plaintiff. Practitioner's local practising certificate cancelled forthwith pursuant to s.425(3)(b) Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT); Tribunal recommends removal of the Practitioner's name from the local roll...
Key principles
Where a tribunal is called upon to determine whether a legal practitioner remains a 'fit and proper person' to practise, the relevant inquiry is whether the practitioner can be...
Conduct involving dishonesty, lack of integrity, attempts to intimidate or to dissuade a witness in disciplinary proceedings, and false representations to the professional body...
When separate charges share a common factual thread, they should not be compartmentalised; the tribunal may consider the interrelatedness of misconduct in assessing overall...
A practitioner's lack of remorse, denial of findings and absence of insight into the misconduct are relevant to whether there has been a change sufficient to displace a finding...
Issues before the court
Admissibility of affidavits tendered by the respondent after findings and during penalty hearing
Standard and scope of the 'fit and proper person' inquiry in disciplinary proceedings
Plain English Summary
The Tribunal upheld earlier findings that practitioner Stephen Stubbs engaged in serious misconduct including dishonesty, false statements to the Law Society and attempting to intimidate a witness. At the penalty hearing the Tribunal excluded parts of the practitioner's affidavit that contradicted the findings, found no remorse or insight, and treated the interrelated misconduct cumulatively. Applying the protective 'fit and proper person' test, the Tribunal cancelled his practising certificate under s.425(3)(b) and recommended removal from the roll under s.425(3)(a). Costs were reserved.
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Deep Dive
1,792 words · generated 14/06/2026
What happened
This decision concerns penalty after the Tribunal had already determined, on 1 February 2010, that the respondent (the Practitioner, later identified as Stephen Stubbs) breached the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT), and was guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct in LP 6 of 2008 and guilty of professional misconduct in LP 1 of 2009. The Tribunal's earlier reasons included detailed factual findings: false representation to the professional body about client instructions, and an attempt to intimidate a witness (referred to as DC) in connection with disciplinary proceedings (see the Tribunal's recitation of findings and its citation of paragraphs 201, 203 and 213 from the 1 February 2010 Reasons).
Whether separate instances of misconduct can be compartmentalised when assessing penalty
Assessing gravity of lack of honesty and threats to witnesses in disciplinary context
Cited legislation
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The Practitioner appealed to the Appeal President under s.79 of the ACAT Act; that appeal was struck out as incompetent on 31 March 2010. The matter then proceeded to a penalty hearing on 27 May 2010. The Practitioner swore an affidavit (10 May 2010) and sought to admit its contents; the Tribunal excluded substantive portions which contradicted its earlier findings, admitted a limited range of paragraphs and permitted cross-examination on those admitted passages. The Practitioner repeatedly denied wrongdoing and would not apologise, which the Tribunal found evidenced an absence of remorse and insight.
The Society sought cancellation of the practising certificate and recommended removal from the roll. The Tribunal concluded that the misconduct was grave, especially the attempt to intimidate a witness, and that the practitioner's continuing denial and lack of insight meant there was no evidence of change sufficient to displace a finding of unfitness. The Tribunal ordered cancellation of the local practising certificate pursuant to s.425(3)(b) and recommended that the Practitioner's name be removed from the roll pursuant to s.425(3)(a). Costs were reserved.
Key procedural markers:
Merits findings published 1 February 2010 (LP 6 of 2008 and LP 1 of 2009).
Appeal struck out 31 March 2010.
Penalty hearing 27 May 2010.
Order cancelling practising certificate and recommending removal from roll on 4 August 2010.
Why the court decided this way
The Tribunal's reasoning is governed by the protective inquiry articulated in authority: the task is not punishment but to determine whether the practitioner remains a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of a solicitor (quoting the High Court in A Solicitor v Law Society (NSW), Reasons for Decision [11]). The Tribunal applied that test to the proven misconduct.
The Tribunal identified central features of the practitioner's misconduct:
Dishonesty and lack of integrity in client matters (LP 6 of 2008), including attempts to minimise or cover up conduct in dealings with the Society (Reasons for Decision, referencing paragraphs 112, 114, 122–137 of the earlier decision).
False representations to the Society and acting without and contrary to client instructions (LP 1 of 2009, Grounds 1 and 2) which the Tribunal concluded would be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute (Reasons for Decision citing paragraphs 201 and 203).
