D'Amore v Independent Commission Against Corruption
[2012] NSWSC 473
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2012-04-02
Before
McClellan CJ
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (14 paragraphs)
ster for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL [1999] NSWCA 8 (1999) 46NSWLR 55 Weal v Bathurst City Council [2000] NSWCA 88 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 Texts Cited: Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed, 2009) Category: Principal judgment Parties: Angela D'Amore (Plaintiff) Independent Commission Against Corruption (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: B W Walker SC/R R Tripodi (Plaintiff) J T Gleeson SC/A M Mitchelmore (Defendant) Solicitors: Thompson Eslick Solicitors (Plaintiff) Crown Solicitor (Defendant) File Number(s): 2011/138619
Judgment 1HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff, Ms Angela D'Amore, was the subject of an investigation and Report by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The Report was published in December 2010 and made findings of "corrupt conduct" in respect of the plaintiff under s 13 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 ("the Act"). 2The plaintiff seeks a declaration that the defendant's Report, and the defendant's findings of corrupt conduct in relation to the plaintiff, were not made in accordance with law and are void for jurisdictional error. 3The plaintiff was a member of the Legislative Assembly of the New South Wales Parliament. As such, she was entitled to engage staff to assist her in her electorate office and, when Parliament was sitting, she was entitled to engage a temporary staff member to work in the electorate office in lieu of a full-time officer who would assist her at Parliament House. This arrangement is referred to as the provision of "sitting day relief officers" to work at Parliament House. The sitting day relief entitlement was introduced by the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal ("the Tribunal") in July 2006. 4The allegations which were investigated by the Commission were that Karen Harbilas and Agatha La Manna (neither of whom were full-time officers) worked at Parliament House as sitting day relief officers for the plaintiff in October-November 2006 and May-June 2007 respectively, and were instructed or authorised by the plaintiff to falsely represent on sitting day relief claim forms that David Nicoletti, the plaintiff's Senior Electorate Officer, had worked at Parliament House while Ms Harbilas and Ms La Manna worked at the plaintiff's electorate office at Five Dock. It was alleged that the plaintiff had signed the claim forms knowing that they contained false representations made by Ms Harbilas and Ms La Manna. The conduct of the other persons involved was also investigated but only the plaintiff has brought proceedings. 5The Commission's findings are recorded in the Report's summary of investigations and results (Report at 5). They were as follows: In October 2006, Ms D'Amore engaged Ms Harbilas to work at Parliament House on sitting days as a sitting day relief officer. The Commission found that Ms D'Amore, knowing that Ms Harbilas was not entitled to receive payment from the sitting day relief allowance unless she worked at the electorate office when Ms D'Amore's electorate officer worked at Parliament House, instructed Ms Harbilas to complete a claim form to falsely indicate that Mr Nicoletti had worked at Parliament House on the relevant days. Ms Harbilas completed two claim forms in this false manner, which related to six sitting days during the period from 24 October 2006 to 26 October 2006, and from 14 November 2006 to 16 November 2006, and received payments from Parliament of around $1,500, to which she was not entitled. In May 2007, Ms D'Amore engaged Ms La Manna to work as a sitting day relief officer at her electorate office. The Commission found that on or prior to 1 June 2007 Ms D'Amore decided that Ms La Manna would work at Parliament House for the last 12 sitting days of the parliamentary session, knowing that this arrangement did not entitle Ms La Manna to receive sitting day relief payments. Ms D'Amore instructed or authorised Ms La Manna to complete three claim forms to falsely indicate that Mr Nicoletti had worked at Parliament House on the 11 sitting days that the evidence shows Ms La Manna had worked at Parliament House. Ms La Manna completed three claim forms in this manner and received payments of around $3,000 from Parliament to which she was not entitled. 6The Commission found that the plaintiff and Ms La Manna had engaged in corrupt conduct in relation to their involvement in obtaining sitting day relief payments. No findings of corrupt conduct were made in relation to Mr Nicoletti or Ms Harbilas. 7The plaintiff submitted that, in making its findings, the ICAC exceeded its statutory powers. Specifically, the plaintiff submitted that the ICAC's finding that the plaintiff had engaged in corrupt conduct was made without any evidence, or at least any rationally probative evidence, that she knew that the conditions of the sitting day relief entitlement had not been met. 8The ICAC is constituted under s 4(1) of the Act as a corporation. Section 2A of the Act states that the principal objects of the Act are: (a) to promote the integrity and accountability of public administration by constituting an Independent Commission Against Corruption as an independent and accountable body: (i) to investigate, expose and prevent corruption involving or affecting public authorities and public officials, and (ii) to educate public authorities, public officials and members of the public about corruption and its detrimental effects on public administration and on the community, and (b) to confer on the Commission special powers to inquire into allegations of corruption. 