Whereas at trial and on appeal in the Federal Court there was a real issue as to whether the rights conferred by the Permit were "property" for the purposes of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, in this Court that point was abandoned. Every judge of the Federal Court had determined it against the Commonwealth [100] . In light of the characteristics of the rights under the Permit and the broad concept of "property" accepted by this Court [101] , the Commonwealth's belated concession is scarcely surprising. However, it is important, in my view, to record that the Commonwealth conceded that the asset which the respondent held under the Permit was a valuable entitlement which, as between citizen and citizen, had the features of a right to property. Thus, it was "definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and [had] some degree of permanence or stability" [102] . Yet according to the Commonwealth, as between the citizen and the Commonwealth, rights under the same Permit lacked any character of property independent of the statute which gave rise to the Permit [103] . It was accepted by the respondent that its interest derived from federal legislation. That interest had no separate existence as a common law right. Moreover, it was conceded that when, pursuant to CPA, the respondent lost its rights as a permittee in Area A of the Zone, the Commonwealth did not acquire exactly the same rights as had been enjoyed by the respondent. What the Commonwealth received, according to the respondent, was the extinction of the inconvenient, but until then valuable, rights of property within the Zone which it had earlier provided might be granted and transferred, as they had been. This was done by the Parliament to permit a new legal régime by which new property rights in the form of permits issued by the new Joint Authority, might be granted to new persons without the impediment which the earlier