An attempt to intimidate a witness (DC) in disciplinary proceedings (LP 1 of 2009, Ground 3), which the Tribunal described as a grave finding capable on its own to demonstrate unfitness (the Tribunal quoted its earlier paragraph 213: 'For an officer of the Court to attempt to... intimidate a witness ... is conduct which of itself would justify a finding that a person is not fit and proper to remain on the roll. It is certainly professional misconduct.').
The Tribunal considered the interrelated nature of the charges. It rejected the practitioner's submission that the charges could be compartmentalised and dealt with in isolation. Because the incidents shared a common factual thread, their cumulative effect informed the Tribunal's assessment of fitness and penalty (Reasons for Decision, LP 6 of 2008 section).
The Tribunal also considered the practitioner's state of mind and character post-finding. It relied on the practitioner's affidavit and evidence in cross-examination to conclude there was no remorse or insight, and indeed continued denial of wrongdoing (Reasons for Decision, 'The Submissions' and evidence extracts). The absence of insight and lack of evidence of reform were directly relevant to whether the practitioner remained fit to hold a practising certificate.
Finally, the Tribunal rejected mitigation proposals, supervision, fines, restrictions, courses, as manifestly inadequate in light of the gravity of dishonesty and the attempt to intimidate a witness. Instead, exercising its protective jurisdiction under s.425 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT), it ordered cancellation and recommended removal.
Before and after state of the law
Before this decision, the controlling principles were well established:
The protective 'fit and proper person' test (High Court authority and established appellate guidance).
The centrality of honesty and integrity in the legal profession; dishonesty or threats to witnesses are particularly serious.
This decision applies those principles to a fact pattern involving multiple interrelated breaches: false representation to the professional body, acting contrary to client instructions, and an attempt to intimidate a witness. The Tribunal's conclusions reinforce the following points:
Even if a particular charge is characterised as 'unsatisfactory professional conduct' rather than 'professional misconduct', where dishonesty and lack of integrity are present, the conduct may nonetheless be grave enough to justify cancellation or removal.
The interrelationship of charges allows a tribunal to assess cumulative unfitness; compartmentalisation is inappropriate where incidents form part of a common factual thread.
A practitioner's refusal to accept findings and lack of remorse or insight is highly consequential at penalty, often tipping the balance towards cancellation/removal rather than supervisory or rehabilitative sanctions.
The decision does not alter statutory powers, but it is a clear application of the protective jurisdiction and provides a detailed exemplar for how tribunals may reason to cancellation/recommendation of removal where dishonesty and threats are present and the practitioner shows no insight.
Key passages with plain-English translation
Quotation (Reasons for Decision [11]): "the question... is not one of punishment but 'whether the court is justified in holding out [the solicitor] as a fit and proper person...'"
Translation: The Tribunal's job is to decide whether this lawyer can be trusted to do legal work properly, not to punish him for past wrongdoing.
Quotation (Reasons for Decision [213]): "For an officer of the Court to attempt to dissuade, deter or intimidate a witness... is conduct which of itself would justify a finding that a person is not fit and proper to remain on the roll."
Translation: Trying to scare or stop a witness from testifying is so serious that, on its own, it can make a lawyer unfit to practise.
Quotation (Reasons for Decision under 'The Submissions'): "The Practitioner is not only not remorseful... but... to deny [the findings] shows no insight... gives this Tribunal no confidence that he has undergone any radical change..."
Translation: Because the lawyer keeps denying what the Tribunal found and shows no regret or understanding of how bad his behaviour was, the Tribunal does not believe he has reformed.
Quotation (Reasons for Decision referencing Cummins): "The legal profession has long required the highest standards of integrity."
Translation: Lawyers are expected to be especially honest and trustworthy because of the public role they play.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
This decision is squarely engaged by fact patterns involving:
Proven dishonesty by a practitioner in client matters which undermines client trust.
False representations to a professional regulatory body about client instructions or conduct.
Attempts to intimidate or dissuade a witness involved in disciplinary or court proceedings.
Multiple charges that are factually related and together show a pattern of ethical failures.
A practitioner's continuing denial of findings, lack of remorse and lack of insight following findings of misconduct.
Where those elements are present, especially in combination, this decision supports a penalty of cancellation of practising certificate and recommending removal from the roll.
How later courts have treated it
The decision itself cites and relies on established appellate authority: the High Court's formulation of the protective test (A Solicitor v Law Society (NSW)), the NSW Court of Appeal's emphasis on honesty and integrity (NSW Bar Association v Cummins), and tribunal decisions such as Slowgrove as works the Tribunal may follow or treat as persuasive. This ACAT decision is consistent with those authorities, particularly in emphasising:
The protective nature of the jurisdiction.
