Crawford v R

Personal circumstances of the applicant 14 The applicant was born in 1948 and so he was aged 61 at the time of the offence. 15He had no previous convictions in this State but in Queensland he had been convicted and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for the cultivation of cannabis in 1991 in circumstances remarkably similar to the manner in which he was doing so at Tumbulgum. The sentencing remarks in that case were tendered before the judge in the present case. They indicate that he had purchased a rural property and set up an underground hydroponic system. He had become involved in that endeavour because of financial difficulties; he had become bankrupt following an economic recession which occurred some years earlier. There was material before the sentencing judge attesting to the applicant being a man of otherwise good character. There was a recommendation that he be considered for release on parole after serving 12 months. 16A Pre Sentence Report prepared by the Probation and Parole Service ("the report") informed his Honour that the applicant had been happily married for 43 years. He and his wife had three adult children. His wife was experiencing some difficulties with her health. Very little else was provided as to his personal circumstances. 17The applicant told the author of the report that his motivation for offending was to provide financially for his immediate household until he qualified for the age pension. He appears to have been quite explicit in conceding that he was intent on financial gain alone. 18The only other matter of note in the report is that the applicant had been a co-operative inmate since going into custody following his arrest; he abided by routine, engaged in employment and was interested in pursuing studies.

The proceedings on sentence 19The applicant was represented in the District Court by a Queens Counsel very experienced and capable in criminal matters, Mr Rosser. 20The applicant did not give evidence. The matters of significance that were the subject of Mr Rosser's submissions were that there were no statutory aggravating factors (which the judge accepted). The objective seriousness of the offence was "no higher than the mid-range and probably a bit below that conceding if it was in thirds probably well within the second third". The supply offence was consequential to the cultivation offence and so the sentences should be concurrent (which the judge accepted). 21As to subjective matters relevant to sentence, it was conceded that "there are precious few of those". There had been an early plea of guilty (the judge accepted this and allowed for a reduction of 25 per cent for the utilitarian value of the plea). The applicant had co-operated in the application by the New South Wales Crime Commission for a forfeiture order which was relevant to his remorse (the judge accepted that there was remorse in any event by virtue of the plea of guilty). 22Of significance to one of the grounds of appeal, there was no submission that the judge should find special circumstances pursuant to s 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act so as to permit a reduction of the non-parole period to less than the usual 75 per cent of the head sentence.

Ground 1 The sentencing judge erred in the application of s 54B(2) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 by:

(a) adopting a now impugned two-stage process of sentencing and using the standard non-parole period as a starting point.

(b) failing to give a full statement of reasons for the specification of a non-parole period lower than the standard.

