Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Gates

Characterising the Conduct

1. The facts in this case are novel. There is no precedent to assist us. Therefore an analysis of where the Solicitor's misconduct might most comfortably sit is necessary and the Tribunal is grateful to both Ms. Groenewegen and Mr. Walsh for their submissions in this regard.

A Did the conduct occur in the course of legal practice?

1. The first question is whether the Solicitor's misconduct occurred in the course of legal practice or whether it was personal to the Solicitor, occurring in the course of employment which happened to be in a law practice.
2. This question must be answered because misconduct within the course of practice is more directly connected with a Solicitor's status as a professional, and ordinarily has a greater bearing on fitness to practice.
3. In the case of New South Wales Bar Association v. Osei (No.2) [2008] NSWADT 324 one of the questions which the Tribunal had to determine was whether Mr. Osei's conduct occurred 'in connection with the practice of law' within S 127(2) of the Legal Profession Act 1987.
4. Mr. Osei practised as a barrister from Downing Chambers, situated in Pitt Street, Sydney. He also was a Director of a company known as Caprock International Pty Ltd ('Caprock') which was a company formed by the barrister and his wife. Among other things, Caprock conducted an immigration consultancy business and both the barrister and his wife were, at the relevant time (of the conduct complained of) registered migration agents under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As a result of his migration consultancy work with Caprock, the Barrister was retained by a husband and wife to appear before the Refugee Review Tribunal ('RRT') seeking a review of a decision by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs refusing to grant them protection (Class A) visas.
5. The Bar Association argued that the Barrister's role in appearing before the RRT was 'sufficiently closely connected with actual practice ' that it should be held as being 'in connection with the practice of law'. The Tribunal rejected the submission saying (at paragraph 87) 'The mere fact that some similar skills may be deployed in the RRT by a migration agent as are commonly employed by lawyers appearing in Courts or other Tribunals is not to the point. The connection must be between the conduct of the lawyer and the lawyer's legal practice. It is not sufficient that the nature of the conduct in question is such that it is of a type that might be engaged in by a lawyer in legal practice.'
6. In the case of Law Society of New South Wales v Jayawardena [2008] NSWADT 187 the Tribunal was asked to determine whether Mr. Jayawardena's conduct occurred 'in connection with the practice of law' in order for it to consider the orders which were being sought against the Solicitor. In its Reasons, the Tribunal referred to the case of Council of the NSW Bar Association v. Sahade [2007] NSWCA 145. Mr. Sahade had been found guilty of professional misconduct in 1999 as a result of pre-registering and applying for shares in Telstra, through a public offering by the Commonwealth, by making multiple (353 pre-registration applications and 215 applications for shares using slight variations of names and addresses) in circumstances where multiple applications from the same persons for shares in Telstra were not permitted. The NSW Bar Association appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. At [86] the Court of Appeal noted that it was 'also relevant that the conduct complained of involved share purchases and was, in that sense, unrelated to the practice of law. The conduct revealed a defect in character, because of its deceptive or deceitful nature. Whilst that aspect of character is of high importance in relation to practice as a legal practitioner, it may be accepted that individuals behave differently in different circumstances. It would be wrong in the presence [sic] case to simply assume that a reasonably brief period of deceptive conduct in relation to private investments is of weighty significance in relation to the practice of law.'
7. The court (at [58]) further observed that 'some aspects of character are likely to be of limited relevance to the practice of law. However, a willingness to engage in deceptive or dishonest behaviour would generally be a matter of central relevance. Such a characteristic may be revealed by conduct in the practice of law or in conduct unrelated to the practice of law.'
8. At [74] the Court of Appeal said this: 'the better view is that conduct occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law will only constitute professional misconduct if it would justify a finding of a kind defined in the definition. In other words the definition may be expansive in relation to personal misconduct, but only in respect of misconduct sufficiently serious to warrant a finding of unfitness or lack of good character. There is no temporal element involved in this, rather the identification of a high standard.'
9. The Tribunal in Jayawardena's case determined at [149] 'it therefore seems to us in order to make a finding against an Australian lawyer for 'unsatisfactory professional conduct' one needs to find the conduct complained of as being conduct 'in connection with the practice of law' (in other words he/she must hold a current practicing certificate to be caught by this definition of conduct) but, in order to make a finding under section 497(1)(b) (that is professional misconduct where the conduct complained of is 'otherwise than in connection with the practice of law') one needs to make a positive finding relating to facts that fall within Sahade principle.
10. In the case of Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v. Costigan [2013] NSWCA 407 the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the phrase 'in connection with' as contained in clause 106A of the Legal Profession Regulation 2005. In that case it was asserted that Mr. Costigan had received moneys on account of legal costs for legal services in advance of the provision of legal services and had dealt with such money in contravention of S. 252 of the Legal Profession Act 2004. The Court considered a number of cases dealing with this subject matter and concluded: 55 'in this case, the nature of the connection can be evaluated by reference to the specific obligations imposed on the barrister both with respect to the deposit and withdrawal of money received from direct access clients. Although the Act specifies that the money received from direct access clients is not trust money, the barrister receiving the money on account of legal costs for services to be provided, must deal with the money in the prescribed manner if he or she is to bring themselves within the exemption provided by cl 106A. 56 In the case of the respondent's Account 72333, it is clear from the nature of the entries recorded in that account that it was used for the respondent's personal financial affairs. The position is likewise in relation to the credit card Account 3725, and credit card Account 5500. None of these accounts were maintained by the respondent 'in connection with' his practice as a barrister.'
11. In the case before us, the misconduct did not involve the provision of legal services to any person nor was it as a result of the Solicitor taking advantage of the privileges afforded to her by reason of her status as a legal practitioner, rather, the conduct occurred in the course of the Solicitor's employment.

