Ground 1 - mis-construal of the law and asking the wrong question
22 By Ground 1 in the Notice of Appeal, the appellant contends that the IAA misconstrued the law and asked itself the wrong question when considering whether, for the purpose of s 36(2)(a), there was a real chance that he would suffer serious harm and whether, for the purpose of s 36(2)(aa), there was "a real risk" that he would suffer "significant harm". The error had occurred, the appellant submitted, because when considering these issues, the IAA had asked itself whether there had been a change in the security situation between some unknown time in the past, on the one hand, and the time of the decision, on the other, rather than assessing the risk the appellant would face in all the circumstances.
23 The contention was put in alternate ways:
instead of considering whether there had been a change or an increase in the risk, the IAA had been required to consider whether, in all of the circumstances, there was a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm, or a real risk of him suffering significant harm; and
the IAA had not considered whether the prospect of infrequent attacks occurring again in Kabul may present a real chance that the appellant would be harmed, if he returned to Kabul.
24 The appellant relied for these contentions on [39] and [40] of the IAA's reasons:
[39] After consideration of the above, I accept that there have been targeted attacks on Shias in Kabul in the past and the recent attack appears to have been directed specifically against Hazara Shias, with the expressed intention of possible further attacks. I also accept that ISKP/ISIS have demonstrated the potential to undertake occasional further high profile attacks in Kabul against Shias despite having limited influence. However the information before me still raises the question of whether the bombing is indicative of a change in Kabul's security situation to an extent that there is a real chance of serious harm for Shia Hazaras, such as the applicant, living in Kabul.
[40] I accept country information which indicates that insurgent groups continue to target high profile groups and places in Kabul, including government institutions, political figures, ANDSF, personnel associated with coalition forces, other security services, international organisations and diplomatic representatives of some countries. However the applicant does not have any profile or association with these groups which is likely to bring him to the attention of insurgents. Although the recent attack was on a high profile protest, and demonstrates the capacity of ISKP/ISIS to undertake high profile attacks in isolated circumstances, it is not indicative of an increased risk to an ordinary Shia Hazara living in Kabul. While I accept that there continue to be security issues in Kabul, I am not satisfied of the likelihood of ISIS or any other group, being able to perpetrate further attacks against the Shia Hazara community such as to establish that the applicant as a Shia Hazara, not engaged in such activities, will face a real chance of serious harm in Kabul. I therefore find that the applicant does not face a real chance of persecution as a Shia Hazara upon return to Kabul in the reasonably foreseeable future.
(Footnote omitted and emphasis added)
25 The appellant submitted that the emphasised passages in these paragraphs, in particular the last sentence in [39], indicated that the IAA had considered whether the appellant's fear of harm was well-founded by asking whether there had been a change in the security situation in Kabul to such an extent that there was now a real chance that Shia Hazaras, such as the appellant, who lived in Kabul may suffer serious harm.
26 The FCC Judge rejected this ground, at [31]-[32]. His Honour held that the IAA had referred to a possible change in the security situation in Kabul when considering the implications of new information received pursuant to s 473DD of the Act, namely, information concerning a suicide bombing targeting Hazaras which had occurred in Kabul on 23 July 2016. The Judge said that, when the IAA's reasons are read in context, it could be seen that the IAA had concluded, on the basis of country information, that the security situation before the 23 July 2016 bombing had not posed such a risk that it could be said that the appellant had faced a real chance of persecution, so that it had been pertinent for the IAA to enquire whether the suicide bombing reflected a change in the security situation and, if so, whether there was an increased risk to ordinary Shia Hazaras.
27 The submissions of the appellant did not identify any particular error or shortcoming in the reasons of the FCC Judge. Instead, the appellant invited the Court to make its own examination of the reasons of the IAA and to come to a conclusion as to their effect which differed from that of the FCC Judge.
28 It is appropriate to note the structure of the IAA's reasons. The IAA considered first the appellant's claims for protection pursuant to s 36(2)(a). It addressed, and made findings concerning, each of the three bases upon which the appellant claimed protection. As noted above, the IAA accepted many of the appellant's claims in that respect. It then considered separately the appellant's claim that his fear of harm related to the whole of Afghanistan, including Kabul. Paragraphs [39] and [40] appear in that section of the IAA's reasons.
