Available quantum of penalty - 'body corporate'
52 Section 178(4) of the Act provides for differential maximum penalties for breaches of awards or certified agreements, depending upon whether the penalty is to be imposed upon 'a body corporate' or is to be imposed 'in other cases'. The maximum penalty for a body corporate is five times that for a person not a body corporate. Section 178(1) envisages that such a breach may be committed by 'an organisation [that is, a registered organisation of employees or employers - see s 4] or person bound by an award … or a certified agreement'. Organisations are themselves constituted as bodies corporate: s 27(a) of Schedule 1B - 'Registration and Accountability of Organisations'. The (compounded) reference to 'a body corporate' 'bound by an award' obviously includes organisations as well as many kinds of bodies corporate which may be employers: trading corporations, charitable incorporated bodies, governmental instrumentalities given statutory corporate status, and so on.
53 Subsection (5A) of s 178 of the Act is in the following terms:
(5A) A penalty for a breach of a term of a certified agreement may be sued for and recovered by:
(a) an inspector; or
(b) an employee whose employment is subject to the agreement; or
(c) a person or organisation that is bound by the agreement; or
(d) an organisation:
(i) that has at least one member whose employment is subject to the agreement; and
(ii) that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the member in relation to work carried on by the member that is subject to the agreement; or
(e) an officer or employee of an organisation mentioned in paragraph (c) or (d), where the officer or employee is authorised, under the rules of the organisation, to sue on behalf of the organisation.'
54 Subsection (5) has similar provisions in relation to a breach of a term of an award or order.
55 As the respondent submitted by way of background on this question:
'5. The Applicant was engaged in public sector employment as an officer under the Public Service Act 1922.
6. Clause 5.1 of the Defence Employees Industrial Agreement 1998-1999 (the "Agreement") provides that the persons bound by the Agreement include the Minister for Defence.
7. Section 170M of the Act provides however that, in the case of a Division 2 Agreement, the certified agreement binds, relevantly, the employer.
8. Section 352 of the Act provides as follows:
In spite of anything to the contrary in this Act or any other law, the employer of an employee engaged in public sector employment shall, for the purposes of this Act and the Rules of the Commission, act only by an employing authority of the employee acting on behalf of the employer and, in particular:
(a) Anything done by an employing authority of an employee has effect, for those purposes, as if it had been done by the employer of the employee; and
(b) Anything served on, or otherwise given or notified to, an employing authority of an employee has effect, for those purposes, as if it had been served on, or given or notified to, the employer of the employee.
9. At the time of entry into the Agreement, the employing authorities through whom the Respondent was required to act were the Minister administering the Department in which the Applicant was employed, in this case the Minister of Defence and the Minister of State for Industrial Relations: Item 3 of Schedule 2 of the Workplace Relations Regulations 1996 as in force at June 1998.
10. The fact that the Minister for Defence was a party to and was bound by the Agreement is accordingly consistent with the scheme of the Act in relation to public sector employment, which provides that the employing authority acts on behalf of the employer. In this case the employer was the Respondent. The Respondent was therefore bound by the Agreement: s.170M. If a penalty is to be imposed, it must be imposed on the Respondent.
11. The issue for determination is accordingly whether the Respondent falls within the category of "a body corporate" or "other cases".
"Body Corporate" /"Other cases"
12. The distinction in s.178 between "body corporate" and "other cases" was introduced by Schedule 11 to the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996, No. 60 of 1996. The explanatory material in respect to the Amendment Act does not provide any guidance concerning the rationale for the changes or the meaning of the new phrases.
13. The expression "body corporate" is not defined by the Act. It appears in a number of other sections in the Act including, for example, s.349.'
56 Notwithstanding that the common modern phenomenon of private persons acting as trustees for others, including corporations, in large commercial ventures involving employment, including on a substantial scale, has apparently not excited the attention of the drafters of the legislation, the legislative policy appears to be to limit the exposure of individual people to large penalties. Such individuals might be employees or employers (usually, in the latter case, on a small scale).
