conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest.) Those implied powers may in many instances serve a function similar to that served by the inherent powers exercised by a superior court but they are derived from a different source and are limited in their extent. The distinction between inherent jurisdiction and jurisdiction by implication is not always made explicit, but it is, as Menzies J points out, fundamental." 14. His Honour observed, further, at 628: "It would be unprofitable to attempt to generalise in speaking of the powers which an inferior court must possess by way of necessary implication. Recognition of the existence of such powers will be called for whenever they are required for the effective exercise of a jurisdiction which is expressly conferred but will be confined to so much as can be derived by implication from statutory provisions conferring particular jurisdiction." 15. The power of a superior court to summarily dismiss an action is an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of such a court: Bayne v Baillieu [1908] HCA 39; (1908) 6 CLR 382 at 398 per O'Connor J; Burton v The President etc. of the Shire of Bairnsdale [1908] HCA 57; (1908) 7 CLR 76. These cases suggest that the inherent power is founded upon the power of a court to protect itself from an abuse of its processes: see also Williams Supreme Court Civil Procedure Butterworths (1987) p125. It was submitted by the appellant that the Work Health Court's power to do likewise is part of its implied powers. I was not referred to any authority which has decided whether such a power has been found to be implied by the statutory provisions establishing an inferior court. Nor have I been able to find any authority on the point myself. The power of inferior courts to refuse to hear proceedings on the ground that they are oppressive and an abuse of process is averted to by Dawson J Grassby at [1989] HCA 45; 168 CLR 1 at 10. In that case, the High Court decided that no such power could be implied in the case of a magistrate before whom committal proceedings have been brought because the statutory obligations of a magistrate were couched in mandatory terms as a consequence of which there was no room for the implication of such a power. 16. On the other hand, in England it has now been recognised that a power does exist in inferior courts to refuse to hear proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the court, and are vexatious and oppressive: see Reg v Humphreys (1977) AC 1 at 45-6 per Lord Salmon; R v Brentford Justices, ex parte Wong (1981) 73 Crim App R 200; R v Grays Justices, ex parte Graham (1982) 75 Crim App R 229; R v West London Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Anderson (1985) 80 Crim App R 143. The majority of the High Court seemed to recognise such a power in the case of criminal proceedings pending in the District Court of New South Wales in Jago v The District Court of New South Wales and Ors [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23. Whatever may be the situation in England or New South Wales, I am bound to approach the matter in accordance with the principles referred to in Grassby. 17. The powers of the work Health Court are set out in s94 of the Act. This section provides: "94. POWERS OF COURT (1) The Court has power to hear and determine - (a) claims for compensation under Part V and all matters and questions incidental to or arising out of such claims; and (b) all other matters required or permitted by this Act to be referred to the Court for determination,and such other powers as are conferred on it by or under this or any other Act. (2) The Court may expand or abridge a time prescribed by or under this Part as it thinks fit." 18. Section 95 of the Act empowers the Chief Magistrate to make rules and give practice directions, not inconsistent with the Act, regulating the practice and procedures of the Court. Section 95(4) provides that the practice and procedures of the court in relation to a matter are within the discretion of the court. Section 97 provides that, in addition, the court or a magistrate has, in relation to a proceeding, except to the extent that the matter is specifically provided for under the Act, all the powers of a Local Court or a magistrate under the Local Court Act. It seems to me that prima facie the Work Health Court has an incidental power to dismiss an application summarily and prima facie, express power is conferred by s97. Orders 22 and 23 of the Local Court Rules provide the procedure for summary judgment in the Local Court. So far as the incidental power is concerned, s94 confers a power in the widest of terms to hear and determine applications for compensation under the Act, and s95(4) leaves any question of practice and procedure in the discretion of the court. A power to dismiss summarily is in my opinion a matter of practice and procedure. In Adam P Brown Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Incorporated and Philip Morris Ltd [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 176 Gibbs CJ and Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ cited with approval the following passage from Salmond on Jurisprudence 10 ed (1947) p476 which distinguishes substantive from procedural law: "'Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks; procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates the conduct and relations of courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself; the former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matters litigated.'" 19. The Solicitor-General, Mr Pauling QC, who appeared for the respondent, pointed out that the powers conferred by s95 and s97 were to be read subject to there being no specific provision by the Act, and as s107(2)(a) required the agreement of the parties to decide the matter summarily, there was no room for any express or implied power to dispose of the matter summarily in the absence of consent. I do not consider that s107(2)(a) has the effect contended for by Mr Pauling QC. There is a well-recognised difference between summary trials of proceedings and summary judgment applications. For example, the Supreme Court Rules provide for both procedures: see Orders 22 and 23 which deal with summary judgment applications and r22.06(1)(d) which empowers the court, by consent of the parties, to dispose of a proceeding finally in a summary way. The Local Court Rules similarly observe the distinction: see r22.04(1)(d) and Orders 22 and 23. I conclude, therefore, that the Work Health Court did have jurisdiction to entertain an application by the appellant for summary judgment. 20. The final question is whether the learned magistrate made any error of law in deciding to dismiss the application for summary judgment. No argument was addressed to his Worship as to the merits of the application. The only question he was called upon to decide is where and when the application would be heard. His Worship dismissed the application because he considered that he must have evidence before him. No doubt it was essential that there be evidence placed before the court before the application could be determined, but there were affidavits already on file in support of the application. His Worship failed to give the appellant any opportunity to be heard before dismissing the application. Although the appellant was represented at the adjourned hearing on 16 March 1992, his Worship did not call upon the solicitor for the appellant before ordering that the summons be dismissed. There is nothing to suggest that the appellant's solicitor waived her right to be heard. This was a clear denial of natural justice to the appellant, and a breach of denial of natural justice is an error of law: Escobar v Spindaleri (1986) 7 NSWLR 51. Although s107 of the Act requires that a preliminary conference be heard "informally," that is not sufficient, in my opinion, to indicate that the rules of natural justice do not apply. 21. I should also mention that although the Rules of the Work Health Court make no provision for summary judgment applications, it is clear that s95(4) of the Act empowers the court or a magistrate to decide its or his own procedures for the hearing of such an application: see Bogeta Pty Ltd v Wales (1977) 1 NSWLR 139 at 149. 22. As to Mr Pauling's submission that there was an error because the summary judgment application rested upon disputed facts and included a difficult question of law, there was no material either before me or before the learned magistrate in the absence of submissions as to the merits of the application, upon which a finding of that kind could be made. Of course, when the application is heard on the merits, those sorts of consideration will be most relevant as to whether the relief sought is granted or refused. But that moment has not yet come. 23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the order of the learned magistrate dismissing the summons for summary judgment is set aside, and the respondent is ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the application of 16 March 1992 and the costs of this appeal.