29 In [36], the IAA accepted that the appellant would face the same difficulty in accessing the Hazara-majority provinces of Bamiyan and Daykundi as he would if returned to Ghazni. The IAA then considered in [37] the risk of harm which the appellant would face if he resided in Kabul. It commenced by noting the content of reports from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and recorded:
Shia Hazaras comprise 40-50% of Kabul's total population of approximately 4 million people;
the Afghan Government maintains effective control over Kabul, although insurgent and criminal violence is common;
the primary targets for insurgent attacks are Government institutions, political figures, Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), personnel associated with coalition forces, other security services, international organisations and diplomatic representatives of some countries; and
there have been a number of attacks against Shias in Kabul since 2001, including a suicide bombing in December 2011 and three "small" attacks (in September 2013, February 2014 and October 2015).
30 In [38], the IAA considered the information concerning the incident on 23 July 2016 when two bombs had exploded in the midst of a large protest by Shia Hazaras in Kabul, for which ISIS had claimed responsibility. It referred to the reports of various analysts concerning the implications of the July 2016 bombing. The IAA concluded [38] by referring to reports of analysts that "there is the likelihood of occasional further infrequent "one off" attacks being undertaken by ISIS within Kabul against targets which include religious minorities (mainly Shia Hazaras)" and which could result in mass casualties. It recorded that the analysts' reports did "not indicate that [ISIS] will conduct regular, sustained attacks in Kabul".
31 In my opinion, [39] and [40] understood in context tend to confirm that the IAA did address its attention to the correct question arising under s 5J of the Act. Earlier, in [11], the IAA had identified the elements of a "well-founded fear of persecution" for the purposes of s 5J which were relevant in the appellant's circumstances. These were:
• the person fears persecution and there is a real chance that the person would be persecuted
• the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the receiving country
• the persecution involves serious harm and systematic and discriminatory conduct
• the essential and significant reason (or reasons) for the persecution is race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion
• the person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person, and
• the person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if they could take reasonable steps to modify their behaviour, other than certain types of modification.
32 It was not suggested that this identification of the elements contained error.
33 Having found that the appellant did have a well-founded fear of persecution in relation to some areas of Afghanistan, the IAA then considered whether that fear existed in relation to all of Afghanistan. It found that that was so in relation to certain areas. It then considered more specifically whether the appellant's fear was well-founded in relation to Kabul.
34 Commencing with [37], the IAA referred to DFAT reports before considering the implications of the suicide bombing which had occurred in Kabul on 23 July 2016. It is unsurprising that the IAA considered whether the information concerning that bombing indicated a change in the position revealed by the DFAT reports. That is because the appellant's then representative had submitted that the 23 July 2016 bombing indicated two matters: first, that the security situation in Kabul was deteriorating; and, secondly, that the DFAT reports which pre-dated it should not be relied upon, at [7]. In that context, it was natural for the IAA to consider whether the bombing on 23 July 2016 was indicative of a change in the security situation.
35 In my view, reasonably and fairly understood, the reasons of the IAA indicate that, as serious as the incident of 23 July 2016 was, it did not indicate that the risk to "an ordinary Shia Hazara living in Kabul" was increased beyond that disclosed in the DFAT reports. The IAA then made its assessment on the basis of the information contained in the DFAT reports, but taking account of the information concerning the 23 July 2016 bombing.
36 In short, the IAA accepted that insurgent groups were continuing to target high profile groups and places in Kabul and that the bombing on 23 July 2016 indicated the capacity of particular groups to undertake high profile attacks in isolated circumstances. Nevertheless, because the appellant did not have any profile or association with the likely targets, the IAA concluded that he would not face a real chance of serious harm in Kabul. It did not reach that conclusion by considering only the effect of the change.
37 Accordingly, I do not consider that the reasons of the IAA reveal the error alleged in Ground 1. That ground is dismissed.