Covell Matthews v French Woolstone

Application for adjournment 4Mr Arnold's evidence having been rejected, the applicants seek an adjournment of the hearing of the motion, in order to enable the deficiencies in the evidence to be remediated. In substance, that what is envisaged is that Mr Arnold would opine, that it would be difficult for a business such as the restaurant conducted by the respondents to be maintained if the documents allegedly not produced were not maintained. 5It remains as open now as it did before Mr Arnold's report was read for the applicants to submit that the respondents were obliged to keep such documents as a matter of law. Whether that would support an inference that they in fact kept such documents and had them in their possession, custody or power at the time production was required is another matter, but I do not see how the rejection of Mr Arnold's opinion on a matter of law prejudices the applicants in any relevant way. 6Although there are some respects in which his report might have approached matters properly the subject of accountancy opinion, where it did - and those aspects were few - it was inadequately expressed to be a matter of expert opinion. For example, Mr Arnold gave evidence of what he would "expect", rather than what was standard or invariable practice. And even evidence of standard practice would be of dubious utility in a case in which the applicants bear the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 7To my mind, it is dubious that evidence of the kind proposed to be adduced - to the effect that it would be difficult as opposed to practically impossible - to maintain such a business, would suffice to permit an inference to be drawn that such documents at one time existed, in a case in which the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, as it is in a contempt application. And if there were an available inference that such documents existed at some time in the relevant period from 2006 to 2009 covered in the notice to produce and subpoenas, it would be a long bow to conclude from that, without more, beyond reasonable doubt, that such documents still existed in 2012. 8Accordingly, it seems to me that insofar as I have rejected those parts of Mr Arnold's opinion that amount to a conclusion of law, there is no prejudice to the applicants because they can still contend that that is the legal position without reliance on an accountant's opinion to that effect today. Insofar as I have rejected other aspects of his report which depend on accountancy practice, they seem to me to be a minor part of his report and it is dubious in the extreme that remediation of those defects would advance the applicant's case. Moreover, these are contempt proceedings; they involve serious allegations and serious consequences. They are interlocutory proceedings that interrupt and delay the progress of the substantive matter. They have been set down for months on the basis that the applicants' evidence is complete and they ought not remain hanging over the respondents' heads. In those circumstances I am not prepared to accede to the adjournment application.

Application for leave to discontinue 9The applicants now seek to discontinue the motion. Discontinuance is governed by UCPR r 12.1, the effect of which is that discontinuance of proceedings as a whole, or of any claim for relief in the proceedings, may be effected either with the consent of each other active party in the proceeding - which plainly is not the case here - or with the leave of the court. Accordingly, this is an application for leave to discontinue. 10It is a general principle that, although there may be exceptions, rarely will it be appropriate to grant leave to discontinue once the proceedings have proceeded to a contested hearing: see Stahlschmidt v Walford [1879] 4 QB 217; Re Alpha Company Limited [1903] 1 Ch 203; Stevens v Theatres Limited [1903] 1 Ch 860. This is because once the parties have defined their positions, prepared their cases and proceeded to a hearing it is ordinarily regarded as unfair to deprive a party who has obtained a forensic advantage of that advantage. For example, even where leave to discontinue is granted, where a defendant has gained some advantage leave to discontinue is usually granted on terms that preserve the advantage: see Covell Matthews v French Woolstone [1977] 2 All ER 591, 594 affirmed [1978] 2 All ER 800; Young Austin & Young Limited v British Medical Association [1977] 2 All ER 884; SCI Operations Pty Limited v Trade Practises Commission (1984) 2 FCR 113; Rydges Hotel Limited v Charles of the Ritz Ltd [No 8] (1987) 12 IPR 75. 11In my view, particularly having regard to the quasi-criminal nature of these proceedings, and the state they have reached, this is a case in which it would not be appropriate at this stage to grant leave to discontinue. 12That conclusion is fortified by the circumstance that there are other apparent obstacles to the applicants' claim, which would not apparently be overcome by an adjournment. 13In particular, it appears (1) that the order relied on as founding the contempt was not endorsed with a notice to party bound; (2) that it was not served personally on the fourth, fifth and sixth defendants; and (3) that the motion for contempt was not served personally on those defendants. All of those matters would require, at least, that the court be persuaded to dispense with compliance with the Rules, and while it might be persuaded to do so in the case of one non-compliance, bearing in mind the strict character of contempt proceedings, it might be thought unlikely that the court would be prepared to dispense with three defects in such compliance. 14Moreover, there is a very live question as to whether the order in respect of which contempt is alleged imposed any obligation on the respondents at all. As Black J explained in his Honour's judgment, the obligation to produce was imposed by the notice to produce and by the subpoena, and the effect of his Honour's order was to extend time for compliance, rather than to impose an obligation to produce. I have not reached any final view on that matter but, as presently advised, there is at least a very considerable difficulty for the applicants in that respect. 15Finally, the remedies sought are sequestration or fine, rather than attachment and committal of the directors of the defendants, and it might be thought unlikely that those remedies would advance the production of the documents in question in order to assist the plaintiffs prosecute the substantive case. 16None of that is to overlook that, while I am not in any position to express a view one way or the other as to whether it is the case, there may have been a failure to produce documents, and that failure may be important to the applicant's substantive case. However, it seems to me that there may be other remedies under the Rules, in connection with the enforcement of subpoenas and notices to produce, that may afford a far more useful means of securing the production of documents than this present application. 17As it seems to me, both by reason of the evidentiary deficiencies that have already emerged, and on account of the other apparent difficulties to which I have referred, it is far better that this matter be brought to a head now once and for all, rather than be protracted, while many of those difficulties will persist. 18I decline to grant leave to discontinue.

Disposal 19Leave to discontinue having been refused, the applicants offer no further evidence. In those circumstances, there is no case to answer, and the motion must be dismissed with costs.

Application for costs to be payable forthwith 20Although in a sense the contempt application is a discrete matter, it is, in reality an element in the plaintiffs' endeavours to obtain discovery to prosecute the substantive proceedings. While the submission that the costs should be payable forthwith is not without force, on balance, I do not consider as a matter of discretion, that a "forthwith" costs order is warranted. 21I decline to order that the costs be assessed forthwith.

Further directions 22I note that the plaintiffs' lay evidence in the substantive proceedings is complete. 23I direct that the defendants not be entitled to rely at the hearing without the leave of the Court on any lay evidence that has not been served by 8 March 2013. In this respect, if it is not practicable to obtain an affidavit from a proposed witness, service of a written outline of the evidence that the witness is expected to give, together with any documents that it is expected that that witness would prove, will suffice in lieu of an affidavit. 24I adjourn the proceedings to 15 March 2013 at 9.45 before me for further directions.

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