Subjective factors
29 The respondent has not previously been found to have contravened the FW Act. But on 4 March 2009 it admitted to contraventions of s 342(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ("WR Act") in that it failed to lodge with the Workplace Authority an Australian Workplace Agreement for 57 of its employees and that in doing so it failed to pay four employees the amount of shift allowance due under the relevant award. It offered an undertaking to the Commonwealth of Australia (through the Office of the Workplace Ombudsman) as a result of which the Workplace Ombudsman decided not to commence civil penalty proceedings against it. With one qualification there is no evidence that it failed to honour the undertaking. The qualification relates to paragraph (g) of the undertaking, in which the respondent promised to ensure that it did not engage in conduct in contravention of the Act or Regulations in the future. The WR Act, of course, has been repealed. But the provisions in play in this case largely duplicate provisions contained in the WR Act. There is no evidence that the respondent did not take appropriate steps to guard against contraventions of the Act. Equally, however, there is no evidence that it had any system in place to prevent the kinds of contraventions that occurred in this case. Indeed, such evidence as there is touching on this issue indicates that it did not.
30 Still, the circumstances of the contraventions of the WR Act are entirely different from those in the present case. In the former case the respondent voluntarily disclosed to the Office of the Workplace Ombudsman that it had not lodged the agreements as required and it appears to have fully cooperated with the Office in the investigation.
31 I do not regard these previous contraventions as aggravating factors but the respondent should not be treated as a first offender.
32 More significant is the fact that the respondent showed no contrition. On the contrary, it consistently sought to justify its conduct. Far from cooperating with the prosecutor, it put the applicants to strict proof on every matter (at first including, astonishingly, the CFMEU's status as an industrial association within the meaning of the Act), and it denied engaging in adverse action when there was no evidentiary basis for doing so.
33 The respondent submitted that no weight should be put on the absence of contrition. I reject the submission. The absence of contrition bears upon the risk of reoffending and therefore on the question of specific deterrence. The respondent drew my attention to some recent remarks of Perram J in ACE Insurance Limited v Trifunovski (No 2) [2012] FCA 793 at [113]-[114] where his Honour said:
It is not clear to me how an artificial construct such as a corporation can experience the complex human emotion of contrition made up, as it is, of an amalgam of distinctly human emotions such as regret, shame and sympathy. I do not doubt that a corporation may exhibit signs of regret but it is too much to expect that such an artificial construct can be meaningfully contrite.
For civil penalty cases involving corporations it would be more coherent to ask only whether the corporation has changed its behaviour. Nothing more can be expected; a person who does not literally or physically exist may not wear sackcloth.
34 While I naturally accept the force of Perram J's remarks, I do not agree that nothing more can be expected of a corporation than that it has changed its behaviour. A corporation may admit its wrongdoing and spare the other parties the costs of prosecuting the case. In a jurisdiction, such as this, where costs can only be awarded in exceptional cases that is a meaningful expression of contrition. The corporation may also offer recompense. It may apologise. The decision-makers themselves could offer apologies. It may introduce precautions to guard against the risk of reoffending. In the present case, evidence was led (and not contradicted) that the General Manager, Ben Van Roon, acknowledged that Mr Hamilton should not have rejected Mr Lamberth's nomination for the safety and health committee. In the circumstances, the respondent could (and should) have stopped the ballot.
35 Yet, the respondent did nothing. Moreover, it sought to shift all responsibility away from itself to the employee it wronged.
36 Doubtless the primary purpose of having a system of pecuniary penalties for conduct of this kind is to deter employers from taking action against employees for reasons the Parliament considers unacceptable. The penalties should therefore be of a kind that would be likely to act as a deterrent to like-minded employers: Ponzio at [93]. Barker J observed in Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association v International Aviation Service Assistance Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 205 IR 465 at [20] that "[a]t a general level, persons in the position of an employer must receive a message, indicated by the imposition of a pecuniary penalty, that much more than lip service is to be paid to the objectives of the FW Act in relation to industrial freedoms". The same must be said of workplace rights.
37 Consequently, as the authorities demonstrate, deterrence (both general and specific) plays an important part in the assessment of penalty. Specific deterrence will often be unnecessary. But this is not such a case. The failure to acknowledge wrongdoing or to explore, let alone devise, ways of preventing future action being taken for, or influenced by, a prohibited reason indicates the need for the penalty to deter this respondent from acting in the same way again. Ms Slade gave evidence that the respondent has no formal process or written guidelines or procedures for making decisions about whether to offer further employment to a person on a fixed term contract. Nor does it have a system for auditing decisions of this kind. Ordinarily, she said, and in this particular case, there was not even a formal record of who made the decision, the reasons for it or when it was made. As the applicants submitted, the absence of transparent procedures for determining who should be offered permanent employment is open to abuse and conducive to decisions being taken for prohibited reasons. That is particularly so where, as here, the employer has been averse to unions playing an active role at the workplace.
38 These matters together with the absence of any contrition indicate that, despite the respondent's relatively good record, there is a substantial risk of re-offending.