A two-staged approach? 23The judge sentenced the applicant at a time when it was thought that the correct approach to sentencing for offences carrying a standard non-parole period was as described in R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; (2004) 60 NSWLR 168. The High Court of Australia overturned R v Way some four months after the applicant was sentenced: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 ("Muldrock"). The applicant contends that the judge's approach conformed to R v Way and was contrary to the correct approach described in Muldrock. 24Muldrock held (at [26]) that it was "a mistake to give primary, let alone determinative, significance" to what was thought in R v Way to be a requirement of s 54B(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act to impose the standard non-parole period unless there were reasons for imposing a longer or shorter period. It was also held (at [28]) that nothing in Pt 4 Div 1A of that Act required or permitted a court to engage in a two-stage approach to sentencing for standard non-parole period offences, commencing with an assessment of whether the offence falls within the middle of the range of objective seriousness and, in the event that it does, by inquiring if there are matters justifying a longer or shorter period. 25The applicant's contentions turn on the following passages from the judge's sentencing remarks. After a review the facts of the applicant's offending, his Honour said: Well those facts are sufficient, in my view, to set out the surrounding circumstances in order for me to explain my assessment, which I have to make because of the nature of count 1 against Mr Crawford, as to where in the degree of seriousness these facts come. 26His Honour then considered whether there were any statutory aggravating factors present (s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act) and found there were none. He continued: I do not find any aggravating factors. That is all I do at the moment in connection with forming an assessment of where this comes in the range of criminality. I am quite satisfied it is properly described as midrange arguably it is above midrange but I am not going there, I leave it clearly in midrange. The degree of sophistication was significant, the quantities are significant, the planned rewards were significant, and I must say in reaching that conclusion I have been assisted by the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the matter of Stock [2011] NSWCCA 49, a matter in which I was involved at first instance, I do not see much distinction balancing one thing against the other as far as count 1 is concerned. 27His Honour then discussed the applicant's pleas of guilty and the question of remorse and then continued: So as far as mitigating factors are concerned there is the plea to be approached in the way in which I have indicated and there is really nothing else to add under subs (3) [of s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act], and those are the significant factors to be borne in mind when assessing the appropriate sentence for Mr Crawford. 28His Honour referred to some matters pertaining to the sentencing of the applicant's wife before returning to the applicant: Well having covered all those matters in the case of Mr Crawford, as I have said midrange, the non-parole period is of significance, had it not been for the plea in this case I would have regarded a sentence in the region of twelve years to be appropriate, and that is reduced to nine, and that, in my view, is consistent with the case of Stock. There is no basis upon which I can properly find any special circumstances. 29His Honour then imposed the sentences referred to earlier in this judgment. 30It may be inferred from the first of these extracts from the sentencing remarks that the judge considered it necessary to make a determination of the level of objective seriousness of the cultivation offence because of the prescription for it of a standard non-parole period. That inference is supported by the fact that he made no such determination of the objective seriousness of the supply offence. There is nothing wrong with a judge making such a determination (as to which see below); but it is why he did so, and what followed, that is significant. 31The second extract reveals the result of his Honour's determination, that the objective seriousness of the cultivation offence was "midrange". 32The third extract involved his Honour determining what mitigating factors were present. The sequence of his Honour's reasoning is indicative of him doing this in order to determine whether there was reason to impose something other than the standard non-parole period. He identified the plea of guilty and remorse. 33The final extract reveals his Honour's determination that, but for the plea, the sentence would have been one of 12 years. If that was the case, and there being no special circumstances, the non-parole period would have been 9 years. That is very close, but of course not identical to, the standard non-parole period of 10 years. 34His Honour's statement that "the non-parole period is of significance" is significant of itself. This was obviously a reference to the standard non-parole period. The difference between the notional non-parole period under the 12 year starting point of 9 years and the standard of 10 years, is open to be explained on the basis of the mitigating value of the applicant's remorse. 35The Crown submitted that the judge simply made a finding as to the level of objective seriousness, something that has always been a conventional feature of the sentencing process and not rendered erroneous by Muldrock: Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44, per Johnson J at [45]-[47]. It was submitted that the process adopted by the judge did not involve him assigning "determinative significance" to the standard non-parole period. 36While it is open to question whether the judge gave the standard non-parole period "determinative significance", I find the conclusion inescapable that his Honour regarded it as having "primary significance". Further, there are all the indications of his Honour having adopted the two-stage approach mandated by this Court in R v Way but found to be erroneous by the High Court in Muldrock.

Adequacy of reasons 37The second aspect of this ground may be dealt with briefly. Counsel for the applicant contended that the judge did not give a full statement of reasons for the specification of a non-parole period either higher or lower than the standard so as to assist appellate review and consistency in sentencing for Div 1A offences: Muldrock at [30]. However, her paraphrase from that paragraph must be considered in the context of what the High Court said in the previous paragraph: [29] A central purpose of Div 1A is to require sentencing judges to state fully the reasons for arriving at the sentence imposed. The reference in s 54B(4) to "mak[ing] a record of its reasons for increasing or reducing the standard non-parole period" is not to be understood as suggesting either the need to attribute particular mathematical values to matters regarded as significant to the formation of a sentence that differs from the standard non-parole period, or the need to classify the objective seriousness of the offending. It does require the judge to identify fully the facts, matters and circumstances which the judge concludes bear upon the judgment that is reached about the appropriate sentence to be imposed. ... 38In this case, all of the "facts, matters and circumstances" which the judge considered were relevant to his determination of sentence were exposed in his sentencing remarks. There was no inadequacy of reasons in this regard.

