The authorities
22Counsel for CSR referred to Ah Dar v State Transit Authority of New South Wales (2007) 69 NSWLR 468; and again to Energy Australia v Butler and Fairfield City Council v Brear . Counsel for WorkCover also referred to Estate of Brockman v Brockman Metal Roofing Pty Limited [2006] NSWSC 235; Symbion Health Limited v Hrouda [2010] NSWSC 295 at [86] - [92] and Fletcher International Exports Pty Limited v Lott & Anor [2010] NSWCA 63 at [40] to [51]. WorkCover submitted that this Court should prefer the approach Brockman v Brockman as it considered the construction of the Act. All of these cases except Fletcher International Exports v Lott involve the exercise of the discretion of the Appeal Panel in determining whether or not to hold an assessment hearing pursuant to s 328 of the Act.
23In Ah Dar v State Transit Authority , Mr Ah Dar, a bus driver, suffered an injury to his left knee at work. His application to resolve his dispute was made under the Act. Mr Ah Dar filed an application to appeal against the assessment of the AMS. He had objected to the determination of the appeal without a hearing. The Appeal Panel had dealt with the appeal on the papers in the mistaken belief that both sides had consented to that manner of determination. Bell J stated at [67] that while it is accepted that it was open to the Appeal Panel to determine that the appeal would proceed without an assessment hearing, there is force to the complaint that the Appeal Panel's discretion to decide whether to hold as assessment hearing was not properly exercised. Her Honour stated that this discretion was not exercised at all because the Appeal Panel, wrongly, understood that each of the parties to this medical dispute wanted the appeal to be determined on the papers. In Ah Dar v State Transit , Bell J concluded that the resulting determination was attended by jurisdictional error. As a consequence the determination of the Registrar and the Appeal Panel were quashed with the matter was referred back for assessment.
24Fairfield City Council v Brear , is a case where the Appeal Panel without notice to the parties dealt with the matter on a basis that went outside the contents of the written submissions. Both parties had submitted that the 2 nd edition of the Guidelines applied. The Appeal Panel without notice to the parties dealt with the matter on a different basis. Barr AJ referred to a long line of authority concerning the right of the parties to be heard that were summarised in the decision Seltsam Pty Ltd v Ghaleb [2005] NSWCA 208 at [7] where Mason P stated:
"[7] Secondly, there is virtually no means of discovering the impact of the secret material upon the mind of the adjudicator without transgressing the very assumptions underlying the doctrines of procedural fairness and of judicial (or limited appellate) review. I agree with Professor D J Galligan who wrote ("Procedural Fairness" in Peter Birks ed, The Frontiers of Liability Vol 1, 1994):
'How can the court know with any certainty that evidence and argument from a party would have made no difference? It simply cannot know in the sense of knowledge as justified belief. Facts, truth, insight, all emerge from argument and discourse, and the clearest case can easily give way to doubt. Megarry V-C put the point well: " ... the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change."[ John v Rees [1970] Ch 354 at 402]
The difficulty is compounded when we take into account the special position of the courts in exercising judicial review; their task is to decide matters of legality and procedure, not to assess the merits. The court faces a dilemma: to judge that a procedure would have made no difference to the original decision, the court has to put itself in the place of the decision-maker; but the more it does that, the closer it comes to an assessment of the merits. This difficulty points to an approach which, in most cases, is the most sensible: since they cannot know with any certainty the effects of the procedural defect, the courts would be wise to order that the procedural requirements be upheld. This need not be inflexible, and there may be exceptions; but exceptions should need to pass a clear and compelling test, and rarely be allowed.'"
25In Fairfield City Council v Brear , Barr AJ concluded that because Fairfield Council had no way of knowing that the Appeal Panel was to depart from the basis of applicability of the second edition of the Guidelines, it was denied procedural fairness. Barr AJ stated that as soon as the Appeal Panel contemplated the possibility of the third and not the second edition of the Guidelines was that which applied, it ought to have informed the parties and afforded them an opportunity to make submissions. The failure to do so amounted to a denial of procedural fairness.
26In Energy Australia v Butler , Mr Butler suffered a number of injuries to his knee and over the years its condition continued to worsen. On 30 June 1995, in the Worker Compensation Commission he was awarded compensation under s 66 in respect of 15 per cent loss of the use of his leg at or above the knee. Dr Bye, the AMS, stated at [13] "I presume the date of injuries for the left leg at or above the knee is a Deemed Date, 30/6/1995 as his original injuries were in 1981." Dr Bye assessed the permanent percentage loss of function of the left leg as equal to 30 percent. It was implicit in Energy Australia's submissions to the Appeal Panel that the 30 June 1995 that had been adopted as the deemed date for injury to the knee was erroneous. While both parties accepted the 30 percent assessed for the loss of function of the left leg. Energy Australia submitted that the needed to be a deduction applied for the pre-existing abnormality and the certificated need to reflect the payment made for the previous 15 percent loss. The Appeal Panel without notice to the parties dealt with the matter on a basis not addressed in the written submissions of either side by determining that the dispute raised was one for the arbitrator to determine and it had no power to deal with it.
27Barr AJ, in Energy Australia v Butler , observed that there were substantial arguments that could have been put before the Appeal Panel which, if correct, were capable of showing that it would be wrong for the Appeal Panel to come to the decision it ultimately did.
