Consideration
20 As the appellants argued, the Authority was obliged to set out its reasons and its findings of fact and the evidence on which they were based. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 346 [69], McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker, in the position of the Authority, could reveal that there was some error of law, or a jurisdictional error in the way in which the decision-maker had proceeded to his, her, or its conclusion. They said, of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, that its
… identification of what it considered to be the material questions of fact may demonstrate that it took into account some irrelevant consideration, or that it did not take into account some relevant consideration (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24).
(emphasis in original)
21 While that is possible, it is also necessary to read the reasons of the decision-maker fairly as a whole. French CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ said in Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173 at 195-196 [59]-[60]:
In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang ((1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272), Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ approved the statement of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Neaves, French and Cooper JJ) in Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd ((1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287) that "[t]he reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error". …
The Delegate's letter must be read fairly as a whole. It is apparent that the Delegate expressed his conclusion in respect of the application in the paragraph before that on which the plaintiff has fixed. …
(emphasis added)
22 Here, the Authority was confronted with accounts of events that it considered to be implausible. The appellants make no challenge to its reasons for finding those accounts implausible. The Authority was then faced with a situation in which the country information on which it relied to find that implausibility also demonstrated that it was necessary, in order for them to have left Iran, that the appellants had to have had valid Iraqi passports. It found that because of the father's previous Iraqi citizenship when he had been expelled from Iraq in about 1979, fleeing to become a refugee in Iran, that he was a person who could reclaim and, in or by 2003, had reclaimed his Iraqi citizenship.
23 Once again, the appellants did not attack the findings of the Authority in coming to that conclusion. Their real attack was based on its findings about the adult children, by focusing on the Authority's wording of [49].
24 The Authority found that the essential reason why the appellants were able to depart Iran lawfully was that they must have had valid Iraqi passports. It is impossible to read [44] of its reasons in any other way than that the legally-issued passports were Iraqi ones. The Authority was entitled to arrive at that position, having considered the country information, because its evaluation of that information was a matter within its jurisdiction. As Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ said in NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13]:
… It is clear from its reasons for decision that the Tribunal did rely on 'country information' in making its assessment of the future, and that the conclusion that it reached was open to the Tribunal on the basis of the material it used. Both the choice and the assessment of the weight of such material were matters for the Tribunal. The Court cannot substitute its own view of the material, even if it had a different view from that reached by the Tribunal.
(emphasis added)
25 Here, the critical question for the Authority was to determine the country of which the appellants were citizens, in circumstances in which it did not believe their accounts of what had happened to them or their assertions that they had not been able to obtain, or regain their entitlement to, Iraqi citizenship. There was material before the Authority by which it was clear, at least from 2005, that the Constitution of Iraq allowed them to reclaim their Iraqi citizenship.
26 The Minister accepted that the evidence was silent about whether the law of Iraq had previously so provided. However, the country information in [3.10] of the DFAT report did not preclude the possibility that from 1991 displaced Faili Kurds, including children born in Iran to refugee Iraqis living there, were able to reclaim their Iraqi citizenship. There was evidence before the Authority that this could have been done at any time, including in 2003 and certainly in 2005. The fact that the position had been clarified and formalised in the later 2005 Constitution did not deprive the Authority of the capacity to interpret or rely on country information to come to its conclusion. That is so even if what it did in [49] was to find that the adult children had obtained Iraqi citizenship at, or very soon after, the destruction of their amayesh cards. However, given their accounts to the Authority that they were able to live without amayesh cards in Iran for some period after 2003, there was also material before it which did not require it to make a precise finding of the time at or by which they obtained their Iraqi citizenship.
27 Relevantly, the issue for the Authority was whether they were citizens of Iraq, and could be returned there in circumstances where, if they were, they had no fear that they would suffer significant or serious harm so as to engage Australia's protection obligations.
28 Accordingly, the appellants' argument that the Authority made a jurisdictional error by failing to have regard solely to the law of the receiving country, being Iraq, has no substance and must be rejected.
29 Likewise, the reasons of the Authority did not rely, as the appellants argued, only on what the DFAT report said about the 2005 Constitution. It relied generally on the DFAT report. That stated in [3.10] that Faili Kurds had been returning to Iraq since 2003 and some had also returned to Iraqi Kurdistan since the region had achieved de facto autonomy in 1991, and that many had since been able to reclaim their Iraqi citizenship. In those circumstances, where the report did not ascribe a particular year to when this process first operated, it was open to the Authority to make its own evaluation of the country material in arriving at its findings that, however they gained their Iraqi citizenship, by the time they left Iran the appellants did so on valid Iraqi passports: see NAHI [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13].