B The Solicitor misled her employer

1. The Solicitor admits that her conduct involved dishonesty.
2. Without seeking to downplay the Solicitor's admitted dishonest conduct, the relevant dishonesty was not in connection with the Solicitor's dealings with clients or the Court. Further, while it is arguable that the Solicitor was dishonest in her dealings with a fellow practitioner [that is, her former employer] the particular conduct was not in connection with the administration of justice and not in the performance of her duties as a legal practitioner.

Fame and character

1. Dishonesty can be a yardstick by which fame and character are determined.
2. Fame involves being known, favourably, by a large section of the public, while character is directed to a more objective evaluation which might conflict with what the general public thinks. (see Jackson (previously known as Subramaniam) v Legal Practitioners Admission Board [2006] NSWSC 1338 per Jackson J at [56] In this case Ms Jackson was said to have made a false statutory declaration and given false evidence before the District Court in 1996 with respect of the identity of the driver of a motor vehicle which disobeyed a red traffic light in August, 1995. As a result, the Legal Practitioners Board refused to declare her to be of good fame and character and otherwise suitable for admission as a legal practitioner. Ms Jackson appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of New South Wales which found her not be of good fame and character and therefore not a suitable candidate for admission to the profession.
3. In its strict sense, character refers to the inherent moral qualities of a person - which is something more intrinsic to the individual in question. Character is to be contrasted with reputation, which refers to the public estimation or repute of a person, irrespective of the inherent moral qualities of that person. (See Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1 at 15 per McHugh J; [1999] HCA 32 per McHugh J at [33].
4. A person's reputation can render that person famous or infamous, but may have very little to do with character.
5. In Ex parte Tziniolis; Re the Medical Practitioners Act (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448 at 476-476, Holmes JA said: Good character' is not a summation of acts alone, but relates rather to the quality of a person. The quality is to be judged by acts and motives, that is to say, behaviour and the mental and emotional situations accompanying that behaviour. However, character cannot always be estimated by one act or one class of act. As much about a person as is known will form the evidence from which the inference of good character or not of good character is drawn.'
6. The good fame of the Solicitor is supported by nine testimonials in which the referees [even after becoming aware of the substance of the complaint] speak of the solicitor's integrity and highly ethical and professional manner (reference from Jo Haughton dated 16 November 2014 at AMF2 p 219; reference from Peter Cook, undated at AMF2 p 221).
7. Regarding the acts and motives of the Solicitor, she has provided an explanation for her conduct and the circumstances in which it occurred.
8. The Tribunal notes the Solicitor's employer offered the Solicitor partnership and the opportunity to become a signatory to the firm's trust account after the employer knew of at least two improper destinations for the Solicitor's superannuation entitlements. Further, the employer wrote a glowing reference for her specialist accreditation. Therefore, at the material time, the employer regarded the Solicitor as having high moral qualities and being of good character. Later, the employer appeared to change her mind, immediately after the Solicitor resigned and went to work for the opposition.
9. The conduct of the Solicitor in this case and especially in the context in which it occurred, is not sufficient to impugn her inherent moral qualities. We find it is not sufficient to lead to an adverse finding about her character.