The gravity of attempts to intimidate witnesses.
The relevance of absence of insight in penalty.
Practitioners and tribunals facing similar facts will find this decision supportive of a strict approach to penalty where core professional virtues are breached and reform is not demonstrable. It is likely to be cited by regulatory bodies and tribunal members in submissions and decisions where threats to witnesses or dishonesty are present.
Still-open questions
Threshold for removal versus cancellation:
The Tribunal recommended removal from the roll and ordered cancellation of the practising certificate. The fine line when removal (as opposed to cancellation alone) is necessary remains a fact-specific judgment. This decision leans strongly towards removal where dishonesty is combined with threats and absence of insight, but it is not a rigid rule, subsequent tribunals must assess proportionality and prospects of rehabilitation.
The treatment of post-finding evidence:
The Tribunal excluded portions of the practitioner's affidavit that directly contradicted its earlier findings. The precise limits of permissible evidence on remorse and reform at penalty hearings can generate disputes; while this decision demonstrates judicial scepticism towards self-serving denials, a clearer articulation of the standard for admissibility of post-finding evidence would reduce uncertainty.
Interaction with criminal liability:
The Tribunal noted that the attempt to intimidate a witness could, depending on characterisation, amount to criminal conduct. How disciplinary findings ought to be coordinated with concurrent or potential criminal proceedings remains an area where procedural and substantive questions arise.
Rehabilitation and supervised practice as realistic remedies:
The Tribunal rejected supervised practice and course requirements as inadequate in this case. The circumstances in which supervision and remediation are an appropriate alternative to cancellation remain a nuanced inquiry, dependent on the nature of misconduct, indicators of insight and evidence of rehabilitation.
Consistency across jurisdictions:
While the Tribunal applied nationally recognised principles, differences in statutory framing and remedial powers across Australian jurisdictions mean that identical facts might yield different outcomes elsewhere. How tribunals elsewhere balance protective interests and the possibility of rehabilitation will continue to produce variable outcomes.
Concluding note: This decision reinforces that dishonesty and attempts to influence witnesses are among the most serious breaches of legal professional standards. Where misconduct is interlinked and the practitioner shows no insight or remorse, tribunals will be strongly inclined to use their protective powers to cancel practising certificates and to recommend removal from the roll.
Judgment (71 paragraphs)
[1]
COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY v THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER (Stephen Stubbs) (Occupational Discipline) [2010] ACAT 46 (4 August 2010)
[2]
COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY v THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER (****Stephen Stubbs) (Occupational Discipline) [2010] ACAT 46
[3]
Catchwords: OCCUPATIONAL DISCIPLINE - LEGAL PRACTITIONERS -unsatisfactory professional conduct - professional misconduct - admissibility of the practitioner's affidavit - fitness to be a legal practitioner - compartmentalisation of conduct - assessing the gravity of lack of honesty and integrity - penalty
TRIBUNAL: Professor P. Spender Presidential Member
[15]
The Tribunal orders that the respondent's local practising certificate be cancelled forthwith pursuant to s 425(3)(b) of the Legal Profession Act2006 (ACT).
[16]
The Tribunal recommends that the name of the Practitioner be removed from the local roll pursuant to s 425(3)(a) of the Legal Profession Act2006 (ACT).
[17]
On 1 February 2010, the Tribunal published its Reasons for Decision in relation to LP 6 of 2008 and LP 1 of 2009. The Tribunal made the following order:
[18]
Upon being satisfied that the respondent has breached rules 1.1, 1.2 and 39.1 of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT); and is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct in relation to LP 6 of 2008; and guilty of professional misconduct in relation to LP 1 of 2009, the Tribunal orders that:
[19]
the applications be stood over for further hearing concerning any orders to be made pursuant to s. 425 of the Legal Profession Act2006 (ACT).
[20]
The respondent (the 'Practitioner')[1] appealed against the findings and the order of the Tribunal pursuant to s. 79 of the ACTCivil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (the 'ACAT Act'). On 31 March 2010, the Appeal President heard the Practitioner's appeal and ordered that it be struck out as being incompetent.
[21]
Accordingly, this matter was listed for hearing in relation to penalty on 27 May 2010. Mr. Thomas of counsel appeared for the Practitioner and Mr. Beaumont of counsel appeared for the applicant (the 'Society').
