Crowley v Glissan (No 2) [1905] HCA 31

Crowley v Glissan (No 2) [1905] HCA 31 - HCA 1905 case summary — Zoe

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e prosecution was for the publication of a letter. At the he respondent endeavoured to establish, in order to show a f reasonable and probable cause on the part of the prose- yr, that the statements in the letter were true, and secondly it was for the public benefit that the matters should be hed. The appellant's counsel objected to evidence of this ng given, and the learned Judge admitted it, and, as I think, perly. I will not deal with the other charges contained he letter, as they are of minor importance, but will confine my ion to that contained in the sentence, "there is nothing but tion with Crowley and the directors." These words are n to many constructions. They were taken at the trial, and ated by the parties, by the learned Judge in his summing up, xy the Full Court, as asserting the existence of a course of 'ion between Crowley and the directors of the company. acts of Crowley, the appellant, were deposed to by the dent and his witnesses, which, it was said, amounted to f of corruption on the part of the appellant, and also on the tof the directors. It was treated as a charge of corruption en him and them in the management of the affairs of the ny. One of the charges made and sought to be supported e evidence was that the appellant had corruptly interfered h the election of directors on more than one occasion. It was ved that on another occasion he made away with ballot papers, also that he had forged a signature to ballot papers, which, ever, were not produced. Another charge was that he had ed ballot papers addressed to the scrutineers. I will not e about these matters, because the charges must be treated whole, and the defence can only be established by proving the thof the whole of the defamatory matters charged. I will e myself to the charge of corruption. One of the charges on a particular occasion an action for defamation was against the appellant by a discharged servant of the ny. He had in the course of his duty written a letter ich was alleged to be defamatory, and the jury took that view

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and gave a verdict against him for heavy damages. tors, perhaps thinking that it was through endeavouring t his duty to the company that he had incurred the liability, | him £1000 to pay the judgment debt, which he was to repay b instalments, and a year later increased his salary, at the s time increasing the salaries of other officers of the society. it was said, was evidence of corruption. Another charge was thi the appellant had at an early stage of the history of the compa received commission on business introduced by him to the cot pany, and that the directors had done the same thing. Accordin to the evidence every officer of the company did so. Whe that was right or not depends upon whether the persons were entitled to object were aware of it or not. Very likely was not right. Another charge was that in the case of one the directors who was insured for £1000, and was in ill-healtl the appellant allowed him to reduce his policy from £1000 t £400, and that in calculating the amount he was to get the company as the surrender value, he calculated the am at from £15 to £25 more than he ought to have got, it was said that the appellant got an advantage from because the director in question, by means of the money h received in this way, was enabled to pay the appellant a debt du to him. Finally there was a charge made in respect of adi who for many years was a debtor to the company. he was a debtor a rule was passed that, if any director be debtor to the company, he should cease to be a director, but had no application to the case of a member of the company was a debtor becoming a director. It was said that the appell had connived at members who owed money remaining dit and at their receiving commissions. There was some eviden ce all these points. There was evidence also for the defence. At th close of the plaintiff's case counsel for the defendant moved fi non-suit, on the ground that the plaintiff had not made out his The learned Judge refused the application, but reserved leave | move the Full Court to enter a non-suit. The point taken exactly the same as that taken before this Court; that the evid was not inconsistent with the existence of reasonable and prob cause for the prosecution. A rule nisi was asked for on

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always be considered, and the question for the jury in | case is this: taking the facts by reason of which it is that the publication was for the public benefit, including circumstances of the publication itself, whether on those | it was reasonable for the defendant to have considered th: was not for the public benefit that the libel should be publisk Putting the circumstances of the publication out of considerati we would have a merely abstract question left. The question was it for the public benefit that the libel should be lished under the circumstances in which it was published ? can the jury come to any conclusion upon such a question out looking at the surrounding circumstances ? They might fi that it was for the public benefit in some supposed case wh might never arise. Such a finding might have no relation tot publication the subject of the action. All the circums' : the publication must be taken into consideration by the j dealing with the question whether the publication was foi public benefit. I have no hesitation in saying in this case that, the first branch of the defence were established, the jury wo be entitled to say that a reasonable man under the cireumstat ought to have come to the conclusion that the publication was the public benefit. We have here a publie company, with s holders, and with all its transactions liable to public serutiny. - would be altogether unreasonable for a person in the posit the defendant, if the defamatory matter were true and he h reasonable ground for so believing it, to have come to the con sion that it was not for the publie benefit that it shou published. But, as I said before, that can have no practical b ing on this case, except on the assumption that the first b the defence had been established. The whole question is, there sufficient evidence to establish the position that the cire stances were inconsistent with the existence in the mind of defendant of an honest belief, founded upon reasonabl that the libellous matter was not true? Now, that brings me to Piddington's contention as to the meaning of the words of the lil The whole document must be read in dealing with that questi He very properly, I think, contended that there was only sentence which could be considered as seriously libellous, at

