Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Liepins

General principles to be applied

The Solicitor's submissions. Mr Tudehope's contentions on behalf of the Solicitor, advanced at the hearing on 4 June 2015 and in written submissions filed on 14 August 2015, were to the following effect.
As a 'general proposition of law', the Solicitor is 'entitled to raise whatever matter he wishes on the question of penalty provided it is relevant and provided it does not cavil with a finding of the Tribunal'. A defendant in a criminal trial (who might be 'locked in prison') or in a Workcover prosecution is entitled to 'raise any matter on penalty that meets the criteria already mentioned'. Since the Solicitor might well be 'locked out of the profession', he too should be able to claim the benefit of this principle. The statements made by him in Exhibit 1 do not contradict the findings regarding his conduct that are set out in the liability decision. Instead, they amount to no more than 'explanations' of certain aspects of this conduct.
If the Law Society decides that matters alleged by the Solicitor in Exhibit 1 need to be met by further evidence, it may call that evidence. It will also be able to cross-examine the Solicitor. Any disadvantage that it suffers can be 'remedied by way of a costs order'.
It is not open to the Law Society to claim that since the evidence adduced in Exhibit 1 was rejected when it was tendered on the question of liability, it cannot now be adduced on the question of penalty. An argument along these lines is flawed because it 'fails to differentiate between the question of liability and the question of penalty in proceedings such as these where penalty is dealt with quite separately'.
Any claim by the Law Society that witnesses whom it might deem necessary to interview and call might have died or be unavailable for other reasons 'suffers from two difficulties'. First, it may transpire that the Society does not need to call any witnesses in order to respond to the evidence in Exhibit 1. Secondly, until enquiries are made, there is no way of knowing whether or not a witness would be available. '[T]he unavailability of some witnesses does not mean that the whole of [Exhibit 1] should be rejected.'
The 'overriding principle' that must be followed is 'fairness to a person who may suffer the indignity of the loss of his career, his livelihood, his reputation and the coincidental loss of friendships and the disruption to family life'. Consequently, 'the proper course' is for the Tribunal to 'receive the evidence and give it such weight as the Tribunal considers proper in the light of other evidence adduced and any cross-examination of the Respondent'.
(In reply to a suggestion, made by the Tribunal at the hearing on 4 June 2015, that there might be matters in Exhibit 1 that could be dealt with by reference to evidence already before it, without there being any need to receive evidence from the Solicitor) The Solicitor has an entitlement to 'make those same submissions in his Affidavit and leave himself open to cross-examination concerning the view of the evidence [that] he asks the Tribunal to adopt'. In these circumstances, he 'leaves himself open to a negative view being taken by the Tribunal on either or both [of] the particular explanation he wishes to make and his credit in general… [O]n the other side of the coin, the Respondent's submissions may be enhanced by the Respondent's performance under cross-examination and he is entitled to such an advantage if that can be gained'. In either event, the principle to be applied is the principle already stated: the Solicitor is 'entitled to raise any matter in evidence on penalty provided it is relevant and provided it does not cavil with the decision the Tribunal has already made concerning his conduct.'
The Law Society's submissions. The Society's arguments at the hearing on 4 June 2015 and in written submissions filed on 30 September 2015 were along the following lines.
Even though the Solicitor has sought to characterise as 'explanations' a number of statements in Exhibit 1 relating to the conduct by him described in the Application, most of these statements actually contest the findings that were made in the liability decision on the basis of undisputed evidence. '[T]o suggest that evidence as to [the Solicitor's] belief is admissible on the question of orders whilst not on findings of fact, fails to either comprehend or acknowledge that the question of belief… would be a matter for consideration in the initial finding of fact'. The Solicitor accordingly cannot maintain that in Exhibit 1 he is not 'cavilling with' these findings.
It cannot be doubted that the Tribunal is 'functus on any finding of fact already made' in the liability decision. There must be 'finality' in its 'consideration of the facts'. If the Tribunal were now to admit the contested allegations made in Exhibit 1, it might well have to 're-consider the evidence supporting some or all of its findings'. The Solicitor's tender of an earlier affidavit containing these allegations has been rejected by the Tribunal, for the reasons set out in the liability decision.
