separate case of criminal liability, would
justify the exaction of a separate penalty.
But such a logic could never hoid. When an
accused is on trial it is part of the
procedural privilege to which he is entitled
that he should be made aware of precisely what
charges he is to meet. But the practice and
principles of sentencing owe little to such
procedure; what is fitting is that a convicted
prisoner should be sentenced, not simply and
indiscriminately for every act that can be
singled out and brought within the compass of
a technically identifiable conviction, but for
what, viewing the circumstances broadly and
reasonably, can be characterised as his
criminal conduct. Sometimes, a single act of
criminal conduct will comprise two or more
technically identified crimes. Sometimes, two
or more technically identified crimes will
comprise two or more courses of criminal
conduct that, reasonably characterized, are
really separate invasions of the community's
right to peace and order, notwithstanding that
they are historically interdependent; the
courses of criminal conduct may coincide with
the technical offences or they may not.
Sometimes, the process of characterization
rests upon an analysis of fact and degree
leading to two possible answers, each of
which, in the hands of the trial judge, could
be made to work justice. The practice of
amposing either concurrent' or consecutive
sentences cannot avoid creating anomalies, or
apparent anomalies, from time to time. What
must be done 1s to use the various tools of
analysis to mould a just sentence for the