CONSIDERATION
39 It is convenient to commence with two general observations about the approach to the question of construction which arises in this case. The first point is that the CFMEU's attempt to analyse three parts of the Eligibility Rule in isolation from each other ignores the assistance legitimately and necessarily to be gained from reading the Eligibility Rule as a whole. One should seek to understand the rule by considering it as a whole so that its parts may shed light on each other. This is so apart from the question raised by the CFMEU as to the legitimacy of reference to the Industry Rule as an aid to the construction of the Eligibility Rule, a question to which I will return. The first point to be made is that the CFMEU's attempt to present what is truly one question of interpretation as if it were three distinct exercises in construction to be performed separately is an invitation to error.
40 The second general point to be made at the outset is that one must have regard to the statutory context in which the question of construction arises. Section 166(1) of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) provides for the entitlement of a person to become a member of an organisation of employees. It is relevantly in the following terms:
(166(1))… a person who is eligible to become a member of an organisation of employees under the eligibility rules of the organisation that relate to occupations in which, or the industry or enterprise in relation to which, members are to be employed is, … entitled, subject to payment of any amount properly payable in relation to membership:
(a) to be admitted as a member of the organisation[.]
41 This second point has a number of ramifications. First, as to the CFMEU's contention that "the work" referred to in the Eligibility Rule is the work of the Kwinana Plant, it should be noted that the Eligibility Rule confers an entitlement to membership by reference to the occupations of employed persons, not by reference to the industry or enterprise of the employer.
42 In relation to the phrase "incidental to", it should be understood that in construing the words of the Eligibility Rule in their unique legal and industrial context little assistance can be expected from decisions upon the construction of different words in a different legal and industrial context. We are not here concerned with an Eligibility Rule which operates by reference to the employer's industry or enterprise. Moreover, in the Eligibility Rule, the meaning of the phrase "incidental to" is informed by the context in which it appears. That context includes reference to "attendants, greasers, cleaners, trimmers and any other workers assisting in and about the work …". The common characteristic of the occupations listed is that they perform a subsidiary role in relation to the operation of machinery. The phrase "the work incidental to any engine etc" is a reference to the kind of work performed by the occupations earlier listed. The work so described is generically subsidiary to the operation of "any engine, boiler or machinery connected with the production or utilisation of power …". It is not the "work" of the totality of the employer's enterprise. The primary view of the meaning of "the work" advanced by the CFMEU should be rejected. If it were adopted it would lead to the absurd conclusion that an industrial chemist is within the Eligibility Rule.
43 The CFMEU advanced an alternative view of the meaning of "the work" in this context. On this alternative view, the "attendant" or "other worker" is a worker providing assistance to another employee performing one of the named occupations. In this regard, there is no basis in the primary judge's findings of fact, or in the evidence, for the unlikely conclusion that Process Technicians actually assist one or more of the named occupations to perform the work involved in those named occupations. And in any event, even if Process Technicians do provide assistance of this kind from time to time, it cannot be said that the provision of this assistance is the primary purpose of their employment.
44 Secondly, the circumstance that, in conformity with s 166(1) of the Act, the focus of the Eligibility Rule is upon the occupations of the employees covered by it as opposed to what s 166(1) contemplated it might have covered, but did not, namely the industry in which their employers are engaged, also means that the primary purpose test of employment is appropriate. In applying this test one does not focus upon one aspect of an employee's work in isolation from the totality of his or her duties. Thus in Federated Engine Drivers & Firemen's Union (WA) v Mt Newman Mining Co Pty Ltd (1977) 57 WAIG 794, Burt CJ observed in this regard at 794 that not every worker, who in doing the work which he is employed to do drives an engine, is an engine driver within the meaning of the rule. Rather:
… The question in any particular case is, I think, whether the worker is employed to drive an engine so that he earns his wages by doing that, or whether he is employed to do something else. And if the answer is that he is employed to do something else then he is not an engine driver merely because he operates a machine and drives the engine of that machine so as to do what he is employed to do.
45 Similarly, in Joyce v Christoffersen (1990) 26 FCR 261 at 279, Gray J observed that "the primary function of an employee must be determined by looking at what he or she does in the context of the employer's organisation of work".
46 The Process Technicians employed by CSPB perform duties more sophisticated and extensive than those contemplated by any of the particular occupational descriptions listed in the Eligibility Rule. Moreover, their duties are directed, not to the use of machinery for the generation or utilisation of power but to the use of machinery which uses power for the production of chemical products. As a matter of ordinary language one would not describe Process Technicians as "attendants". As to the catch-all "other workers", it pays scant regard to the language of r 2(3) or to the skills of Process Technicians to suggest that technicians responsible for the entirety of a production process are included in the residuum of occupations which generically serve to facilitate the operation of particular items of machinery. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that there is no suggestion that anyone has ever referred to the Process Technicians as "attendants".
47 Senior Counsel for the CFMEU fought a gallant, but, in our respectful opinion, ultimately unsuccessful battle to maintain that the construction for which the CFMEU contended would not lead to an impossibly wide operation for the rule. It is difficult to see how, on the CFMEU's construction of the rule, any worker who turns on an electric switch in the course of his or her employment would not be within the Eligibility Clause.