It is indisputable that the Solicitor was 'given the utmost leeway by the Tribunal on the filing of his evidence'. In consequence, 'by the time the first stage hearing was finalised, the proceedings had been on foot for nearly three years'. For these reasons in particular, any disadvantage suffered by the Law Society through having to contact potential witnesses (some of whom may not have provided evidence in the Law Society's case) and obtain evidence in reply from them could not be sufficiently remedied by costs orders and by the Solicitor himself becoming available for cross-examination. Indeed, the Society might not be able to locate a key witness who could contradict exculpatory material contained in Exhibit 1. The Tribunal might then end up with two conflicting findings, one based on the Law Society's evidence and the other based on the evidence in this Exhibit.
For the foregoing reasons, the principle stated at the commencement of the Solicitor's submissions on admissibility should be significantly modified. It should read as follows: the Solicitor is 'entitled to raise whatever matter he wishes on the question of penalty provided it is relevant and provided it does not cavil with the decision the Tribunal has already made and relied upon concerning his conduct or the facts upon which it relied in making its decision' (emphasis in the original).
This is not to deny that the Law Society may have to procure further evidence in order to respond to evidence put on by the Solicitor (for example, as to his good character) that properly relates to the matter of penalty. What it should not have to do is to seek further evidence bearing upon a finding of the Tribunal already made in the liability decision.
Any assertions in Exhibit 1 that potentially favour the Solicitor and are substantiated in the evidence that the Law Society has already put before the Tribunal must be excluded on the ground of lack of relevance. Such assertions would effectively constitute submissions on the matter of penalty. Affidavits should not, however, be used as 'a vehicle for the making of submissions'. Their sole purpose is the provision of evidence.
Finally, a limited number of statements contained in Exhibit 1 are open to the separate objection that they are vague and/or speculative.
Discussion and conclusions. In my opinion, the arguments advanced by the Law Society on these questions of admissibility are broadly correct. But I would prefer to set out my own reasoning on this topic.
The parties' submissions did not refer to any legislative instrument or decided case bearing on the primary question to be resolved in the present decision: namely, the extent (if any) to which a respondent solicitor or barrister in disciplinary proceedings may at the penalty stage adduce evidence which he or she has not previously put before the Tribunal and which relates to the conduct on his or her part on which the Tribunal has already recorded its findings following the liability hearing.
In the procedural rules of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (where these proceedings commenced) and those of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (where they are now being conducted), no mention was or is made of the 'two stage procedure' - involving what I will call a 'liability stage' and a 'penalty stage' - that has been adopted in the present proceedings. But in these Tribunals, it was and is common practice to adopt this procedure.
A two-stage procedure is in fact implicitly required by four provisions within Part 5 of the LP Act. Section 553 directs the Tribunal to 'conduct a hearing into each allegation particularised in' the disciplinary application with which it is dealing. Section 555 empowers it to vary any such application, provided certain conditions are satisfied. Section 558 (now cl 20 of Sch 5 of the NCAT Act) requires it to 'observe the rules of law governing the admission of evidence'. Finally s 562(1) gives the following important instruction to the Tribunal: If, after it has completed a hearing under this Part in relation to a complaint against an Australian legal practitioner, the Tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the Tribunal may make such orders as it thinks fit, including any one or more orders specified in this section (my emphasis).
The ensuing subsections of s 562 list a number of orders, including (in subs (2)(a)) the order sought by the Law Society in this case: namely, removal of the Solicitor's name from the local roll.
These provisions indicate that the Tribunal's 'hearing into each allegation particularised in' the Application is to be distinguished from, and must be 'completed' before, any subsequent hearing or other procedural step whereby the Tribunal, having made a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, determines what order or orders (if any) should be made under s 562.
