Ground 1 and 2
35 In relation to grounds 1 and 2, the appellant submitted that the Authority was in error in stating that the "information" that the appellant "has a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE" was "new information" in circumstances where the delegate had found, at [60], that the appellant may have transported goods for the LTTE.
36 The appellant submitted that even if the assertion in the written submissions that the appellant had "a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE" was "new information", it did not change the fact that the delegate had already made a finding that the appellant "may have transported some goods for the LTTE", which the Authority did not deal with in its decision.
37 The appellant also submitted that the delegate's finding could not have been "new information": it cannot be that, on the one hand, the core function of the Authority is to "review" fast track reviewable decisions referred to it, whilst, on the other hand, findings forming part of those decisions are only to be considered in "exceptional circumstances". Nor, for that matter, were the delegate's findings "given … to the Authority" by the appellant for the purposes of s 473DD(b) as the findings of the delegate were contained in the "review material" given to the Authority by the Secretary under s 473CB.
38 Finally on these grounds, the appellant submitted that the Authority proceeded in the present case upon the assumption that its function of review only required it to consider the appellant's visa application afresh, without regard to the findings that had been made by the delegate. However this understanding of "review" under Pt 7AA was not accepted in BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 869. It could not be said that, had the Authority considered the issue of whether the appellant transported goods for the LTTE, it would have come to the same conclusion that he was not owed protection.
39 The Minister submitted that the gist of the appellant's case was that the delegate had made a finding that the appellant had transported goods for the LTTE. The Minister submitted that the delegate's statement did not constitute a conclusive finding for the purposes of the facts in issue on the review because the delegate went on to say that in light of the conflict having been over for some time, that would not lead the appellant to have a relevant profile for the purpose of a real risk of serious harm.
40 Further and independently, the phrase the appellant focused on could be read as meaning "even if it were the case that" the appellant had transported some goods for the LTTE, rather than "it is a fact that the appellant transported goods for the LTTE". Or it was equally possible that the phrase was intended to refer to the appellant's brother transporting some goods for the LTTE.
41 The Minister submitted that the claim made by the appellant's advisor in the submission to the Authority dated 8 August 2016 was inconsistent with the claims that had actually been made by the appellant, as the Authority noted.
42 Further, the Authority was not required to consider a new claim that it lawfully excluded under s 473DD. The Minister submitted that the appellant's reliance on BMB16 was misconceived.
43 The Minister submitted that no error could be found to flow from a finding by the Authority that, as the appellant had never claimed to have had any involvement with the LTTE, the statement by his advisor in a post-decision submission to the Authority constituted "new information", notwithstanding what was said in the delegate's reasons at [60]. Thus the statement was correctly not considered, not least because, as new information, it did not meet the criteria for the consideration of "new information" set out in s 473DD.
44 In my opinion, what the delegate said at [60] did not constitute a finding that the appellant has a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE as contained in the submission of the appellant's legal representative in his letter of 8 August 2016 to the Authority or a finding of a possibility to that effect. This follows both from the conditional nature of what the delegate said and the absence of any such claim before the delegate on the part of the appellant. The information that the appellant "has a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE" was therefore, in my opinion, information that was not before the Minister within the meaning of s 473DC(1)(a). It follows that it was new information which the Authority was obliged not to consider unless the Authority was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering it and the appellant satisfied the Authority that the new information could not have been provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision.
45 It also follows that, because the delegate did not make a finding that the appellant has a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE or a finding of a possibility to that effect, the Authority did not fail to complete its review by not further considering that material and I would distinguish BMB16, at [87] per Charlesworth J, on this basis. In any event I note what the Authority said as to the appellant's evidence not suggesting he in fact had any connection with the LTTE: see particularly [24] and [33] of the Authority's reasons.
46 It follows, in my view, that there was no jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority and no error in the conclusion of the primary judge at [21] that there was no error in the Authority's approach to the appellant's submissions, that is, in not taking into account what the Authority found was excluded under s 473DD. I accept the Minister's submission that the Authority was not required to consider a new claim founded on information it lawfully excluded under s 473DD.
47 For completeness, I find there is no basis for any challenge to the Authority's statement, at [6], that the appellant stated unequivocally that he had no involvement with the LTTE at all. This is because what the appellant said at the entry interview and the SHEV interview is not before the Court and because of the strong implication to the effect, that the appellant said he had no involvement with the LTTE at all, in the delegate's reasons, especially at [24] and [33].