Offence No 11
17 On 13 December 1994 an investigator attended the defendant's premises at Top Ryde. On entering the store she observed "Super Jetfighter" toys displayed for sale. Nineteen of this unit were available and the investigator purchased three. The "Super Jetfighter" was of the same type as described in relation to offence no. 6. Undertakings had been given in this Court in proceedings for interlocutory injunction concerning the non availability of such items for sale. That circumstance was drawn to the attention of the manager. As already observed, this toy failed a requisite projectile test. It was agreed that the store at Top Ryde had not opened for business at the time the prosecutor alerted the defendant to its concerns regarding the "Super Jetfighters". Notification was given on 11 November 1994 and the directive for removal given on 14 November. The Top Ryde store had opened for the first time on 12 November. The agreed statement of facts records that upon discovering failure by the manager (of the Top Ryde store) to act on the directive the defendant immediately called an emergency meeting involving all of its Sydney managers to ensure that all necessary procedures were in place and that all of the managers understood them.
18 In respect of each of the offences the defendant, being a corporation is liable to potential penalties not exceeding a fine of $100,000.
19 The defendant has no prior convictions under this Act. It was not suggested that there was relevant conduct or relevant offences to the taking into account in respect of any matters touching the defendant since these occurrences all of which occurred in the span between 2 September and 13 December 1994.
Mitigation
20 I have referred to the evidence of Mr Shuster. I accept he was a witness of truth, indeed no suggestion that I ought find otherwise was made. He accepted the amendment to some details of his statement put to him in cross examination. It is unnecessary to recite that material but I should record the thrust of the principal matters which I understood to be relied upon by Mr Porter. The tabulation is my own and is adopted for convenience and I will interpolate remarks where appropriate.
(a) An order for payment of the prosecutor's costs is not opposed and it is agreed that the sum sought ($89,772) is a final figure including all aspects of the litigation. The Attorney General confirmed a concession that in fixing fines for the offences the acceptance by the defendant of the obligation to pay these costs would be a matter for consideration.
(b) The pleas of guilty themselves attract leniency. I would take these into account in favour of the defendant on two bases, first evidencing genuine regret on the part of the defendant's directors for the offences (the usual expression of contrition seems ill fitted where a corporation is involved) and, second, crediting the utilitarian value of saving the State the cost of any extended trial. The latter is of particular value where the material is assembled and put before the Court as Mr Porter commented (and I agree) with "considerable commonsense by the parties".
(c) The offences are somewhat stale, all being committed over four years ago. No blame for delay is sought to be attributed to the prosecutor and I was informed that there had been "various negotiations". I will regard the matter of the four year delay as essential neutral but I take into account the corollary that in the progress of legislative action, the community becomes more safety conscious and it might realistically be said that attention to potential product danger by a trader might be expected to be more acutely focussed in 1999 than it might have been in 1994.
(d) In response to investigation the defendant made full and candid disclosure.
(e) In no case was it suggested that the breach was deliberate. It was submitted that neither would I find any of them reckless. There is no need to elaborate upon the standard of culpability to qualify as recklessness in connection with penal sanction. I find that the defendant did not act recklessly in respect of any of the offences.
(f) The defendant was faced with compliance in an area made difficult by the differences in requirements from State to State. It was implied that it was not unreasonable to obtain goods from reputable suppliers (as was not challenged) which were stated to comply with European standards and assumed therefore not to require further investigation. I accept that this approach was bona fide but I reject that it was reasonable. The defendant self evidently made the decision to trade in New South Wales and it was plainly incumbent upon it to make adequate arrangements to become informed of the requirements in this State and to meet them. Effectively nothing was done other than rely upon the implication that satisfaction for one standard could be assumed to be universal until the prosecutor's investigations provoked some activity.
(g) It was conceded that in 1994 compliance mechanisms of the defendant were not "as good as they should have been" but that the measures now being taken including the employment of a highly experienced toy buyer and the testing of items at external laboratories was as much as could reasonably be expected. Attention was drawn to the costs incurred in allied responses following the prosecutor's investigation. I am persuaded by the submission that this expenditure as such is not realistically an amount to be taken into account in mitigation. The defendant ought to have been complying in any event with requirements and the cost involved was a requirement of carrying on the chosen business. The additional costs are a direct result of the circumstance that the defendant did not make timely arrangements to effect compliance.
(h) There has been no report of anyone being injured with the items. In this regard and the issue of expenditure canvassed in the preceding paragraph I would respectfully echo the remarks of Einfeld J (dealing with a parallel provision in the Trade Practices Act 1974 and a toy called "Happy Hippo"):
"There is an important public interest at stake and although the standards are arbitrary, the existence of such standards is widespread around the western world if not virtually universal. Business people must be conscious of their responsibilities in this regard, even if it means factoring into their price structures the cost consequences of having to ensure that their products are safe and rejecting those that are not. It is only a matter of luck that no child was hurt from the dangerous nature of this particular toy" : McInnes v Global Imports Pty Limited 1993 ATPR 41-206.
(i) Some balance sheets of the defendant were produced and it was asserted that they showed that the company was not in a position to pay heavy fines. I am not equipped to analyse the account methods which led to the production of the balance sheets but I can observe that as at 30 June 1998 the stated nett assets appear to approach $9,000,000 and there is a record of retained profits exceeding $5,000,000. Operating revenue (which I take to be virtually the annual takings) was over $115,000,000 and in the light of all the figures I am unwilling to conclude that the negatively assessed profit/loss figure demonstrates any relative impoverishment.
(j) None of the offences was particularly serious. The prosecutor expressly challenged this submission and I would uphold the challenge. No doubt the outcome might have been more serious, for example if actual injury had taken place, but in dealing with preventative safety measures, exposure to risk resulting from simple non compliance is itself serious and in my view cannot be categorized any more mildly.
(k) Any claim to dismissal pursuant to s 556A of the Crimes Act was disavowed and Mr Porter realistically acknowledged that fines should be imposed. It was reiterated that the defendant had no prior convictions and the evidence of Mr Shuster that the defendant had acted exactly in compliance with the law in 1994 was not contradicted. Finally attention was directed to an asserted sense of practical duplication in some of the offences in that they related to identical goods. Section 62(4) of the Act which reflects the flavour of the principles of totality was referred to. In the light of my assessment of appropriate penalty its specific terms do not need to be applied and I shall limit myself to giving appropriate indications when imposing the fines.
Conclusion
21 I conclude that the evidence shows that the responses of the defendant were such that the element usually referred to as "personal deterrence" would not be of any great significance. The offences do however relate to matters of public safety and the element of "public deterrence" is of significant concern. There should be a clear signal to traders that offences arising out of breaches of safety requirement will not be lightly tolerated. Nevertheless in the particular circumstances of these offences and for the reasons adumbrated above the amount of penalty should be tempered but it should be recognized that considerable leniency has been integrated into the assessment of amount. As I have already mentioned it is necessary to give special account to the consent of the defendant to pay the substantial amount representing the whole legal costs of proceedings brought by the prosecutor.
Penalties
22 I impose the following fines and I add some notations concerning the assessment of the discrete amounts.
First Offence
The defendant is fined $2,000.