28In Energy Australia v Butler at [26] Bar AJ continued:
"26 A party has the right to decline to consent to a hearing on the papers and to make oral submissions to a Tribunal: Ah Dar v State Transit Authority of NSW (2007) 69 NSWLR 468 per Bell J at [63]-[69]. That does not mean, of course, that in a proper case a tribunal may not, subject to the requirements of its statute, determine to deal with a matter without a requested oral hearing. But when a tribunal has been requested to give an opportunity to a party to make oral submissions, it needs to be confident that questions are unlikely to arise that call for oral submissions. And even if it so appears at first, if such questions arise during the course of its consideration the tribunal should be astute to recognise the fact and reconsider its original decision."
29Barr AJ decided at [31]:
"31 In my opinion the Panel ought to have realised when it decided to deal with the appeal on a basis contemplated by neither of the parties that they ought to have been given an opportunity to attend a hearing to make submissions. The Panel knew that the plaintiff had asked it not to deal with the matter on the papers. It ought to have known that the way in which it proposed to deal with the appeal was likely to raise substantial questions of a contentious nature. In my opinion the circumstances required the Panel to give the plaintiff the opportunity it had requested to attend and make oral submissions. In denying the plaintiff that opportunity the Panel failed to afford it procedural fairness."
30The determination of the Appeal Panel was quashed and the matter remitted to the Appeal Panel for determination.
31In Brockman v Brockman , the AMS in his supplementary certificate, made a determination that the permanent loss of function of the sexual organs was 100 per cent with nil pre-existing. This revised assessment was unacceptable to Brockman Metal Roofing. One of the medical specialists on the Appeal Panel, Dr Watters, re-examined Mr Brockman. MrBrockman (now deceased) was not served with a copy of Dr Watter's report and no hearing was afforded to him following Dr Watter's assessment. The Appeal Panel recorded the findings and opinion of Dr Watters on examination at paragraph 20 of its reasons.
32Studdert J in Brockman v Brockman considered s 328 and its Guidelines in force at that time. Submissions had been filed on behalf of the deceased, together with medical reports to the Appeal Panel and the deceased submitted that, "the appeal should be determined on the papers". But those submissions had been made before notice was given of the Appeal Panel's determination that there should be a medical examination. When the notice was given of the further examination it did not prompt the deceased to revise his submission that the matter should be determined on the papers.
33Studdert J in Brockman v Brockman stated (at [61]) that it was reasonable to conclude from the statement of the Appeal Panel's reasons that Dr Watters' examination influenced his decision and that his report influenced the other member of the Panel. Studdert J stated that the Appeal Panel was entitled to draw upon the expertise of one of its members, as plainly it did. It was entitled to take into account that expertise and the conclusions reached by that expert without disclosing those conclusions to the deceased, before coming to a final conclusion. Studdert J (at [65]) concluded that s 328 provided for an Appeal Panel being structured by three members, two of whom were to be approved medical specialists. Hence, it was only reasonable to assume that the deceased was on notice that the Appeal Panel would use the medical expertise and experience of its medical specialist members in its deliberations. It was Studdert J's view (at [67]) that he was not persuaded that the deceased was denied procedural fairness by the Appeal Panel and the Appeal Panel was entitled to act as it did. The application for judicial review was dismissed.
34In Symbion Health Limited v Hrouda , the Appeal Panel wrote to the parties and informed them that it would be considering an issue that had not been raised by either party. It was:
"Given that the respondent (the worker ...) has not smoked since the motor vehicle accident on 3 September 2003, which accident resulted in her having a coma [sic] and having amnesia for 7 weeks did the AMS err in attributing the respondent's partial loss of smell as a result of her smoking rather than the injuries she suffered in the accident."
35Symbion Health in its original submissions to the Appeal Panel and in its supplementary submissions made requests for a hearing to address the issue. The submissions did not elaborate in any further detail what issues it wished to address.
36In response, the Appeal Panel in Symbion Health Limited v Hrouda determined:
"... in the absence of any cogent reason being indicated by the appellant as to why it is necessary to hold an assessment hearing, the panel is of the view that it would derive no benefit in terms of its consideration and determination of the appeal by holding an assessment hearing."
37The argument presented by Symbion at the judicial review was that it was not for the Appeal Panel to speculate as to the benefit that it might derive from submissions until they were made. It was contended that the Appeal Panel effectively judged in advance the appellant's capacity to persuade it.
38Symbion also submitted that Guideline 45 was invalid so far as it is inconsistent with the obligation imposed by s 328(1) and there is an error on the face of the record in the Appeal Panel's refusing an application for hearing in the light of s 328(1). Hall J (at [74]) followed the decision of Studdert J in Brockman v Brockman and held that Guideline 45 is valid and not inconsistent with the provisions of s 328(1).
39So far as whether or not Symbion should have been afforded a hearing, Hall J stated at [79]:
"79 Accordingly, Symbion elected not to respond directly to the issue raised by the Panel in terms of the merits of the issue or otherwise. Further, it did not identify any reason or basis upon which it asserted a hearing was necessary for the purpose of addressing the issue. Thus, the comment made in para [14] of the Statement of Reasons of the Appeal Panel:
'... The Appellant neither indicated why it had not addressed fully this issue in its further written submissions nor what it was about this issue that necessitated the holding of an Assessment Hearing.'"
40In Symbion Health Limited v Hrouda , Hall J noted that in the absence of any cogent reasons (as quoted above) the Appeal Panel determined that it would not hold an assessment hearing. The issue was then whether Symbion had a legitimate grievance or complaint in contending, as it did, that it had been denied procedural fairness in the Appeal Panel failing to advise it before its final decision on 12 June 2009, that it refused its request for a hearing. Hall J decided that it did not.
41The final case referred to by WorkCover was Fletcher International Exports Pty Limited v Lott . It concerns whether the failure to grant an oral hearing under s 354 of the Act was an error in point of law. This authority concerns a different issue and is not of assistance here.