Jurisdictional error by the Full Bench
60 The task of the FWC involved a value judgment based on its "satisfaction" or lack of satisfaction about specified matters. The ultimate assessment of whether the choice of group was fair involved a very broad judgment. That judgment was committed to the FWC. The FWC would commit jurisdictional error if it misunderstood, or failed to exercise, its jurisdiction (Public Service Association of South Australia v Federated Clerks' Union of Australia, South Australian Branch (1991) 173 CLR 132).
61 In the case of the Full Bench, it would commit jurisdictional error if it failed to apply itself correctly to the particular task of deciding the appeal (Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [31]). That task also involves proceeding from a correct appreciation of the legislative scheme.
62 Although it is important to give full weight to the independent discretion of the FWC, and the Full Bench, I have come to the view that the findings of the primary judge with regard to each of the jurisdictional errors which he concluded that the Full Bench had made should not be disturbed.
63 The first error is revealed by [25] of the Full Bench decision set out earlier. It is an inevitable consequence of the fact that s 186(3) and (3A) are addressed to coverage in the wider sense I earlier identified, over a period of up to four years, that there will be very many cases where it will not be possible to meet the test posed by the Full Bench. In my respectful view, that test involved a misconstruction and misapplication of the statutory principles.
64 It was not relevant to an assessment of the question posed by s 186(3) that the Full Bench did not know how many employees would, or might, in future be covered by site specific agreements and hence excluded from the operation of the enterprise agreement. The possibility that the agreement might not apply to unknown future employees on unknown future sites did not alter the "coverage" of the agreement even though it might have an effect on whether the agreement "applied" to particular employees at particular sites. The criticism made by the Full Bench would apply with equal force to any agreement with the capacity to operate at future sites or projects not in existence, or actual contemplation, when the agreement was made. The extent of application of the agreement could not be known with certainty. In the words of the Full Bench, it would not be possible to make "any definitive finding" about that matter. However, in my respectful view that is a different position from the ascertainment of the "group of employees to be covered", a task which involves an appreciation of the nature of the work to be regulated and rewarded by the agreement rather than how many employees may, in the years to come, carry out the work, or where.
65 I therefore agree with the primary judge that the Full Bench made a jurisdictional error about this issue.
66 The second error found by the primary judge is crystallised in the following passages in the Full Bench decision:
[30] … In this case three employees on one site have bargained and agreed on an agreement with potentially very wide application to other employees who have not engaged in bargaining under Part 2-4 of the Act and will not be given the opportunity to bargain. …
…
[34] … We also consider that the operation of the Agreement, as made with the three employees, would undermine collective bargaining by other employees in a manner not compatible with the objects of Part 2-4, …
67 Although the Full Bench was directed by s 578(a) to take into account the objects of Part 2-4 (as stated in s 171) it is far from clear how the Full Bench was able to conclude that an agreement made with three employees could "undermine" collective bargaining, or that it was relevant to state any conclusion in such broad terms.
68 It is not correct, with respect, to say (or suggest or infer) as the Full Bench did in [30], that there were in fact other employees who had been denied a chance to bargain. The "other employees" referred to were potential (and unknown) possible future employees who would never have a chance to bargain unless there was no agreement in place when they were engaged. Deprivation of that opportunity would arise in the case of any employee engaged during the term of an agreement.
69 It should be noted that the statutory objective in s 171(a) (which I set out earlier) refers to "collective bargaining in good faith", but it is apparent that this statutory objective, and the reference in s 171(b) to "good faith bargaining", must be understood in the overall context set by Part 2-4 of the FW Act.
70 Neither "collective bargaining" nor "good faith" is defined by the FW Act. There are, however, a number of procedural directions and discretions in the FW Act which concern "good faith bargaining requirements" (see s 228 and following). They include facilities for bargaining representatives to seek bargaining orders, majority support determinations and scope orders. None of those procedures was relevant to the present case.
71 It has not been suggested that it was impermissible for three employees to be asked to make an agreement or vote to do so. The FW Act permits such an agreement to be made and requires that it be approved if the statutory tests are met. Unless the proposed agreement failed to meet a relevant statutory test there could be no basis for introducing a further, more general, requirement of the kind adopted by the Full Bench.