C Defrauding the revenue and misuse of superannuation funds

i. Failure to pay personal income tax on $16,383.46 when it was acquired income

1. The Solicitor's uncontested evidence is that the failure to pay income tax on the superannuation payments improperly received by her as income was unconscious and unintended as she failed to turn her mind to the tax implications of what she was doing.
2. Hence, we accept that her conduct must be distinguished from those who wilfully defraud the revenue by submitting false personal tax returns. (See Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Livanes [2012] NSWCA 325. Mr. Livanes' crimes in defrauding the Commonwealth of $1,640,604 were described as representing a high level of dishonesty motivated by greed over a long period of time. His dishonesty demonstrated that he was guilty of moral turpitude 'and is not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients, the courts, or the public': per McColl JA at [44])
3. Similarly, her conduct must be distinguished from those who avoid paying income tax by wilfully failing to submit personal tax returns for years on end. (see New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284)

ii. Misuse of superannuation funds and defrauding the revenue whilst submitting otherwise accurate personal income tax returns.

1. If the Solicitor's wrongdoing is regarded as a misuse of superannuation funds there is a wealth of precedent. Solicitors have often appeared before the Tribunal for failing to pay their employees' superannuation entitlements and failing to remit to the ATO collected GST and PAYG Withholding Tax. (see Council of the Law Society NSW v Bouzanis [2006] NSWADT 55; Council of the Law Society of NSW v Vosnakis [2007] NSWADT 42; Council of the Law Society v. Somerfield [2008] NSWADT 235; Council of the Law Society NSW v Koffel [2010] NSWADT 149; Council of the Law society NSW v. Gillroy [201]NSWADT 232; Council of the Law Society NSW v Nicopoulos [2011] NSWADT 84; Council of the Law Society NSW v. Dalla [2011]; Council of the Law Society NSW v. Kingston [2014] NSWCATOD 21; NSWADT 130; Council of the Law Society of NSW v Delpopolo [2014] NSWCATOD 55). In this sense, these solicitors have used public funds to prop up their practices. Without more, they are not removed from the Roll.
2. The Solicitor's conduct is no worse and in our view less serious than that of the respondents who come before this Tribunal in relation to conduct described above.
3. In cases involving unpaid PAYG Withholding Tax, monies deducted from employees' gross salaries have intentionally not been remitted by the respondents to the ATO. Such a failure exposes the innocent employee to potential action by the ATO.
4. In cases involving unremitted GST, monies were collected on behalf of the ATO but not forwarded to it by the respondents.
5. In cases of unpaid superannuation entitlements, monies that should have accrued in a compliant fund for the later benefit of employees did not reach their intended destination.
6. Among others, Mr Koffel, Mr Kingston and Ms Delpopolo used the ATO's and employees' monies to prop up their failing business. None of them was regarded as unfit to practise.
7. In this case the Respondent solicitor did not use monies intended for the benefit of others. She used monies which were intended for her later use prior to them vesting in her.