9In exercising the functions and powers so conferred, the ICAC must "regard the protection of the public interest and the prevention of breaches of public trust as its paramount concerns": s 12. It is also to "direct its attention to serious corrupt conduct and systemic corrupt conduct and is to take into account the responsibility and role other public authorities and public officials have in the prevention of corrupt conduct": s 12A. 10Section 13 of the Act sets out the ICAC's principal functions, which include, in s 13(1)(a), the power: to investigate any allegation or complaint that, or any circumstances which in the Commission's opinion imply that: (i) corrupt conduct, or (ii) conduct liable to allow, encourage or cause the occurrence of corrupt conduct, or (iii) conduct connected with corrupt conduct, may have occurred, may be occurring or may be about to occur, 11The ICAC may conduct an investigation on its own initiative or on a complaint, report or reference being made to it: s 20(1). If a matter is referred to the ICAC by both Houses of Parliament, it is required to investigate that matter: s 13(1)(c). 12Section 13(2) of the Act requires the ICAC to conduct its investigations with a view to determining, among other matters, "whether any corrupt conduct, or any other conduct referred to in subsection (1)(a), has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur". In undertaking an investigation, the ICAC is not bound by the rules or practice of evidence and can inform itself on any matter in such manner as it considers appropriate: s 17(1). French CJ considered that the presence of a similar provision in legislation relating to the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal indicated that the Tribunal was "able to act upon information whether or not it is embodied in evidence which would be admissible in a court of law": Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32; (2010) 241 CLR 390 at [15]. 13The provisions of Divisions 2, 3 and 4 of Part 4 of the Act confer broad powers on the ICAC with respect to the conduct of its investigations, including the power to compulsorily obtain information (s 21) and documents (s 22), and the power to enter public premises (s 23). If it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so, the ICAC may conduct compulsory examinations, which are to be held in private: s 30(1), (5). Alternatively, the ICAC may conduct a public inquiry: s 31. In both instances, s 35(1) empowers ICAC to summon a person to appear and give evidence or produce documents. 14The ICAC may authorise a person who appears at an examination or inquiry to have legal representation: s 33. In the case of a public inquiry, a person required to attend is entitled to be informed, before or at the time that he or she is required to appear, of the general scope and purpose of the inquiry and the nature of the allegation or complaint being investigated: s 31(6). If the person is legally represented, his or her representative is permitted, with the ICAC's leave, to cross-examine any witness on any matter that the ICAC considers relevant: s 34(1). The legal practitioner appointed to assist the ICAC in an inquiry has the same entitlement. 15Section 13(3) confers on the ICAC: (a)the power to make findings and form opinions, on the basis of the results of its investigations, in respect of any conduct, circumstances or events with which its investigations are concerned, whether or not the findings or opinions relate to corrupt conduct, and (b)the power to formulate recommendations for the taking of action that the Commission considers should be taken in relation to its findings or opinions or the results of its investigations. Section 13(5) enumerates three examples of the findings and opinions which the ICAC may respectively make and form under s 13(3), including, in s 13(5)(c), "findings of fact". 16Under s 74(3) of the Act, the ICAC is required to prepare a report on matters in relation to which it has conducted a public inquiry. The contents of such a report are prescribed in s 74A, which provides: (1) The Commission is authorised to include in a report under section 74: (a) statements as to any of its findings, opinions and recommendations, and (b) statements as to the Commission's reasons for any of its findings, opinions and recommendations. (2) The report must include, in respect of each "affected" person, a statement as to whether or not in all the circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that consideration should be given to the following: (a) obtaining the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions with respect to the prosecution of the person for a specified criminal offence, (b) the taking of action against the person for a specified disciplinary offence, (c) the taking of action against the person as a public official on specified grounds, with a view to dismissing, dispensing with the services of or otherwise terminating the services of the public official. 17Section 74B(1) of the Act limits the scope of findings and recommendations which may be included in a report; it provides that the ICAC is not authorised to include in a report a statement as to: (a)a finding or opinion that a specified person is guilty of or has committed, is committing or is about to commit a criminal offence or disciplinary offence (whether or not a specified criminal offence or disciplinary offence), or (b)a recommendation that a specified person be, or an opinion that a specified person should be, prosecuted for a criminal offence or disciplinary offence (whether or not a specified criminal offence or disciplinary offence).