72 In my respectful view, the criticism expressed by the Full Bench in [30] and [34] of its decision which I set out earlier was misplaced. The "employees" to whom the Full Bench referred were future employees. It was not to the point that an agreement was made before some employees were engaged: that was a feature of the process. It would be the inevitable result also of any greenfields agreement when no employee covered by the agreement would have an opportunity to vote to accept its terms. Ironically, in a sense, the agreement did provide the possibility of collective bargaining on a site by site or project by project basis but the Full Bench appeared to think this a disabling rather than meritorious feature.
73 Deputy President McCarthy had said:
[20] … I do not sense anything in the making of this Agreement as evincing any intention by the Applicant to circumvent the objects of the FW Act and, in particular, an intention to prevent or frustrate the right of employees to be represented and collectively bargain.
74 There was no feature of the agreement identified by the Full Bench which suggested it was intended to, or might possibly, frustrate the operation of the FW Act in future or prevent good faith bargaining in accordance with the FW Act in an appropriate case when effect was given (if it ever was) to the possibility of negotiating a site specific or project agreement as contemplated by cl 1.2.
75 The Full Bench also said:
[31] … While it is true that some bargaining may occur notwithstanding the Agreement, it is still the case that only some aspects of the bargaining options under the Act would be available to employees covered by the Agreement. For example, employees at a new site who fall within the terms of clause 1.1(b) would be covered by the Agreement and therefore would not be able to take protected industrial action in relation to the bargaining for a site or project specific agreement during the operation of the Agreement. The taking of protected action is part of the bargaining scheme of the Act. …
76 I referred earlier to the difficulties in the proposition that the possibility of protected industrial action was removed by cl 1.1(b). In a case of the present kind that proposition, in my respectful view, rests upon an assumption which does not withstand scrutiny. Where there is no existing agreement, there is nothing to stop an agreement being made before work on a project commences (e.g. a greenfields agreement) or as soon as a very small number of employees have been engaged. In either case the possibility of protected industrial action is removed at that point.
77 Furthermore, the consequences to which the Full Bench referred are those which are imposed by the FW Act itself. Such consequences cannot be brought to account to sustain a charge that the scheme of the FW Act was being subverted or undermined.
78 The Full Bench went on:
[32] In relation to the potential for the selection of the group to undermine collective bargaining, we also note the provisions in the Act regarding the making and approval of greenfields agreements (e.g. s.182(3)). The agreement before us is not a greenfields agreement within the meaning of s.182(3). It is an agreement reached through bargaining with three employees. If it were possible to make an agreement with such a limited number of employees on one site with potential application to many sites and employees in a large geographical area such as Western Australia, this would mean that it is possible to make an agreement with a similar effect to a greenfields agreement for possibly a very large number of employees, without meeting the requirements of s.182(3).
79 The consequences of a greenfields agreement (made before any employee is employed) is that the restrictions on employee bargaining referred to in the preceding paragraph in the Full Bench decision are equally imposed. The FW Act recognises each form of bargaining. It does not prefer one over the other.
80 Section 182(3), which was referred to by the Full Bench in the last passage set out above, provides:
182 When an enterprise agreement is made
…
Greenfields agreement
(3) A greenfields agreement is made when it has been signed by each employer and each relevant employee organisation that the agreement is expressed to cover (which need not be all of the relevant employee organisations for the agreement).
(Emphasis in original.)
81 Self-evidently, this provision refers only to greenfields agreements. It has nothing to say about an agreement made directly with employees. It is not relevant to suggest some circumvention of any "requirement" in s 182(3); failure to comply with its terms would spell invalidity, if it applied.
82 The Full Bench seems to have proceeded, in this part of its reasons, on an unexpressed preference for union negotiation, leading to greenfields agreements. Such a preference does not, with respect, reflect the statutory scheme. One consequence of that approach when it is followed is (as I have said) that there is no direct employee involvement at all. That may, or may not be, appropriate or the chosen course in particular cases but it cannot be elevated to the status of a rule. Such a consideration was not a relevant one in the assessment of matters under s 186(3) and (3A).
83 The Full Bench did not say directly that it may not be fair for an enterprise agreement made with three existing employees to cover a wide range of other classifications and jobs in which they may have no conceivable interest, or that the group thereby constituted may not be fairly chosen. I do not exclude the possibility that such an assessment may be available in a proper case but it is not necessary to pursue that question here.
84 I agree with the conclusion of the primary judge that the Full Bench made a second jurisdictional error in its reliance upon its specific finding that the agreement would undermine collective bargaining, for the reasons which it gave.