Conclusion on Ground 1 39I would uphold Ground 1(a) but not 1(b). I will come to a consideration of whether a lesser sentence was warranted and should have been passed (s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW)) in due course.

Ground 2 The learned sentencing judge erred in failing to have proper regard to the question of the special circumstances 40It would have been open to the judge in the exercise of his sentencing discretion to set a non-parole period for the cultivation offence at less than three-quarters of the total term if he was satisfied that there were special circumstances: s 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. But, as can be seen in the fourth extract from the sentencing remarks above, the judge considered there was no basis upon which he could "properly find any special circumstances". 41It was conceded in written submissions that "little had been put forward on behalf of the applicant in terms of mitigating circumstances as well as nothing put forward on the question of any finding of special circumstances". It was also conceded that the judge was not even invited to make such a finding. 42It was submitted, however, that the judge "did not have proper regard to the operation of special circumstances because there was no proper consideration of the mitigating factors some of which were available to enable a finding of special circumstances, e.g. the age of the applicant, motivation, remorse and the need for rehabilitation". 43Ignoring for the moment that the applicant's very experienced counsel did not consider it appropriate to invite the judge to consider finding special circumstances, the matters mentioned in the submissions in this Court did not mandate that such a finding be made. 44The judge was clearly aware of the applicant's "age"; not only did he refer to it (ROS 10) but the applicant was physically present in the court room. The applicant's "motivation" was irrelevant to the need for a longer parole period; indeed, the fact that he offended for reasons of greed was not a matter in his favour in any respect. "Remorse" was not ignored by the judge; he found in the applicant's favour on that subject. Finally, no attempt was made to explain in this Court (or the court below) why a longer parole period was required because of a "need for rehabilitation". 45It must be borne in mind that the sentence imposed entails a potential parole period of 2 years and 3 months. No submission was made in either court as to why a longer period of parole was necessary and should have been provided. 46Ground 2 has no merit.

Ground 3 The sentence imposed was, in all the circumstances, manifestly excessive 47It is unnecessary to determine this ground as the same issues, and more, fall to be considered by the question posed by s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act.

Is a lesser sentence warranted? 48There was no challenge to the finding by the judge that the objective seriousness of the cultivation offence was "midrange". 49The applicant had very little in terms of subjective matters standing in his favour beyond his plea of guilty and remorse. His age, 62 at the time of sentencing and 65 now, is of some significance but not greatly so. The Pre Sentence Report recorded that he takes medication for arthritis but that this condition did not prevent him from engaging in employment. 50The applicant was not to be punished further for his prior offence. But personal deterrence is a significant consideration, given the prior offence was almost identical; the applicant had served a term of imprisonment; and he chose to replicate such offending solely for financial gain. General deterrence is also important. 51To be taken into account as well are the legislative guideposts of the maximum penalty of 20 years and the standard non-parole period of 10 years. 52Affidavits were read in the event the Court came to consider re-sentencing. The applicant experienced a "coronary event" in custody in June 2012. A medical report appears to suggest that the situation is not terribly serious, relatively speaking for a person of his age. His wife continues to experience various issues of ill-health. And his son, aged 41, was diagnosed a few months after the applicant was sentenced with a "significant and disabling" disease. He lives with the applicant's wife who cares for him. They live on the Gold Coast and find it difficult to travel to Kempsey where the applicant is being held in the Mid North Coast Correctional Centre. 53Upon consideration of all of this I am persuaded that the Court should allow the appeal and re-sentence the applicant for the cultivation offence. I would adopt a starting point of 10 years and reduce that by 25 per cent for the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty. Like the sentencing judge, I see no basis for finding special circumstances.

Orders 54I propose the following orders:

1. Leave to appeal granted.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court for the offence of cultivating, by enhanced indoor means, a commercial quantity of cannabis.
4. In lieu, sentence the applicant to imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 5 years and 7 months with a balance of the term of the sentence of 1 year 11 months. The sentence is to date from 31 May 2010. The earliest day on which the applicant will become eligible to be released on parole is 31 December 2015. 55ADAMSON J: I agree with R A Hulme J.

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