[22]
On behalf of the Practitioner, Mr. Thomas sought to lead evidence contained in an affidavit sworn by the Practitioner on 10 May 2010. The Tribunal will return to the question of the admissibility of the contents of that affidavit shortly. No evidence was led by the Society. Comprehensive written submissions were filed on behalf of the Practitioner and the Society.[3] The submissions filed on behalf of both parties were of assistance to the Tribunal. Both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Beaumont made oral submissions[4] which were also of assistance to the Tribunal.
[23]
The Tribunal heard argument regarding the admissibility of the Practitioner's affidavit. With the exception of paragraphs 1 to 16, Mr. Beaumont objected to the affidavit. Mr. Thomas submitted that paragraphs 17 to 33 were relevant because until the appeal process was exhausted, the Practitioner was entitled to assert in sworn evidence that he did not accept the findings of the Tribunal.[5] Mr. Beaumont submitted that his objections to those paragraphs was put on the basis that it was in the form of substantive evidence, which contradicted the Tribunal's findings and was therefore inadmissible, although that evidence was relevant, he submitted, in a negative sense because the Practitioner was deposing to the fact that he did not accept those findings.[6] The Tribunal considered the submissions put on behalf of both parties and rejected paragraphs 17 to 33 of the Practitioner's affidavit.
[24]
Mr. Thomas pressed paragraphs 34 to 40. After hearing submissions on behalf of both parties,[7] the Tribunal rejected paragraphs 34 and 35 and allowed paragraphs 36 to 40.[8] The Tribunal then invited cross-examination of the Practitioner by Mr. Beaumont in light of the Tribunal's evidentiary ruling.
[25]
The Practitioner was cross-examined.[9] It is helpful to set out some relevant extracts of the cross-examination.[10]
[26]
Q: We've agreed that you deny that you attempted to intimidate [DC], correct?
[27]
You cannot apologise then for attempting to intimidate [DC], can you?
[28]
Q: Yes, but Mr...., my question was you don't apologise for any of the charges found against you, do you?
[29]
The Practitioner rejected all of the Tribunals' findings in relation to his very serious conduct, which constituted the charges and findings (LP 6 of 2008 - unsatisfactory professional conduct and LP 1 of 2009 - professional misconduct). This evidence and indeed the tenor of the submissions both oral and in writing put on behalf of the Practitioner, to which the Tribunal shall turn in due course, demonstrate to the Tribunal that first, the Practitioner is not only not remorseful about the conduct that the Tribunal found proven, but secondly, that he, in choosing in the face of the findings, to deny them, shows no insight into the serious nature of the conduct which goes to the very heart of the duties and obligations of legal practitioners. Thirdly, his stance in this regard gives this Tribunal no confidence that he has undergone any radical change that would be necessary to displace a finding of unfitness in relation to the charges.
[30]
In A Solicitor v Law Society (NSW)[11] the High Court said:
[31]
As Griffith CJ pointed out in Southern Law Society v Westbrook [(1910) [1910] HCA 31; 10 CLR 609 at 612], the question that arises when the power of the Supreme Court is invoked in such a case as the present is not one of punishment but "whether the court is justified in holding out [the solicitor in question] as a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of a solicitor".
[32]
The question, which the court and this Tribunal in such cases must pose for itself is this: bearing in mind the circumstances of the case before it, is the Tribunal justified in holding out the legal practitioner in question as 'a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the important duties and grave responsibilities which belong to a solicitor'?[12]
[33]
As to this aspect of the Tribunal's reasons for decision, we do not propose, for the main part, to set out again the comprehensive findings in relation to the charges. References to paragraph numbers in the Tribunal's reasons for decision published on 1 February 2010 will, in most instances, be made.
[34]
LP 6 of 2008 (Client N Complaint - finding of unprofessional conduct)
[35]
Notwithstanding that the Tribunal found that the Practitioner's conduct amounted to unprofessional conduct rather than professional misconduct, his conduct was, nonetheless very serious, involving dishonesty and demonstrating a lack of integrity. Moreover, the Tribunal found the Practitioner's conduct in covering up and/or attempting to minimise the seriousness of his conduct in his dealings with the Society to be 'preposterous'.[13]
[36]
As to those essential characteristics of honesty and integrity in a legal practitioner, the NSW Court of Appeal in NSW Bar Association v Cummins per Spigleman CJ said:[14]
[37]
Honesty and integrity are important in many spheres of conduct. However, in some spheres significant public interests are involved in the conduct of particular persons and the state regulates and restricts those who are entitled to engage in those activities and acquire privileges associated with a particular status. The legal profession has long required the highest standards of integrity.
