Ground one
18 The appellant's first complaint is that the primary judge gave inadequate reasons for the conclusion that the Tribunal made no error in applying the findings which it made in relation to the Refugee Convention ground to the Complementary Protection ground. The trial judge's reasons in this respect were as follows:
Ground 5
35. In relation to ground 5, the Tribunal correctly identified the relevant law. It was open to the Tribunal to take into account its comprehensive adverse credibility findings under the Refugee Convention in determining whether or not the applicant met the criteria for complimentary protection. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 5 is made out.
19 There is no doubt that the fundamental requirements of natural justice necessitates a litigant being informed of the reasons why their submissions are rejected or not accepted. In this case the reasons provided for the rejection of ground five are extremely brief. Whilst they indicate a correct conclusion as to the entitlement of a Tribunal to apply its findings of fact to both Refugee Convention grounds and Complementary Protection grounds, it does not explain why that was appropriate in the present case.
20 However, that is not to say that any injustice flows from the inadequacy of the reasons which would warrant the allowing of the appeal. It is well accepted that an error arising from inadequate reasons does not necessitate the allowing of an appeal merely on that basis. In Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430, 444 it was said
Lastly, it is noted that an appealable error arising from inadequate reasons does not necessarily mean that a new trial is required. An appeal court is entitled to consider the matter and, if appropriate reasons are given, may itself decide the matter. Thus, if the only conclusion open on the evidence available at trial was the conclusion reached by the trial judge, then, notwithstanding an inadequate statement of reasons, the matter need not go to a new trial: NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation (formerly GIO of New South Wales) v Mesiti (Court of Appeal, 1 December 1994, unreported).
21 See also Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2004) 29 WAR 273 at [29]; Van der Velde v Halloran [2011] WASCA 252 at [102].
22 To a substantial degree the appellant's argument in this respect is misguided. The Tribunal did not make findings in relation to the Convention grounds and then merely apply them to the Complementary Protection grounds. What it actually did was make findings about the facts and circumstance alleged by the appellant which underpinned his claims under the Convention and s 36(2)(aa) and, having done that, applied those findings to the claims advanced by the appellant. There was no error in it doing so.
23 The real difficulty for CZT17 is that the findings made by the Tribunal were to the effect he "was not now or never was a supporter, member, leader or position holder, associated with, involved or perceived to be associated with the JCD or BNP or Jubo Dal or in opposition to the Awami League or faced any of the difficulties he claims for the reasons he claims in Bangladesh or has been involved in the BNP in Australia, either as a member or follower or in any capacity". That conclusion was pivotal in respect of both the Convention claims and the Complementary Protection claims which he advanced as the reason why he ought to be granted a protection visa. The Convention claims were based on his engagement in certain political activities but, as the Tribunal disbelieved his evidence and concluded that he was not so engaged, his claim of persecution for them could not be sustained. The only foundation for a visa under the Complementary Protection grounds was the alleged risk of harm arising from his erstwhile political involvement were he to be returned to Bangladesh. The consequence of the factual findings made by the Tribunal obliterated the substratum of that claim as well.
24 Therefore, even if the primary judge's brief reasons were inadequate, no injustice arose on which an appealable error might be detected because the conclusion expressed by the primary judge was obviously correct.
25 Whilst the entitlement of the appellant to receive adequate reasons for the rejection of his claims is paramount, it must also be kept steadily in mind that the work pressures on the FCC are substantial and that is particularly so in relation to migration matters. Further, many of the arguments advanced by litigants before that Court are, perhaps through a lack of understanding, misguided and ill directed. That is an adequate descriptor of the argument advanced to the primary judge in respect of this ground. Whilst a first instance judge must provide adequate reasons for any conclusion reached, it is necessary to keep in mind the context in which the judicial officer is required to hear and determine the matter at hand.
26 No appealable error is demonstrated in respect of ground one.