D. The solicitor acquired as a legal owner monies in which she held only a beneficial interest.

1. The Solicitor as a beneficiary obtained funds properly destined at this time for the trustee of a compliant superannuation fund.
2. This is very different from a trustee using without authority entrusted funds (in which by definition they have no beneficial interest). In these cases solicitors have been found liable for misappropriation, the remedy for which was tailored to reflect the level of subjective dishonesty involved in the use of the funds.(see Dupal v Law Society of NSW [1990] NSWCA 161; Kumar v. Legal Services Commissioner [2015] NSWCA 161; Council of the Law Society of NSW v Pizzinga [2012] NSWADT 211; Council of the Law Society of NSW v Nicholls [2012] NSWADT 222; Council of the Law Society of NSW v. Ross [2013] NSWADT 106; Council of the Law Society of NSW v. Scanlan [2015] NSWCATOD 44.)
3. The Solicitor has admitted and the Tribunal accepts that dealing with moneys in which she had a beneficial but not a legal interest is to be regarded as objectively dishonest.

Discussion

1. The Tribunal accepts the Solicitor experienced a number of significant stressors over a number of years and took positive steps to seek assistance in respect of those stressors. In response to a question asked of her by Dr. Olav Nielssen as to her emotional state around the time she banked the superannuation cheques, Ms. Gates said 'I was working all the time.... I felt the burden of everything... I was seeing a counsellor around that time to try to repair the situation with my mum... I was not sleeping well... I wasn't well physically.... I was having thoughts about wanting it all to end.... of stopping work.' She said 'I could do work but when I thought of anything personal it was like my head would not work.... I can picture looking back having these cheques.... I tried to think it through but I could not get to the point of how I could fix this.'
2. In his submissions, Mr. Walsh reminded us of another very significant stressor which the Solicitor had to deal with being the spectre of her right to practice being removed from her and the Tribunal accepts this fact. The relevant resolution was passed by the Professional Conduct Committee on 13 October, 2014 and notified to Mr. Walsh on 20 October, 2014 but it was not until 12 August, 2015 that the Law Society notified Mr. Walsh the Society would be seeking a reprimand in lieu of a strike off order.
3. It was put to us that when a solicitor admits to being dishonest and the question of whether a dishonest solicitor should remain on the roll, one has to look at the context in which the dishonesty occurred and ask the question 'does the dishonesty admitted to give rise to the suggestion that the solicitor is unfit to practice' followed by 'does the public need to be protected from this solicitor, did the dishonesty occur in the course of legal practice or outside the course of legal practice.' In this particular case, it appears those questions were not asked by the Law Society at the relevant time and had they been, in our view, the question of fitness to practice would not have arisen. In our view the time that elapsed between the filing of the original Application and the notification to the Solicitor that a strike off order would no longer be sought by the Council was punitive in the extreme.
4. As stated earlier in these Reasons, the good fame of the Solicitor is supported by nine testimonials in which the referees, with full knowledge of the substance of the complaint against her, speak of the Solicitor's integrity and highly ethical and professional manner. That evidence, together with the Solicitor's admission and contrition has been taken into account by us in reaching our decision. However, it remains the fact that the Solicitor knowingly engaged in dishonest conduct.
5. In her Statutory Declaration signed 17 November, 2014, the Solicitor declares at paragraph 40 'I did not appreciate the sanctity of superannuation funds or understand the rules and regulations regarding their payment and operation. I associated those funds as being intended for my benefit at some point and did not properly contemplate the consequences of my actions. I intended at this time to rectify the incorrect deposit of the superannuation funds by making a payment into the SMSF at a later date. I failed to do this.'
6. 79 The Tribunal does find it difficult to accept the legitimacy of the above statement in circumstances where that person holds a law degree which assumes at least a basic knowledge of the workings of superannuation entitlements including conditions of access, where her employer requested her to nominate a superannuation fund into which that employer could pay her entitlements (as opposed to the Solicitor's bank account) and where the solicitor specifically requested her employer to give her the cheques for her superannuation entitlements on the basis that she would bank them herself.
7. It was submitted by Mr. Walsh that the misconduct falls to the lower end of the range and may in the unusual circumstances of this particular case amount to a finding of unsatisfactory professional misconduct.
8. Section 496 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 [LPA 2004] defines unsatisfactory professional conduct as including: 'conduct of an Australian legal practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner.'
9. For the reasons outlined above, the Solicitors conduct was not 'in connection with the practice of law'.
10. On that basis, unsatisfactory professional conduct as defined in s496 of the LPA 2004 does not lie.
11. Section 497(1)(b) of the LPA 2004 provides that professional misconduct includes: '(b) conduct of an Australian Legal Practitioner whether occurring in connection with the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.'
12. We are not satisfied upon the basis of the underlying conduct which we have described and in light of the good fame of the solicitor of which we have been satisfied that the Solicitor is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. Accordingly, the conduct does not fall within the statutory definition of professional misconduct contained in section 497 of the LPA 2004 as construed in Sahade at [74].
13. In his submissions, Mr. Walsh alluded to the case of Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v. John Alexander Xenos [2012] NSWADT at 283 where a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct was made in circumstances where Mr. Xenos failed to pay Counsel's fees
14. Mr. Walsh submitted that in the case before us similar health and financial factors were present plus additional features which have been referred to above in these Reasons which could assist us in characterising the conduct as unsatisfactory professional conduct.
15. The Tribunal notes that in the Xenos case at [30], it was stated that the conduct might have been more appropriately characterised as professional misconduct but for the lack of evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees being charged and taking into account evidence as to the solicitor's health and financial situation during the relevant period (June 2008 to April 2009). We do not accept that the conduct is to be characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct for the reasons already stated.