57 All Commonwealth statutory interpretation is now, as a matter of Australian statutory and common law to be undertaken from the outset in a purposive and contextual way: s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408; Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85, 99, 112. Thus viewed, the question is whether s 178 should be construed so as to give the Commonwealth the benefit of the lower penalties thought appropriate by the legislature for natural persons. It may immediately be observed that if the statute gives such a benefit to the Commonwealth, it works a corresponding detriment to any person or organisation suing the Commonwealth to recover a penalty from it. Such a result appears inconvenient and unlikely to have been part of the legislative policy. The Act is concerned with matters to do with relations between employers and employees. The largest employer in the nation is, and for many years has been, the Commonwealth itself. The Commonwealth, it was expressly contemplated, would be bound by agreements and awards made or operative under the Act. The Commonwealth, although no doubt less liable than some private employers to seek to evade its obligations under such an agreement or award, is as liable as many to misunderstand or, for a variety of reasons, otherwise simply to fail to observe such obligations. I am unable to see why Parliament might have intended that an employee disadvantaged by such a failure on the part of the Commonwealth should be limited in his or her ability to recover a penalty to what would be available against a natural person, and to one-fifth of what would be available from a family company, however small.
58 Nevertheless, context and inferred legislative policy may have to give way to an intractable statutory text. In my opinion, however, there is no such obstacle.
59 The respondent's argument is that s 22(1)(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)recognises a distinction, otherwise valid, between a body politic and a body corporate. Thus the respondent, undoubtedly being a body politic, cannot be a body corporate for the purposes of the Act, and falls within the category of 'other cases' referred to in s 178(4). The respondent submits:
'28. … In this respect a comparison should be drawn between s.2A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the "TPA") and s 6 of the Act. Section 2A of the TPA makes clear that the word "corporation" in the body of the Act should generally be read to include "the Crown in right of the Commonwealth". No such provision appears in s.6. Had Parliament intended that the words "body corporate" appearing in the Act should include the Respondent, it would have said so in express terms, as it did in s.2A of the TPA. The difference between the two legislative schemes is telling.'
60 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed.) captures the ordinary meaning of 'body corporate' in a legal context in one of the meanings given for 'body': 'An artificial "person" created by law; a corporation'. The same dictionary gives as the definition of 'corporation' in a legal context: 'A body corporate legally authorised to act as a single individual; an artificial person created by royal charter, prescription, or legislative act, and having the capacity of perpetual succession'.
61 The Australian Constitution, in the covering clauses, is described as "An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia'. The preamble recites that 'the people of' the States (then excluding Western Australia) 'have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown … and under the Constitution hereby established'. Section 3 empowered the Crown to declare that 'the people of' the States 'shall be united in a Federal Commonwealth under the name of the Commonwealth of Australia'.
62 In the Constitution itself, Chapters I, II and III provide for the vesting and manner of exercise respectively of the legislative, executive and judicial powers 'of the Commonwealth' to be vested in the organs established: ss 1, 61 and 71. Section 61 provides that the executive power 'is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General' as her representative. That power is also declared to '[extend] to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth'. In Chapter III, s 75(iii) contemplates that the Commonwealth 'or a person … being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth' might be a party to judicial 'matters'. Section 78 confined the power of the Parliament to 'make laws conferring rights to proceed against the Commonwealth or a State in respect of matters within the limits of the judicial power'.
63 Section 6 of the Act provides:
'(1) This Act binds the Crown in each of its capacities.
(2) However, this Act does not make the Crown liable to be prosecuted for an offence.'
64 The terms of subs (2) appear to underline that the Commonwealth might be sued for a penalty.
65 Section 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provides:
'In any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party, the rights of parties shall as nearly as possible be the same, and judgment may be given and costs awarded on either side, as in a suit between subject and subject.'
66 For present purposes, the intendment of s 64 appears to be, among other things, to give a person suing the Commonwealth to recover a penalty for contraventions of the Act the same remedies that would be available if the Commonwealth did not have its governmental character. Apart from any possible intrinsic implications from its governmental character, the Commonwealth, as the provisions of the Constitution referred to above make clear, is a body of people which may be sued as such, and as if it were, an individual. With or without reference to s 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), that, in my opinion, is enough to indicate that the Commonwealth, at least for the purposes of s 178, is a 'body corporate'.