48 It may be accepted that the eligibility rules of a trade union must be broadly construed; and that the scope of a membership clause should not be read narrowly or read down by reference to the membership clauses of other industrial organizations: R v Cohen; Ex parte Motor Accidents Insurance Board (1979) 141 CLR 577 at 587 per Mason J. It may also be accepted that it is not relevant to the construction of the Eligibility Rule that there may be another industrial organisation that might be a more natural representative of a given employee: Electrical Trades Union of Australia v Waterside Workers Federation of Australia [No 2] (1982) 59 FLR 78 (at 87); 42 ALR 587, 595.
49 That having been said, one should not accede to attempts to promote exorbitant claims which, if allowed, would render otiose the efforts of those who laboured long and hard to produce explicit statements intended to mark out the scope of a union's coverage of occupations in the workplace.
50 In this regard, the context afforded by the Industry Rule, r 3(F), limits the scope of the Eligibility Rule so that it does not include those employees engaged in the generation or use of power only as an aspect of their role in an integrated process directed to the production of some other product. The Industry Rule refers to "drivers of or attendants to any … pump, boiler, generator or motor used in or in connection with the generation, production, distribution or utilisation of power, and persons assisting in or about any work incidental thereto" (emphasis added). This provision indicates that the Eligibility Clause is not concerned with the occupations of all workers who operate machinery which uses power, but with those occupations who assist in the operation of machinery which is used in connection with the utilisation of power.
51 The CFMEU's argument that recourse to the Industry Rule is impermissible because there is no ambiguity in the Eligibility Rule is difficult to accept, given that the dictionary meanings of "incidental" cited by Counsel for the CFMEU include the meanings "naturally appertaining to" as well as "happening or likely to happen in … subordinate conjunction with something else": see Re IBM Global Services Australia Ltd (2005) 144 IR 389 at [62]. The CFMEU argued for the former meaning and argued against the latter.
52 In our respectful opinion, it is legitimate to have regard to the Industry Rule for the purpose of resolving doubt as to the proper construction of the Eligibility Rule. It is also legitimate to eschew a construction which is so "extremely wide or indefinite as to be unlikely to have been intended". Each of these propositions is supported by the decision of the High Court in R v Gough; ex parte The Municipal Officers' Association Australia (1975) 133 CLR 59. At 68-69 Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Jacobs JJ said:
The contention on behalf of the Association is that the members of the university staffs in question are persons employed by statutory corporations, it being conceded that the adjective "statutory" in r. 5 governs not only "authorities" but also inter alia, "corporations". It is submitted that the words "statutory corporations" simply mean corporate bodies which are created by statute and whose powers are conferred by statute. It is common ground that each of the universities concerned is constituted by a statute which provides that the university shall be a body corporate and proceeds to endow it with legal capacity. Therefore, it is submitted, each university is a statutory corporation within the natural meaning of the words of the rule.
The argument of the Association as to the meaning of r.5 cannot be accepted. We are not concerned with a rule which appeared alone or in another context. If it were right to sever the words "Statutory Authorities, Corporations, Trusts, Boards or Commissioners" from the rest of r.5, and to construe them as meaning any authority, corporation, trust, board or commission constituted under statute, the condition of membership stated by the rule would be extremely wide and indefinite and the rule would permit the Association to enrol as its members persons employed by all sorts of bodies, public and private, whose only common characteristic would be that they were set up under the provisions of a statute. Such a result would not be likely to have been intended. However, it is not permissible to construe those words in isolation; in accordance with ordinary principles they should if possible be given a meaning that will render them harmonious with the rest of the instrument in which they appear. If statutory authorities and corporations within the meaning of r.5 included all authorities and corporations set up by statute, they would embrace all the "Local Authorities, Cities, Municipalities, Towns Boroughs, or Shires" previously mentioned, because in Australia today such instrumentalities of local government are constituted under statutory provisions; the result would be that the earlier words of the rule would be rendered quite superfluous. In the context of the rule the generality of the words "Statutory Authorities, Corporations, Trusts, Boards or Commissions" must be limited by the other words, earlier and later, with which they are associated, and which show that they were intended to have some flavour of local government. This is not to ignore the words "or by" on which the Association so strongly relies; those words introduce a new class, but it is a class not unconnected with that earlier described. Moreover, the context provided by r.3 provides further assistance in resolving the ambiguity in r.5. Although it is established that the conditions of eligibility of a registered organization may validly extend beyond the industry in respect of which the organization is registered, that is no reason why, in attempting to place a meaning on ambiguous words in the eligibility clause, any assistance provided by the industry clause should be rejected: see per Barwick C.J. in Reg. v Watson; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union (25). The industry clause in the present rules (r.3) supports the conclusion that the statutory corporations mentioned in r. 5 form part of one "industry" whose other parts are local government and municipal bodies. In the context provided by rr 3 and 5 it is apparent that the expression "statutory corporations" must be limited to corporations exercising functions of a public nature in some way analogous to those exercised by local authorities
(Emphasis added).
53 The broad construction of the Eligibility Rule for which the CFMEU contends is forced and awkward. An occupation which involves the monitoring and operation of the production process of a chemical production plant requiring attention to pressures, temperatures, chemical reactions, flows and throughputs, would not ordinarily be described as an "attendant". Further, the suggestion that the functions of highly skilled Process Technicians are subsumed by the residual catch-all "other workers" when the Eligibility Rule specifies other classes of employee by reference to a skill characteristic of the occupation is distinctly odd and unconvincing.
54 For these reasons we conclude that the challenge to the decision of the primary judge must fail.