Findings

1. The common law test of professional misconduct and whether it requires that the conduct involved be directly referrable to legal practice was considered by Spigelman CJ (Mason P and Handley JA) in New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284 at [36] - [43] in which the Chief Justice stated: '36 The origins of contemporary doctrine on these matters is to be found in the judgment of Lopes LJ in Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750 where his Lordship at 763 propounded what he described as a non-exhaustive definition of "infamous conduct in a professional respect" as follows: "If it is shewn that a medical man, in the pursuit of his profession, has done something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency,' then it is open to the General Medical Council to say that he has been guilty of 'infamous conduct in a professional respect'." 37 In Allinson, the Court of Appeal was exercising a statutory jurisdiction. The phrase "infamous conduct in a professional respect" was statutory, appearing in s29 of the Medical Act (21 and 22 Vict. c. 90) (U.K.). 38 This definition was applied to the case of the solicitor in the case of In re A Solicitor. Ex parte The Law Society [1912] 1 KB 302, where the issue was the definition of "professional misconduct" within the Solicitors Act 1888 (U.K.). 39 In Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 Viscount Maugham adopted this definition for purposes of the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts when he said at 288-289: "Apart from the statutory grounds, it is of course true that a solicitor may be struck off the rolls or suspended on the ground of professional misconduct, words which have been properly defined as conduct which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute and competency: In re a Solicitor. Ex parte The Law Society ." 40 Lord Atkin may have taken a different view in Myers v Elman, when he said at 303 that the words "professional misconduct" … "only mean misconduct in the exercise of the profession". 41 Viscount Maugham's approach - which omits from the Allinson formulation, the introductory words "in the pursuit of his profession" - appears to have prevailed, at least in New South Wales (see Re Hodgekiss (1962) SR (NSW) 340 at 351; Re Mayes and the Legal Practitioners Act [1974] 1 NSWLR 19 at 24-25; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Costello [1984] 3 NSWLR 201 at 203D-E, 207B-C). 42 In Marten v Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons' Disciplinary Committee [1966] 1 QB 1, Lord Parker CJ said at 9: "… Mr Crispin says that as a matter of law a professional man's conduct cannot be said to be disgraceful to him in a professional respect unless it was done 'in pursuit of his profession,' and he would add that 'in pursuit of his profession' meant 'in the course of the practice of the profession.' For my part I see no valid ground for limiting the words in the manner suggested. If, of course, the conduct complained of is equally reprehensible in anyone, whether a professional man or not, as for example, conduct constituting some traffic offence, that conduct would not come within the expression. But if the conduct, though reprehensible in anyone is in the case of the professional man so much more reprehensible as to be defined as disgraceful, it may, depending on the circumstances, amount to conduct disgraceful of him in a professional respect in the sense that it tends to bring disgrace on the profession which he practises. It seems to me, although I do not put this forward in any sense as a definition, that the conception of conduct which is disgraceful to a man in his professional capacity is conduct disgraceful to him as reflecting on his profession, or, in the present case, conduct disgraceful to him as a practising veterinary surgeon." 43 In that case, the conduct involved the mistreatment of animals which, although not arising in the course of practice, did have a direct bearing on the practice of his profession by a veterinarian." At [56] the Chief Justice further stated: 'There is authority in favour of extending the terminology 'professional misconduct' to acts not occurring directly in the course of professional practice. That is not to say that any form of personal conduct may be regarded as professional misconduct. The authorities appear to me to suggest two kinds of relationships that justify applying the terminology in this broader way. First, acts may be sufficiently closely connected with actual practice, albeit not occurring in the course of such practice. Secondly, conduct outside the course of practice may manifest the presence or absence of qualities which are incompatible with, or essential for, the conduct of practice. In this second case, the terminology of 'professional misconduct' overlaps with and, usually it is not necessary to distinguish it from, the terminology of 'good fame and character' or 'fit and proper person.'