67 The governmental character of the Commonwealth as a body politic and the terms of s 22 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) do not, in my opinion, provide any adequate, let alone compelling, reasons for viewing the matter differently. As a matter of ordinary language and legal possibility, a body politic may also be a body corporate or be equated to such: they are not mutually exclusive categories. A body corporate may have a governmental character: various types of local government bodies both here and elsewhere in countries of the common law tradition are examples of this, as are some instances of specific-purpose, trading corporations set up by governments. There is no reason why a body politic, in the sense of an organised State or part of a State, might not also be a body corporate. A State legislature could proclaim local government entities as bodies politic and bodies corporate. Undoubtedly, the Commonwealth is a body politic. However, it appears to me that, by virtue of the Constitution and the legislation to which I have referred, there is no reason why it cannot be regarded as a body corporate for the purposes of s 178 of the Act. By the use of the term 'body corporate', a wider class of entities than merely trading corporations was clearly envisaged. It would be entirely consistent with s 6 of the Act to regard the term as including entities with a governmental character, provided they also have the necessary corporate character. In my opinion, the Commonwealth has such a corporate character.
68 The purpose of s 22(1)(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) is to indicate that, subject to context, expressions used to denote persons generally such as 'person' should not be limited to natural persons: see s 22(1)(aa). In referring to bodies politic as well as to bodies corporate, the provision emphasises the prima facie inclusiveness of expressions such as 'persons'. It was unnecessary for the creation of that emphasis for the framers of the section to acknowledge in a considered way that there was an unbridgeable gulf between bodies politic and bodies corporate, and in my opinion they did not do so. Far less does s 22(1)(a) so provide. Quite apart from s 22(1)(a), a body politic might or might not be regarded for a particular legal purpose as having some of the attributes of a natural person.
69 The respondent's reference to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ('the TPA Act') casts no light upon the Act. That Act is primarily concerned with aspects of the conduct of trading corporations. In order to subject the Commonwealth, when directly carrying on business activities, to liability as a deemed 'trading corporation', s 2A(2) of the TPA Act referred to the Commonwealth as acting 'as if … [it] were a corporation'. But 'corporation' is itself defined in s 4 of the TPA Act, with an eye to the Constitution as referring to, among other things, a 'trading corporation'. The definition, also in s 4, of 'trading corporation' directly gives that term its constitutional meaning. That, in such a context, a provision deems the Commonwealth when carrying on business to be a corporation does not assist at all as to whether, for the purposes of quite different legislation, having quite a different constitutional underpinning, the Commonwealth should properly be regarded as a corporation.
70 I add that s 352 of the Act does not, for the reasons given by the respondent, affect that question. Section 352 does not purport to deem the employer of an employee of the Commonwealth to be anyone other than the Commonwealth. The section provides facilitatory and clarificatory means whereby, for the purposes of the Act, the Commonwealth may conveniently act by agents described as 'employing authorities' and whereby persons dealing with the Commonwealth may conveniently do so by dealing with such agents. Although the relevant 'employing authorities' were the Minister of Defence and the Minister of State for Industrial Relations (see Item 3 of Schedule 2 of the Workplace Relations Regulations 1996 (as in force at September 1998), the employer remained the Commonwealth.
71 I am generally fortified in the view I take by the approach of Hungerford J in Workcover NSW v Police Service of NSW (2000) 50 NSWLR 333. Section 187 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) abolished the privilege against self-incrimination for bodies corporate. His Honour held that such abolition was effective against the State. In particular, his Honour rejected (at [22]) the notion that the concepts of a body politic and a body corporate 'were mutually exclusive'. Indeed, as his Honour showed (at [23]), there is much to be said for the view that, in a legal context, as distinct from general modern usage, if such be the preferable view of the context, 'a body politic is a body corporate … established for a public purpose'.
72 The respondent criticised that decision on a number of bases. I need not go into them. Whatever may be any imperfections of reasoning, the decision in that case appears to me to be correct. It is, however, correct to say, as the respondent did, that Hungerford J's conclusion 'must … be seen in its context'. Although the present context is different, in its own way, such context, to my mind, supports the conclusion I have reached, as I have sought to indicate.