In the Court of Appeal's decision in King v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 353, the failure by the Medical Tribunal to adopt a 'two-stage procedure' in disciplinary proceedings instituted under the Medical Practice Act 1992 against a medical practitioner was held to amount to a denial of procedural fairness. The following passage in the judgment of Handley AJA at [202 - 205], appearing under the heading 'No separate hearing on penalty', explains the Court's reasoning: 202 The last ground of appeal alleged that the Tribunal should have published its findings and given the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence and make submissions on the appropriate orders consequential on those findings. In ordering deregistration without giving the appellant this opportunity the Tribunal acted in breach of its duty of procedural fairness. 203 The need for a second sentencing stage is an accepted feature of the criminal process. In Forge v ASIC [2004] NSWCA 448, 213 ALR 514 [417]-[427] this Court applied the principle to proceedings for civil penalties against directors which could involve disqualification. In Hall v New South Wales Trotting Club Limited [1977] 1 NSWLR 378 the principle was applied to proceedings in a domestic tribunal involving possible expulsion from a voluntary association. In that case Hutley JA said at p 382: "... a person found guilty cannot really address until he knows of what he has been found guilty." 204 In Lucire [2011] NSWCA 99 [65] Basten JA, giving the principal judgment, said that the practitioner: "... should not have been required to address submissions to the Tribunal on the appropriate orders until the Tribunal had determined whether and in what respects her conduct constituted professional misconduct." 205 In my judgment this ground of appeal succeeds, and the orders of the Tribunal should be set aside…
The proceedings in Lucire v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 99, to which Handley AJA referred at [204], were also disciplinary proceedings under the Medical Practice Act.
In view of Mr Tudehope's submission (see [26] above) that the present proceedings should be treated as analogous to criminal proceedings, a further dictum from King should be mentioned. At [6], McColl JA, in the course of determining whether the complaint against the practitioner was sufficiently particularised, held that there was no 'apt analogy' between the disciplinary regime under the Medical Practice Act and the 'jurisprudence relating to the commencement of criminal proceedings'.
In determining what I have called (at [41] above) the 'primary question' arising from the Law Society's objections to Exhibit 1, it is vital to bear in mind that in many if not most instances, a determination by the Tribunal that professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct has been committed does not follow automatically from a series of factual findings that it has made with regard to the specific acts and omissions of the practitioner that have been particularised in the disciplinary application.
This proposition is most clearly illustrated in cases, like the present, where the Tribunal makes a finding of professional misconduct at common law. The established test for this form of misconduct - whether the conduct in question would be regarded as 'disgraceful and dishonourable' by 'competent and reputable' members of the legal profession - manifestly requires a value judgment based on the careful assessment of many aspects of this conduct. Equally, a value judgment is required when determining under s 498(1)(a) whether a breach of a provision of the LP Act should be held to constitute professional misconduct, unsatisfactory professional conduct or neither of these. The same applies when the Tribunal is deciding whether non-compliance with a notice under s 660 amounts to professional misconduct. It must assess whether any 'excuse' put forward by the respondent practitioner is a 'reasonable' one: see s 676(3) and (4).
For these reasons, I would rephrase as follows a proposition quoted above at [36] from the Law Society's submissions: '[T]o suggest that evidence as to [the Solicitor's] belief regarding aspects of his conduct described in the Application is admissible on the question of orders whilst not on findings of fact or on the Tribunal's finding that the Solicitor was guilty of professional misconduct, fails to either comprehend or acknowledge that the question of belief… would be a matter for consideration in the initial finding of fact and/or in the finding of professional misconduct.'
To take the matter one stage further, if the Solicitor had adduced during the hearing on liability the 'explanations' (to use Mr Tudehope's term) that he now puts forward for aspects of the conduct on his part that has been alleged, found proven and held to constitute professional misconduct, the Tribunal might have arrived at a different characterisation of this conduct. It might conceivably have held that this was a case of unsatisfactory professional conduct only. Conversely, if in comparable proceedings the Tribunal made a determination of unsatisfactory professional conduct but then permitted the respondent practitioner to offer 'explanations' of this conduct in an affidavit tendered at the hearing on penalty, the applicant, through tendering evidence in reply, might well induce the Tribunal to believe that a finding of professional misconduct would have been more appropriate.
For these reasons, the cumulative effect of allowing a legal practitioner to put forward numerous 'explanations' of a series of acts and/or omissions by him or her that the Tribunal has held to constitute professional misconduct may well be to undermine substantially the legitimacy of this ruling. This outcome should not be permitted. In this set of circumstances, as in many others occurring in litigation, the principle of finality must prevail.
In a number of passages in Exhibit 1, the Solicitor has made allegations about the conduct of individuals (including former clients and persons whom he employed in his firm) which would, if accepted, assist him to 'explain' his conduct. Some of these allegations are in conflict with affidavit evidence from the relevant individual forming part of the Law Society's case on liability. This evidence was not challenged by the Solicitor at the hearing on liability. Other such allegations refer to conduct by a person from whom the Law Society did not obtain evidence.
