Nevertheless, the order reversing the decision of Irvine C.J. was in my opinion right. The termination of the estate limited for the joint lives of the nephews upon the death of John throws no light upon the meaning of the succeeding clause, "and on the death of either of them in trust as to the undivided moiety held in trust for him for his sons ... who shall attain the age of twenty-one years." "Either" is not a technical word, it is a distributive word, and may mean one of two, or each of two - depending upon the subject matter and the context. A common grammatical illustration will suffice: "You can take either side," that is one side or the other; "The river overflowed on either side," that is, on each side. Everyone seems to agree with Irvine C.J. that, reading the will as a whole, apart from certain merely technical words contained in it, the real intention of the testator was to make provision for each of his nephews during his life, and after his death a further provision in remainder for such of his sons as should attain the age of twenty-one years. "That such was his intention is ... not a matter of conjecture but of conviction." Any other construction results in a disposition that "may be described not only as capricious but almost as fantastic." But, if so, why cannot the non-technical word "either" be construed so as to accord with the intention of the testator gathered from the language of his will? It is not so intractable a word that the intention of the testator must be defeated. In my opinion, the words "on the death of either of them," in the context in which they are found, mean on the death of each of them. And it may be noticed that the words "either of my said nephews," where they occur a little later in the will, mean each of his nephews. It was pointed out, however, that this construction does not exhaust the difficulties of the will. The estate limited for the joint lives of the nephews is terminated upon the death of John, and there is no other disposition in favour of William. But the general provisions of the will may evince a contrary intention, upon which I express no opinion, or the residuary gift may take effect during his life. The matter is of little importance in the present case, for John died in 1928 and William in 1929. But even if the estate of William terminated with the death of John, still the succeeding gift operates and takes effect upon his death. All that can be said is that the testator has not sufficiently expressed his intention in the case of William but has done so as to his sons. Again, the gift, "but failing such sons attaining that age the said undivided moiety shall be held for the survivor" of the nephews "during his life", etc., throws light, it is said, upon the preceding gift, and indeed controls its interpretation. But, on the interpretation of the preceding clause which I adopt, the difficulty under this clause only arises from the use of the word "survivor," and in the case of one nephew dying leaving sons and the other nephew then dying leaving no sons. The sons of the nephew first so dying are not sons of a survivor. It was suggested that the whole difficulty was met if the word "survivor" were read "other." But if the testator's intention in the preceding clause is clear, as I think it is, then there is no reason why effect should not be given to it because the testator's subsequent dispositions are difficult in application or fail to provide for all cases that may arise. The difficulty suggested has not in fact arisen and never will arise: each nephew died leaving sons.