[38]
There are four interrelated interests involved. Clients must feel secure in confiding their secrets and entrusting their most personal affairs to lawyers. Fellow practitioners must be able to depend implicitly on the word and behaviour of their colleagues. The judiciary must have confidence in those who appear before the courts. The public must have confidence in the legal profession by reason of the central role the profession plays in the administration of justice. Many aspects of the administration of justice depend on the trust by the judiciary and/or the public in the performance of professional obligations by professional people.
[39]
Mr. Beaumont submitted that even though the charges were to be considered separately, it was not possible and indeed commonsense dictates that they not be compartmentalised.[15] That is not the same thing, as Mr. Thomas suggested, as [aggregating] a whole series of diverse events in coming to a particular conclusion.[16] These events were not disparate or diverse. They shared a common factual thread.
[40]
The Tribunal is persuaded by the submissions put on behalf of the Society that the conduct cannot be compartmentalised or viewed in a vacuum and that is particularly so in this case when the facts and circumstances relating to all the charges are so closely interrelated or have some common factual connections.
[41]
True it was that the Tribunal did not make a finding of professional misconduct against the Practitioner in relation to the two grounds of this complaint, but that does not mean that the Tribunal did not regard the conduct, lacking in a grave manner as it did in honesty and integrity - characteristics going to the very heart of the obligations of a legal practitioner - as very serious indeed. The Tribunal rejects the submission put on behalf of the Practitioner that the appropriate penalty in respect of this charge is a restriction on the Practitioner's right to apply for an unrestricted certificate for five years together with supervision and the requirement that he undertake appropriate courses in legal practice and ethics. The Tribunal regards the suggested penalty as being manifestly inadequate and inappropriate.
[42]
At paragraphs 201 and 203 of the reasons for decision of 1 February 2010 this Tribunal stated as follows:
[43]
201. The Tribunal finds that the conduct charged is proven and is serious indeed. It goes to the very heart of the solicitor/client relationship and to those duties owed by a solicitor to his or her client that are fundamental to a legal practitioner's awareness of professional responsibility. Moreover, a solicitor owes a duty of candour and frankness in his or her dealings with his or her professional body. This duty is fundamental to the ethical duties of a solicitor. Breaches as serious as the ones charged in Grounds 1 and 2 warrant a finding of professional misconduct against the Practitioner and the Tribunal so finds.
[44]
203. Further, applying the general law test for professional misconduct, the question is; would acting without and contrary to instructions and then falsely representing to the Society that the client was present and gave those instructions be reasonably regarded by solicitors of good repute and competency as disgraceful or dishonourable? The answer must inevitably be yes.
[45]
The Tribunal is persuaded by Mr. Beaumont's submission in this respect,[17] that the professional misconduct found by this Tribunal in relation to grounds 1 and 2 of LP 1 of 2009, even taken in isolation, but, more particularly, when viewed with ground 3 of LP 1 of 2009 demonstrates comfortably that the Practitioner cannot be trusted by his clients or the public; by his professional association; by the Courts or Tribunals before whom he appears; by his fellow practitioners; and that the presence on the roll of someone who cannot be trusted even at this most basic level by his own peers, the Society, the Courts or clients is contrary to the interests of the administration of justice as well as the public interest.
[46]
At paragraph 213 of the reasons for decision of 1 February 2010 this Tribunal found:
[47]
213 ... For an officer of the Court to attempt to dissuade, deter or intimidate a witness from giving or adhering to their evidence in any proceedings, but especially disciplinary proceedings about that very solicitor, is conduct which of itself would justify a finding that a person is not fit and proper to remain on the roll. It is certainly professional misconduct.
[48]
In addition, the Tribunal also made related findings[18] of a very serious nature. It was submitted by Mr. Thomas that this conduct by the Practitioner while serious was nonetheless at the lower end of the scale of professional misconduct, because it did not involve conduct of a criminal nature. That submission however overlooks the threat to DC and the serious way in which such conduct might be characterized as a matter of criminal law. The Tribunal regards this finding, comfortably made, as the gravest of all the findings made against the Practitioner.