With regard to these passages in Exhibit 1, I agree with the following contentions of the Law Society. If its objections to them were rejected, the Society would or might be compelled to seek evidence from the relevant individuals about these allegations by the Solicitor. Since the Tribunal has completed the inquiry required by the LP Act into the Society's allegations against the Solicitor, this task should not now be imposed upon it.
My conclusions about the 'primary question' may accordingly be summed up as follows. In the present proceedings, the Tribunal has 'completed' its 'hearing into each allegation particularised in' the Application, recorded its findings regarding the conduct of the Solicitor described in the Application and declared itself to be 'satisfied' that the Solicitor has 'engaged in… professional misconduct' (the quoted phrases in this sentence are drawn from ss 553 and 562(1) of the LP Act). For the purpose of determining what order or orders (if any) it should now make under s 562, it should not admit evidence relating to this conduct that is now tendered by the Solicitor.
This conclusion would be equally applicable if the Solicitor had adduced some evidence at the hearing on liability and now sought only to supplement this evidence to a limited extent. It is all the more justifiable in the present case by virtue of the lengthy delay occasioned by the Solicitor's failures to (a) comply with directions for the filing of his evidence in response to the Law Society's affidavits and (b) furnish a verified explanation for these failures. I do not accept Mr Tudehope's contention that a costs order would constitute a sufficient remedy for any difficulties (which might be substantial) that the Law Society might encounter in trying at this late stage to obtain evidence in response to the parts of Exhibit 1 to which it has objected.
I agree with the Law Society's submission that any allegation made in Exhibit 1 which potentially favours the Solicitor but has already been put before the Tribunal in the Law Society's evidence is inadmissible on the ground of lack of relevance. It is entirely open to the Solicitor to draw attention to this part of the admitted evidence in his submissions on penalty and argue that it should be taken into account by the Tribunal.
A comment should be made about Mr Tudehope's opposition to a proposition that appears to have been advanced by the Law Society. As indicated above at [28], this was that since the evidence adduced in Exhibit 1 was rejected when it was tendered on the question of liability, it could not now be adduced on the question of penalty. But in fact, the evidence in question was never formally tendered at the hearing on liability. Instead, the application made by Mr Marsh, appearing for the Solicitor, was for leave to tender an earlier affidavit by the Solicitor containing this evidence. For the reasons given in the liability decision at [21 - 22] (quoted above at [14]), leave was refused.

Rulings on admissibility

Through applying these principles to the contested passages in Exhibit 1, I have come to the conclusion that all of the Law Society's objections should be upheld.
I do not propose to explain my detailed reasons for this conclusion with regard to each of the numerous contested passages. It will suffice to discuss a representative sample comprising three sets of allegations made within these passages.
In so doing, I will refer to relevant paragraphs of the Grounds and Particulars of the Application, which are quoted in full in the liability decision at [28]. These Grounds and Particulars are divided in eight Sections (A to H), each of which relates to the affairs of a former client of the Solicitor. One or more separate Grounds (usually numbered (i), (ii) etc) are set out at the top of each Section. The Particulars appearing in each Section are individually numbered 1, 2, 3 etc. I will refer to them as P1, P2, P3 etc.
In Exhibit 1 the scheme of letters and numbers used in the Grounds and Particulars is adopted to some extent.
Section A: Estate Late Wladyslaw Janowski. In Section A of Exhibit 1, the Solicitor admitted the Grounds advanced in Section A of the Application, but made certain allegations in response to the Particulars. In paras (1)(b), (1)(c)(i), 1(c)(ii), 2(c)(iii) and 2(e)(i) of Section A, he alleged that Ms Tagalakis, who had been appointed alongside himself as executor of the will of the late Wladyslaw Janowski, had signed an agency agreement authorising the sale of a property forming part of the estate and had attended the auction at which the property was sold. In her affidavit, however, Ms Tagalakis deposed at para 5 that she 'was not provided with any information concerning the agent's commission or other fees associated with the auction'. This allegation by her is reproduced in Section A of the Application as P11.
In his submissions, Mr Tudehope claimed (with specific reference to para A(1)(c) of Exhibit 1) that Ms Tagalakis had in fact 'signed the Agency Agreement' and that the allegation in para A(2)(e)(i) was 'associated with a reference to the material already before the Tribunal'. He did not, however, identify any passages in the Law Society's evidence that served to substantiate these claims.
