be remitted to the District Court."
8. The Commonwealth Director mounted a powerful challenge to the reasoning in Purves. She noted that the applicant in that matter had been unrepresented and that the prosecutor had conceded error. The Court had proceeded to deliver an ex tempore judgment. The Director further submitted that Purves had no precedential value because the matter had been dealt with sub silentio without argument, referring to Spence v Queensland [11] and other cases referred to therein. She further submitted that "the underlying facts of Purves are unclear and the conduct that formed the basis of the concession is not recorded in the judgment." [12]
9. Two matters of statutory construction were relied upon. One was that, by contrast with s 33(1), the Commonwealth provision merely conferred power on the judge to ask the relevant question, using "may ask". That was a point of distinction from s 33. However, the second point, which applies equally to s 33 is that s 33(1), in contrast to s 33(2), does not impose a condition upon the exercise of the power. Accordingly, if it is clear that the offender admits guilt and indicates a desire to have the matters taken into account by the court (and the court considers it appropriate to do so), those factors are sufficient to engage the power to take the further offences into account.
10. In Kabir the Director further submitted that "it does not strain the statutory language to interpret either s 16BA(1) or s 16BA(2) as allowing a legally represented person to indicate his or her wish through counsel, as regularly occurs with other procedural events in criminal proceedings." [13]
11. The Court in Kabir accepted those submissions. Harrison J stated: "[48] This Court should be slow to encourage the triumph of form over substance. One of the purposes for provisions such as s 16BA is to permit an offender to have offences with which he or she has not in fact been charged, dealt with and disposed of, in order that he or she will not at some later stage, following the passing of a sentence for charges that have been laid, be confronted with further criminal proceedings for those uncharged matters or be otherwise punished for the admitted offence. However, despite this obvious benefit, being the prospect that a sentencing court may 'take into account all or any of the offences in respect of which the person has admitted…guilt', the procedure also carries with it at least the possibility of an adverse or disadvantageous outcome. So much is clear from the terms of paragraph 4 of the s 16BA Schedule, which in this case was in the following terms: 4. If the court takes an offence that you have admitted into account, the court may make such orders about reparation, restitution, compensation, costs and forfeiture as it could have made if you had been convicted before the court of the offence, but will not impose any other punishment for the offence. [49] In that context, it is therefore obviously important that an offender's admission of guilt and the associated giving of consent to the admitted offences being taken into account should take place with appropriate certainty. However, it would be an artificial and unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the words 'ask him or her' to read or understand them as requiring that the offender concerned must personally and physically participate in the process. The important issue is that the Court can be satisfied that the offender consents to the proposed course, not whether he or she does so in a particular way. If an offender is unrepresented, there is presumably no alternative to that offender indicating in words or otherwise that the necessary consent has been given. So much appears to have inspired the decision of this Court in Purves. However, in the case of a represented offender, there is not in my view anything arising either as a matter of principle or from the words of the provision that requires a Court to elicit a personal response from the offender if the circumstances otherwise make it abundantly clear that an admission of guilt has been offered and consent to the use of that admission has been given. [50] The important aspect of s 16BA is that the offender has both admitted guilt for the relevantly specified offences and wishes them to be taken into account. The discretion given to the Court in s 16BA(2) about whether or not to take all or any of the offences into account is specifically predicated upon that admission being made and that wish being communicated. There is in my view neither any indication to be gleaned from the words of s 16BA(1) in particular nor any reason of general sentencing principle why the Court cannot legitimately arrive at the appropriate level of satisfaction ('if it thinks fit') based upon the words or conduct of an offender's legal representative. That is quite obviously what happened in this case. Mr Kabir's counsel at the sentencing hearing made it clear, and his Honour understood and appreciated, that Mr Kabir both admitted guilt for the relevantly specified offence and wished it to be taken into account. His Honour proceeded accordingly."