[49]
The Tribunal does not accept that this conduct is therefore at the lower or less serious end of the scale of professional misconduct. Mr. Thomas submitted that regulation by supervision of the Practitioner for a significant period of time, a fine, a restriction on his ability to obtain an unrestricted practising certificate and restricting the type of legal work that the Practitioner could engage in were all appropriate sanctions in these circumstances. Suffice to say, the Tribunal rejects that submission. Again, the Tribunal regards the submission as to the appropriate penalty for such conduct as suggested by Mr. Thomas as manifestly inadequate and inappropriate.
[50]
Rather, the Tribunal is persuaded by the submission put on behalf of the Society that the Tribunal's findings disclose fundamental flaws in the Practitioner's character namely, dishonesty, disloyalty and a manifold contempt for his ethical duties to the Society, his clients and the administration of justice.[19]
[51]
Moreover, there was no evidence that these undesirable flaws in the Practitioner's character have changed since being identified. Of major concern to the Tribunal was the evidence given by the Practitioner, which demonstrated that he plainly has no insight into the serious nature of his conduct. All of these factors indicate to the Tribunal the fundamental unfitness of this Practitioner to remain on the roll.
[52]
Mr. Thomas submitted that a finding of professional misconduct did not require that a legal practitioner's name be removed from the roll. The jurisdiction, he submitted, was a protective one. In support of this submission he relied on Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Slowgrove.[20] That case had a similar feature to the finding against the Practitioner in the present case regarding the threats made to DC. In Slowgrove the barrister had made a threat against the magistrate who was to hear a case involving the barrister's client. In Slowgrove there was a finding of professional misconduct and the Tribunal ordered, inter alia, that the practitioner's name be removed from the roll of practitioners. It is helpful to set out the whole of the relevant passage in Slowgrove. [21]
[53]
A finding of professional misconduct does not, of course, automatically lead to an order for removal of a Respondent's name from the Roll: Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v McCaffery [2004] NSWCA 470. However, where that finding involves, as here, a finding in effect that the misconduct proven demonstrates unfitness to practise, and where, as here, there is a strong basis for considering that that defect is still operative, it is a course that must be considered....
[54]
It was submitted by Mr. Beaumont[22] that, where there has been a finding of unfitness to practise, which is what the Tribunal has found in respect of the Practitioner, there is a firm basis for the order made in Slowgrove's case to be made. Mr. Beaumont submitted that if there was a finding, as here there has been, that the Practitioner is unfit to be on the roll of practitioners then a fortiori a practitioner is unfit to hold a practising certificate.[23] The Tribunal may only recommend removal from the roll, but the Tribunal has express statutory power to order that a practising certificate be cancelled.
[55]
Having regard to all of the charges, all of which have been proved, together with the findings, the Tribunal is comfortably satisfied that the appropriate penalty is to order that the Practitioner's practising certificate be cancelled forthwith and recommends that the Practitioner's name be removed from the roll of practitioners in the ACT.
[56]
APPLICANT: COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE ACT
[57]
TRIBUNAL MEMBER/S: P. SPENDER PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER
[58]
DATE/S OF HEARING: 27 May 2010 PLACE: CANBERRA
[59]
DATE/S OF DECISION: 4 August 2010 PLACE: CANBERRA
[60]
FULL REPORT ( ) CASE NOTE ( ) UNREPORTED DECISION ( )
[61]
[1] 2 This decision was previously anonymised and cited as Coun_cil of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v The Legal Practitioner [2010] ACAT 46 pursuant to section 423A of the Legal Profession Act 2006. As the appeal period has ended, the practitioner has now been identified in the citation of this decision. The reasons for decision otherwise remain unchanged from the date of publication._
[62]
[3] Society's written submissions dated 9 March 2020; Practitioner's written submissions dated 25 March 2010; and Society's written submissions in reply dated 6 April 2010.
[63]
[4] Transcript 27 May 2010 ('Transcript') p 38.15 - p 49.25.
# COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Respondent/Defendant:
THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER
Legislation Cited (3)
Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007
Solicitor's Act 1888
Profession Act 2006
Cases Cited (3)
(2004) 216 CLR 253
(1910) 10 CLR 609
(2001) 52 NSWLR 279
AI Analysis
Outcomeplaintiff
Disposition:
Practitioner's local practising certificate cancelled forthwith pursuant to s.425(3)(b) Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT); Tribunal recommends removal of the Practitioner's name from the local roll pursuant to s.425(3)(a); costs reserved (Orders dated 27 May 2010; Reasons dated 4 August 2010).