2. On the basis of the conclusions reached in Cummins, in our view the dishonest conduct by which the solicitor misled her employer to direct superannuation moneys into a personal account would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute and competency and, although a form of personal conduct, may in the circumstances be regarded as professional misconduct although at the lower end of the scale.
3. In the case of Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v. Da Rocha [2013] NSWCA 151 the court considered the concept of 'fit and proper' and at paragraph 29 said 'In Foreman where the court of appeal indicated that in determining whether someone is a fit and proper person to be a solicitor the relevant considerations may include: the protection of the public against similar conduct, the character of the solicitor, and the effect which an order will have on the understanding (within the profession and amongst the public), of the standard of behaviour required of solicitors, the effect upon relationships which must exist between solicitors and the circumstances surrounding the impugned conduct.'
4. The protection of the public is not in issue given that the conduct complained of did not occur in the course of legal practice and no member of the public was harmed. The good character of the solicitor is confirmed by a number of members of the legal profession whose testimonials are before us and who state that the conduct complained of was out of character and we accept those testimonials. The formal finding which we intend to make of professional misconduct in what can only be described as unusual circumstances is directed in part to remind the profession of the standards required of all practitioners both in the practice of their profession and where such conduct might occur outside the course of practice but manifest the absence of qualities which are compatible with or essential for the conduct of practice.
5. The Tribunal acknowledges the Solicitor's early concession of her conduct once complained of and her contrition. In her Statutory Declaration dated 17 November, 2014 at paragraph 81, the Solicitor states, 'I accept unreservedly that I did the wrong thing.....'. At paragraph 82, the Solicitor states' I ask that I be given an opportunity to continue to prove that since rectifying my mistake in April 2011 and further in November, 2013, that I can be an upstanding member of the community and make the Legal profession proud to include me as a member'.
6. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Solicitor's conduct as particularised in the Agreed Statement of Facts and as established on the evidence amounts to professional misconduct. As reflected earlier in these Reasons, the Solicitor did not oppose the orders sought by the Council, however it is a matter for this Tribunal to determine whether those proposed Orders are within the permissible range and we so find.

Costs

1. By Clause 23(1) of schedule 5 of the civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 the Tribunal is required to order costs of the Council to be paid in proceedings such as these where the Tribunal has found that the Solicitor, an Australian legal practitioner, is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct and there are no exceptional circumstances.
2. There have been findings of professional misconduct. There are no exceptional circumstances that would justify any other outcome regarding the Council's costs. The Tribunal therefore has concluded that there should be an order for the Solicitor to pay the Council's costs of the proceedings.

Orders

1. The Tribunal makes the following orders: 1. The Solicitor be reprimanded. 2. The Solicitor, at her own expense, is to undertake within 9 months of the date of these orders, a course in Legal Ethics and a course in Practice Management that is approved by the Manager of Professional Standards Department of the Law Society of New South Wales and achieve a mark of not less than 50%. 3. The Solicitor pays the costs of and incidental to the proceedings as assessed or as agreed. I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 30 March 2016