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to the whole letter. That sentence contained the allegation re was "nothing but corruption with Crowley and the etors." Now, it is quite true that in a case of libel, whether il or criminal, the meaning of the words is a question for the under all the circumstances of the case. And if this had n a prosecution for criminal libel, and the issue was to be deter- ed by the jury under the direction of the Judge, it would be t to them to say what was the fair and reasonable construction he words. But that is not the case where the question is as he attitude of mind of the person initiating the prosecution. entitled to take a reasonable view of the meaning of the s, and if he does take a reasonable view of their meaning, d honestly believes that the words as bearing that meaning ntrue, he is entitled all through the case to treat the words having that meaning. Now, interpreting this letter in the of the surrounding circumstances, it appears to me reason- capable of only one meaning, namely, that there was in the s between Crowley and the directors a system of corrup- But it is not necessary to go as far as that. As long as ley had reasonable grounds for putting that construction it he was protected. Further, as to the meaning of the , there is one circumstance which I think may fairly be n into consideration. Evidence was given of the letter of o which this was a reply. In that letter, according to intiff's evidence, Walters asked him if he had heard about rley and the directors carrying on, and said that Mr. Saunders, citor, had told him about it. Then he went on to mention the eof Punch. That is the whole of the matter of which he It is to those instances of alleged corruption between ley and the directors that the letter refers. We find also nce of the meaning placed upon the letter by Crowley him- at an early stage of the proceedings, in a letter written by a to the respondent on 2nd March, 1903. In that he says: "In nection with your letter of 2nd February to Mr. Walters, re is one sentence which neither my directors nor myself | allow to pass, that is, 'there is nothing but corruption | Crowley and the directors.'" Again, on 26th November,

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uses this expression, "If, as seems likely, this leniency has b mistakenly construed by you, well and good, they will then af you an opportunity of proving if there is the slightest shado truth in your damnable libel that ' there is nothing but corrup with Crowley and the directors.'" In view of that evidence clear that the serious part of this imputation was that wh volved the management of the company in a charge of corr For the purposes therefore of the question which had to be s mitted to the jury as to the honest belief, on reasonable grounds, the appellant that the defamatory matter was not true, it must. taken that it amounted to a charge of systematic corrup between him and the directors. Is there any evidence to lish that ? I must say that I can see none. There was eyi of three charges extending over a period of three years, chi made in connection with the management of elections. There) evidence to go to the jury to support these charges, but it app to me that they involve nothing more than improper con op the part of Crowley himself, not on the part of the di There is evidence of the charge as to the loan of £1000, but is no evidence of corruption in any of the circumstances connect with that. Then there is a charge as to the taking of comn i sion. His Honor the Chief Justice of New South Wales thou that in that there was some evidence of corruption. Corrup is something done knowingly with a dishonest intent. practice, though it may or may not be reprehensible, can certa not in any sense be called corrupt. It appears to have been of the regular business methods of the company openly carri on, for every person who introduced business to get a comm It seems to me that there is no evidence to establish eo between the general manager and the directors in doing sor thing which was apparently done openly and in the o routine of business. In addition to this, there is the el in reference to Hogan and Punch. I can see no evide whatever from which an unfavourable inference can be dra in regard to Hogan's case. As to that of Punch, evide given by the respondent establishes a state of facts cons tent with the charge of corruption. But, as was pointed m

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (114 paragraphs)

it was for the public benefit that it should be published.