It would appear to be the case, from my own reading of this evidence, that no such passages exist. On this supposition, these two allegations in Section A of Exhibit 1 constitute fresh evidence purporting to contest the allegation made by Ms Tagalakis in para 5 of her affidavit and repeated as P11 in Section A of the Application. Ms Tagalakis was not required for cross-examination at the hearing on liability, so her evidence was not challenged in any way at this stage. In the liability decision at [40], the Tribunal recorded its finding that the Law Society's evidence 'sufficiently establishes the matters alleged in the Application'. It went on at [41] to find that the Solicitor's 'acts and omissions described in the Application' amounted to professional misconduct.
Accordingly, the Solicitor's assertions in the specific passages in Exhibit 1 that I am now discussing directly traverse one of the 'matters alleged in the Application' and found in the liability decision to have been established. Furthermore, if the Law Society wished to contest these assertions, it would need to call Ms Tagalakis as a witness. It follows that if the assumption made at the commencement of the preceding paragraph is maintained, the general principles outlined above require that the Law Society's objection to these passages in Exhibit 1 should be upheld.
If on the other hand the Law Society's evidence does contain material supporting these assertions by the Solicitor, his counsel may draw attention to this material at the forthcoming hearing on penalty and may invite the Tribunal to treat the statement in Ms Tagalakis's affidavit as open to question. Since the Law Society bears the onus of proof in disciplinary proceedings such as these, that will be sufficient to induce the Tribunal to take no account of the relevant allegation in the Application (Section A, P11) when considering the matter of penalty. On this reasoning, the Law Society's objection to these assertions by the Solicitor should be upheld on the ground of lack of relevance.
Section G: Estate Late Olgerts Blaubergs. The sole Ground in this section of the Application was that the Solicitor had 'charged professional fees when he was not entitled to do so'. He was the sole executor under the will of the deceased, which did not contain a charging clause. In P4 to P6 of Section G, the following allegations were made: (a) he charged amounts of $5,907.55 for costs, $1,218.93 for disbursements and $712.95 for GST to the estate; (b) he drew a cheque for the total figure of $7,839.13 on his trust account; and (c) he caused this cheque to be deposited in his office account.
In Section G of Exhibit 1, the Solicitor admitted the Ground, but alleged as follows. It had been his practice to allow his secretaries, whom he trusted, to 'handle matters and prepare accounts concerning those matters' and also to 'fill in cheques that were required in any matter assigned to them'. He had instructed them to consult him if there was any doubt concerning the payee or amount of a cheque. He would therefore assume that if they did not raise any question with him any cheque presented to him for signature would be authorised and would contain the correct amount and the correct payee.
With specific reference to the Blaubergs estate, he said that his secretary Sharon Baldwin handled this matter, that he did not recall discussing it with her and that he assumed that she had 'sent the account' (meaning presumably a bill for the costs and disbursements charged).
In reaching its conclusion that the Solicitor was guilty of professional misconduct, the Tribunal's assessment of the significance of this Section of the Application proceeded on the footing that the facts were as stated in the relevant Particulars. In the absence of any evidence or submission to the contrary, it treated the Solicitor as the person who charged the costs, disbursements and GST to the estate, drew the cheque on the trust account and deposited it into his office account. The Tribunal cannot now be asked to reassess this matter on the basis that an employee of the Solicitor carried out these tasks, having failed to consult him to make sure that the transaction was authorised. The relevant employee, Ms Baldwin, did not provide any evidence to the Law Society. There is no way of knowing the extent, if any, to which her testimony would support his account of what occurred. Furthermore this account is not direct evidence of how the events described in P4 to P6 came about and is unsupported.
For all these reasons, and in line with the general principles stated earlier, the Law Society's objections to this part of Exhibit 1 must be upheld.
Section D: Estate Late Tatania Buks. At the time of Ms Buks' death and thereafter, the Solicitor held funds on trust for her. The Public Trustee obtained probate of her will. For present purposes, the relevant Grounds alleged against the Solicitor are twofold. First, he failed to respond to correspondence regarding details as to (i) the origin of funds totalling $817,605.39 that he had forwarded to the Public Trustee following her death, (ii) a trust account statement, and (iii) a copy of any retainer agreement. Secondly, he was guilty of 'failing to account'.
