See also Re Equal Remuneration Principle (2000) 97 IR 177 at 208 in para [126].
17 The other area which should be referred to, although strictly not necessary for determination, is the effect of s 11 of the Industrial Relations Act which is in the following terms:
11 When award may be made
(1) An award may be made:
(a) on application to the Commission or on the Commission's own initiative, or
(b) in the course of an arbitration by the Commission under Chapter 3 to resolve an industrial dispute.
(2) An application for an award may be made only by:
(a) an employer, or
(b) an industrial organisation of employers or employees, or a State peak council.
(3) Anyone who can apply for an award may become a party to any proceedings for making an award.
(4) An applicant for an award, or to become a party to the making of an award, is required to satisfy the Commission that it or any one or more of its members has a sufficient interest in the proposed award.
18 Do the references in s 11(2) to "an employer" and to "an industrial organisation of employers", when read in conjunction with the qualification in s 11(4) as to "sufficient interest", apply where the relevant employers cannot employ employees bound by the subject or proposed award? We do not consider there is any basis to find that an employer in that situation, or an organisation representing such an employer, could be said to have a sufficient interest so as to enable the employer or employers' organisation to be a party to a proposed award in terms of s 11. This conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the appellants' contentions based on s 11 of the Industrial Relations Act . Although the appellants submitted, in effect, that the present proceedings provided the occasion to determine the scope of the section, it is unnecessary, in light of our conclusion, to deal further with the issue.
19 We now return to the earlier consideration of the history of the development of the relevant Wage Fixing principles. The history demonstrates that although some of the references to "the parties" may be thought to be sufficiently general so as to include reference not only to employers and unions actually bound by an award, but also to other employers or organisations which might have some indirect interest in the award, the history seen in its context, in particular the foundational discussion cited above from the State Wage Case - December 1993 , makes tolerably plain that references to parties were clearly intended to be limited to the employers and employees bound by the award or to be bound by the proposed award, or to those organisations representing such employers and employees. There is no basis to construe the reference to "the parties" in either principle 2(e) or principle 10 as including an employer or employer organisation which has an indirect interest in the award or proposed award, as exemplified by the situation of the appellants. The approach of the Full Bench in Re Transport Industry (State) Award (2000) 95 IR 232 at [12] and [38] is, we consider, supportive of this construction of the principles.
20 We now turn to the second issue raised in the appeal as to whether the commissioner at first instance had erred in limiting the material that the appellants could place before the Commission as to cost impact and associated matters. In respect of that issue, the appellants have also raised a related issue as to whether, in adopting the approach he did, the commissioner denied them procedural fairness. As earlier observed, Connor C granted the appellants leave to intervene in the proceedings before him but limited the role they might play in such proceedings. Once the commissioner held, as we consider he correctly did, that the appellants were not parties to the proposed award, then the only role they could have in the proceedings was as an intervener. The commissioner permitted them leave to intervene. The role of interveners before the Commission, and its predecessors, has been the subject of consideration and the development of relevant principles over a number of decades. The approach that has been and should be adopted is one particular to the jurisdiction and it is contrary to the jurisprudence that has developed to afford a person or organisation granted leave to intervene the rights or standing of a party to the proceedings.
21 Two clear principles emerge from the cases and it is sufficient, so far as authorities are concerned, to refer to those set out in the well known judgment in Re Special Constables (Police Department) Award [1956] AR (NSW) 880. For present purposes, it is sufficient to state the relevant principles as having two aspects: first, that the role of an intervener is limited and is subject to the exercise of the Commission's discretion as to that role; and, second, that an intervener has no right to call evidence or to cross-examine witnesses. The approach of Connor C as to the role of the appellants, when considered in the light of the principles, was one within the exercise of his discretion. In terms of the applicable appeal principles, that the exercise of discretion is immune from review unless it can be said to constitute appellable error, reference need only be made to House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. Our review of the record as to the proceedings before the commissioner does not permit the conclusion that the commissioner fell into appellable error in that respect. Indeed, having found as he did that the appellants were not entitled to be parties to the relevant award or, thus, to the award proceedings, it was inevitable that their role in the proceedings would be limited. It is not a question of whether this Full Bench would have taken the same approach adopted by the commissioner. The relevant question, in light of the requirements of s 191, is whether the commissioner misused the discretion available to him. We do not consider he did. Accordingly, it cannot be said in the context particular to this case that the appellants were denied procedural fairness.
22 The conclusions we have thus reached are sufficient to dispose of this appeal on the basis that it should be dismissed. We have come to this conclusion without separately considering the question of leave to appeal. We consider the appropriate course in relation to that aspect is for leave to appeal to be granted as to one issue and to refuse leave otherwise. We approach the matter in this way since the appeal, on the assumption the appellants do have standing to bring the appeal (an issue which we have not considered it necessary to decide), raises an important although limited question as to the construction and application of the Commission's wage fixing principles.
23 We therefore make the following orders in disposition of the appeal:
1. Leave to appeal granted as to the construction and application of the wage fixing principles.
2. Leave otherwise refused.
3. Appeal dismissed.