12. Kabir was referred to in a later case dealing with s 33, Pham v R. [14] Pham was a curious case, but it was, again, one in which there was a substantial mistake which underlay the Court's reasoning. There was a variation between the offence with which the offender had been charged ("supply prohibited drug") and the offence on the Form 1, clearly intended to refer to the same charge, but identified as "possess prohibited drug". There was also a real doubt as to the offender's signature on the Form 1. R A Hulme J noted that the signature bore the date of the hearing, although the offender had been in custody and not present in person at the hearing, and that the applicant's signature on the Form 1 was somewhat different from that on the statement of agreed facts. [15] On being pressed by the State Director to adopt the reasoning in Kabir, R A Hulme J stated: "[30] There is much to be said for the Crown's approach which I would seriously consider accepting if it were not for three matters: the combination of the Form 1 referring on its face to an offence of possession as opposed to supply of a prohibited drug; the issue about the signature on the Form 1; and the fact that English is not the applicant's first language. For these reasons there is a doubt as to whether the applicant himself understood what the judge was being asked to do, no matter how clearly it may have been understood by everyone else. It is necessary to ensure there is transparency about the Form 1 procedure, a matter which has been said to be one of the objects of s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act: LS v R [2020] NSWCCA 27 at [35] (Harrison J). The importance of this was emphasised by Howie J in R v Felton at [3]: … [31] The applicant provided an affidavit for resentencing purposes, but he did not trouble himself to provide any evidence of what transpired between himself and his lawyers in relation to the Form 1 issue, let alone adduce evidence from them. This is a troubling aspect about the matter but ultimately the issue would never have arisen if there had been compliance with the statutory requirements in the first place."
13. The last sentence is important. Whether the difficulty with the identification of the offence would have been revealed by the judge asking the offender a question might be doubted; however, the other two issues raised in this Court could no doubt have been addressed and resolved by such a process. The remarkable result of upholding the ground in Pham was that he was entitled to be resentenced on the basis that the judge had taken into account a lesser offence than that for which he had been charged. How the correction of that error assisted him is obscure.
14. The present case closely resembles Kabir. At no stage has the applicant asserted that she did not admit her guilt of the further offences, nor that she did not intend that they be taken into account. No element of prejudice has been demonstrated by the fact that the judge did not question her by asking whether she wished the Court to take into account the offences on the Form 1 in dealing with the principal offence.
15. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the approach adopted in Kabir with respect to the Commonwealth statute in construing s 33 of the State Act. There is no doubt that the satisfaction of the court that the offender has indicated that he or she wants the court to take the further offences into account is a precondition to the exercise of that power. However, where that intention has been otherwise unequivocally demonstrated, to read subs (1) as imposing a further mandatory condition namely the asking of a question, is, as was accepted in Kabir, a triumph of form over substance.
16. The Sentencing Procedure Act contains many provisions formulated as directions. However, to say that the court "is to" take some step does not demonstrate any clear intention as to the consequence of failure. Each provision must be read in context. A different inference will frequently be drawn from statements in the form of a prohibition, such as that which appears in s 33(4). In the present case, the judge expressly stated in his reasons that the applicant had indicated her wish to have the matters taken into account, no doubt referring to the approach adopted by her counsel. There was no basis for doubting the correctness of that conclusion. In that circumstance, to find error on the part of the sentencing judge in failing to comply with a requirement to ask a question would be to identify an aspect of non-compliance which had no practical consequence.
17. That is not to suggest that the obligation in s 33(1) is unimportant or should be disregarded. The purpose of s 33(1) is to reveal whether there is any misunderstanding on the part of the offender, or doubt as to his or her intention. However, from the point of view of the appeal court, there being no basis for suspecting such a misunderstanding or doubt, the omission is immaterial.
18. The challenge based on a failure to comply with s 33(1) should be rejected.

