It may be added that the proprietor's right to defend his land against water coming upon it by erecting barriers, is generally speaking restricted to penning it back on the higher land whence it would otherwise have naturally come. It does not entitle him to diver it on to the land of a third proprietor to which it would not have naturally gone to the damage of that proprietor.
41 I am also bound by the decision in Elston v. Dore. In that case, a drain cut on the defendant's land had the effect that water, which otherwise would have stayed on the plaintiff's land, flowed along the drain onto the defendant's land. The defendant then filled that drain, causing substantial damage to the plaintiff. The High Court held that this was not a nuisance, because it merely restored the situation to what it had been prior to the digging of the drain.
42 However, in the present case, until the depression on the plaintiffs' land was filled, water flowed from the Princes Highway, and from land on the other side of Princes Highway, through the depression on the plaintiffs' land to American Creek. The effect which the filling of the depression would have had, but for the insertion of the pipe, was demonstrated by what happened when the plaintiffs blocked the pipe in 1997. This caused flooding to the Princes Highway, and to other adjoining land. In my opinion, notwithstanding what was said in Gartner v. Kidman, this would have amounted to a nuisance, not merely because of the diversion of the water to other land in addition to the land from which it flowed, but also because what was done could not fairly be described as "no more than reasonably necessary to protect [the plaintiffs'] enjoyment of [their] own land". In my opinion, the filling of this depression was a major change effected to the plaintiffs' land, not mere protection of it, so that an overall test of reasonableness would apply. In my opinion, it would have been unreasonable to make this major change to the land, such as would cause flooding to the highway and other adjoining land unless adequate provision was made for coping with the water blocked by the filling of the depression, without at the same time making that provision. In fact, nuisance was avoided at that stage by the insertion of the pipe.
43 When Comserv subsequently became the owner of the land, it acquired a property on which a potential nuisance had been created, but the actuality of nuisance had been avoided by the existence of the pipe. In those circumstances, even though the title was not encumbered by any easement for the pipe, the deliberate blocking of the pipe and consequent flooding was in my opinion unreasonable and did amount to a nuisance, both to the Council as owner of the highway, and also to other adjoining owners.
44 The next question I consider is whether either the plaintiffs or the Council were under any duty to maintain or repair the pipe, prior to the resumption of the easement by the Council.
45 It was submitted for the plaintiffs that the Council was causing the water to flow across the plaintiffs' property, so that, if the Council did not keep the pipe in repair and damage flowed, the Council would be liable in accordance with the principle applied in Jones v. Pritchard.
46 As mentioned before, Mr. Donohoe relied here on a pleading point. However, in my opinion a fair reading of the pleadings indicates that the Council did not make an unqualified admission that it was causing water to flow through the pipe on the plaintiffs' land; but rather, the Council was alleging that the water came from land to the west of Pacific Highway as well as from the Pacific Highway itself, and from there was discharged into the pipe on the plaintiffs' land. I accept that as a fair account of the situation, and I do not think those circumstances on their own would be enough to cause the Council to be liable if leakage from the pipe caused damage to the plaintiffs' land.
47 On the other hand, it was submitted for the Council that if the plaintiffs' failure to maintain and repair the pipe meant that the pipe no longer conducted water through the plaintiffs' land, the plaintiffs would be liable in the same way as if they had deliberately blocked the pipe.
48 In my opinion, there is no general duty on the plaintiffs to maintain and repair the pipe. It is conceivable that if the pipe collapsed, and if flooding was thereby caused, of the same type as was actually caused by the blocking of the pipe, that might be a nuisance by the plaintiffs. However, while in my opinion the deliberate blocking of the pipe was unreasonable and did amount to a nuisance, the question of whether a failure to prevent the pipe collapsing would be unreasonable and thus give rise to a nuisance could depend upon the detailed circumstances. It is a hypothetical question, in the circumstances of this case, which I do not need to decide.
49 Finally, I need to consider the question whether following the Council's resumption of the easement, either party has a duty to repair the pipe, or whether either party could be liable for nuisance resulting from failure of the pipe.
50 As a result of the easement, the Council now has a positive right to cause water to flow along the pipe; and in my opinion, that positive right carries with it a responsibility not to cause damage to the servient tenement by an unreasonable failure to maintain the pipe. In other words, in my opinion, the principle in Jones v. Pritchard now applies.
51 However, my finding on the facts means that the plaintiffs have not proved that damage has been caused; and in my opinion they have not proved a sufficient threat of damage to justify a quia timet injunction.
52 On the other hand, it follows that the Council would be liable if it failed to maintain the pipe and damage did ultimately ensue from this.