In Exhibit 1, the Solicitor admitted the Grounds set out in this section of the Application, but made the following three allegations of significance in reply to the Particulars (see Section D, paras 2(c)(ii), 2(d)). First, he believed that at the time when he forwarded the sum of $817,605.39 to the Public Trustee, he also closed the account (in fact, he did not do so, and the account continued to accrue interest over a period of about three years). Secondly, he had been 'instructed by Tatiana Buks not to disclose the source of the funds and believed, incorrectly, that [he] was bound to follow these instructions'. Thirdly, on account of these beliefs, he first did not respond at all to the relevant correspondence from the Public Trustee and subsequently indicated that he would not respond unless they sent him a cheque for $400 to meet his costs of providing a response.
It is probable that the evidence constituting this 'explanation' of his conduct by the Solicitor can only be tested through cross-examining him. It is not at all clear that this evidence, if accepted, would be of assistance to him. But although in all probability no objection to its admission can be raised on the ground that the Law Society would have to seek and possibly tender evidence in reply, the fact remains that the Tribunal's finding of professional misconduct against him was made on the footing that no such 'explanation' was available to him.
It may well be, as Mr Tudehope has maintained, that evidence of this nature could not be said to 'cavil with' the Tribunal's findings on liability. Yet for the reasons expressed earlier in this decision, its admission would blur the lines between the 'inquiry' into the Law Society's allegations that s 553 of the LP Act mandates and the subsequent proceedings, taking place after completion of this inquiry, wherein the Tribunal determines what orders, if any, should be made under s 562. In this specific context, the following passage appearing earlier in this decision at [53] is directly in point and provides a sufficient basis for upholding the Law Society's objection: 53… the cumulative effect of allowing a legal practitioner to put forward numerous 'explanations' of a series of acts and/or omissions by him or her that the Tribunal has held to constitute professional misconduct may well be to undermine substantially the legitimacy of this ruling. This outcome should not be permitted. In this set of circumstances, as in many others occurring in litigation, the principle of finality must prevail.
As I indicated earlier, the three sets of allegations in Exhibit 1 that I have just discussed were selected as 'representative samples'.
In the first of them, a distinguishing feature is that if the Law Society's objection were dismissed it would be required to call a witness (Ms Talagakis) who had already provided an affidavit. She might also have to testify in response to a further allegation made by the Solicitor in Section A, para 2(q). The same pattern applies to parts of the Solicitor's response to Section F of the Application, headed 'Estate of Zinaida Kripens'. In seeking to reply to some of his allegations (see Exhibit 1, Section F, paras 7(b)(ii) and (iii), 7(d)(iv), 7(e)(ii) and (iii)), the Law Society would be required to contact Mr Juris Meisnieks, from whom it has already obtained an affidavit, and probably to call him as a witness.
In the situation depicted in the second of my samples, the Society currently has no means of knowing the extent, if any, to which the testimony of a witness (Ms Baldwin) from whom it did not obtain an affidavit would or might support the Solicitor's unsupported account of what occurred. It might or might not have to call Ms Baldwin as a witness if its objection was disallowed. A similar pattern of events, also involving Ms Baldwin, is also to be found in the testimony that the Solicitor now wishes to give regarding his handling of the Janowski estate: see Exhibit 1, Section A, paras 2(e)(ii) and (iii), 2(g)(i)-(iii), 2(h)(i), 2(l). This pattern is also discernible in the following contexts: Section A (Estate Late Wladyslav Janoski), paras 1(a), 1(j); Section E (Lok purchase from Calleija), para 2(h)(i); Section F (Estate Late Zinaida Kripens) paras 1(a), 2(d)(iii) and 2(g); and Section H (Estate Late Bruno Stegmanis), paras 2(b) and 2(j). The potential witnesses in these instances would be Mr John Mann, Mr Ching Wai Lok, Mr Konstantine Misukowskis and Mr Aivars Mednis respectively.
In my third sample, the probability is that the Law Society would not be able to obtain any evidence from a third party in order to test the explanation offered by the Solicitor for the relevant conduct on his part. The same applies to his statements in Exhibit 1, Section C (Estate Late Veronika Kanks), para 2(k) and Section F, para 2(g).
As mentioned above at [39], the Law Society submitted that a limited number of statements contained in Exhibit 1 were inadmissible on account of being vague and/or speculative. This submission is correct, in my opinion, with regard to Section A, para 2(n) and (p) and Section B (Estate Late Andrejs Baltins), para 2(d).

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (6 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (4)

Cited By (1)