(4) double-counting

1. Finally, the applicant noted an apparent double-counting of the offences on the Form 1 in the process of sentencing.
2. There was no dispute that the use in s 33(3) (and elsewhere) of the singular "principal offence" means that there can only be one principal offence in relation to a particular list of further offences contained on a Form 1. On that assumption, the further offences on the Form 1 cannot be taken into account directly in determining the length of an aggregate sentence, because the power to impose an aggregate sentence assumes that the offender is being sentenced for more than offence. [16] It follows that the further offences can only be taken into account directly in identifying the sentence which would have been imposed for the principal offence, had the judge not proceeded to impose an aggregate sentence for that offence and at least one other offence.
3. There is no dispute that the judge took into account the further matters on the Form 1 in indicating the appropriate sentence with respect to sequence 3. (That was the principal matter of complaint on the appeal.) However, in making orders, the judge stated: "(2) Taking into account the matters on the Form 1 and pursuant to section 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act you are sentenced to [an] aggregate term of imprisonment …." The form of the order indicated, the applicant submitted, double-counting by taking into account the further offences at both stages of the sentencing exercise.
4. That construction of the form of the order is not merely implausible, but ignores the statement by the sentencing judge as to how he came to impose the aggregate sentence. The assumption underlying the applicant's final contention is that the judge was entitled to take the further offences into account: on that assumption, it is necessary to set out the explanation as to how the judge did so: [17] "As I intend to impose an aggregate sentence, it is necessary for me in accordance with the statutory regime to note the indicative sentences that I would have imposed had I determined not to proceed in this way. The indicative sentence for each offence is arrived at having regard to the objective seriousness of the offending, matters to be dealt with on a Form 1 where appropriate, all aspects the offender's subjective case and the need to give effect to the purposes of sentencing generally and for offences of this type in particular. The 25% discount to which the offender is entitled, to reflect the utilitarian value of her pleas of guilty, is to be applied to these indicative sentences. The indicative sentences I regard as appropriate are as follows: Sequence 3 - taking into account the matters on a Form 1, a sentence of 2 years and 10 months imprisonment less 25% to reflect the plea of guilty, making a sentence of 2 years and 1month imprisonment. Sequence 4 - a sentence of 3 years and 3 months imprisonment less 25% to reflect the plea of guilty, making a sentence after rounding down of 2 years and 5 months imprisonment. I have finally concluded that an appropriate total aggregate term of imprisonment is one of 3 years and 8 months imprisonment."
5. It is plain beyond doubt that the judge reached the aggregate term having taken the further offences into account in a manner which was unexceptionable and to which no exception was taken. The form of the order merely reflected that the matters on the Form 1 had indeed been taken into account in the process. It was appropriate to formulate the order in that way so that the Court's records would demonstrate, in the applicant's interest, that the further offences had in fact been dealt with. If this had been the subject of a separate ground of appeal (as it probably should have been) leave would have been refused on the basis that it was misconceived.
6. It follows that the sole ground of appeal must be rejected.

Conclusions

1. In these circumstances, the Court should grant leave to appeal, but dismiss the appeal.
2. DAVIES J: I agree with Basten JA.
3. BUTTON J: I agree with Basten JA.

Endnotes

1. Crown submissions on sentence, par 5.5.
2. Tcpt, 05/02/21, p 7(30).
3. Sentencing judgment, p 32.
4. Tcpt, p 2(15).
5. [2002] NSWCCA 443; 135 A Crim R 328 (Sully and Howie JJ).
6. [2019] NSWCCA 227.
7. [2020] NSWCCA 27.
8. LS at [27].
9. Ibid.
10. [2020] NSWCCA 139.
11. (2019) 268 CLR 355; [2019] HCA 15 at [294] (Edelman J).
12. Kabir at [30].
13. Kabir at [36].
14. [2021] NSWCCA 234.
15. Pham at [24].
16. Sentencing Procedure Act, s 53A(1).
17. Sentencing judgment, p 32. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 December 2021