Commonwealth v Huon Transport Pty Ltd [1945] HCA 5

Commonwealth v Huon Transport Pty Ltd [1945] HCA 5 - HCA 1945 case summary — Zoe

[31]

The learned judge arrived at a fair hiring rate for the vessels in - the following way. He took five vessels, namely, the Cartela (194 tons), the Dover (115 tons), the Hzcella (174 tons), the Mongana (98 tons), and the Marana (108 tons), for a period of four years, | 1936-1939 inclusive, and ascertained that the average net earnings - per vessel were £21 18s. 10d. per week. This amount was reached by taking the revenue earned by each vessel and the expenditure which was incurred in working each separate vessel, and deducting that expenditure from the revenue. His Honour also had evidence showing that the average net earnings for three vessels, namely, the Cartela, Excella and Dover, for the years 1940-1942 inclusive were £33 17s. 11d. per week. It was assumed that the ships were interchangeable, as apparently they were, in the sense that any one ship could have been used to conduct the trade carried on by any other ship. His Honour then took an approximate mean figure, namely, £27, between £21 18s. 10d. and £33 17s. 1ld. From this sum, £1 10s. a week was deducted on account of what were called trading expenses, representing expenditure necessarily incurred in running the ships, but not such as could be allotted to any particular ship. There was uncontradicted evidence that the general costs of management of the plaintiff company were not decreased by the taking over of the two ships, and accordingly no deduction was made on this account. Thus his Honour reached a sum of £27 per week, less £1 10s., namely £25 10s., and on this basis awarded in respect of the Mongana a sum of £1,231 5s. 8d., and in respect of the Marana £3,679 5s. 8d., making a total of £4,910 11s. 4d. The Commonwealth had already paid £2,091 3s. 5d. Accordingly, on these calculations, the amount due was £2,819 7s. 1ld. Interest was allowed on this sum on account of delay in payment on the part of the Common- wealth, even of the part of the sum which the Commonwealth admitted was payable. The allowance of interest brought the amount of the judgment up to £3,312 17s. 3d.

[57]

property necessarily involves an allowance for interest in case delay in payment, I should desire to hear the question fully Upon the view, however, that the implied contract has no speci characteristics because the Commonwealth was a party to it, but was a contract which might equally well have been made between two private persons, namely, an agreement to pay a fair hire, these questions do not arise. The Commonwealth may make an agree- - ment for the acquisition of property. The rights of the parties under - such an agreement depend upon its actual terms. The constitu- tional provision that the Parliament may make laws in respect to the acquisition of property upon just terms applies only to statutes made by the Parliament, and not to contracts voluntarily made between the Commonwealth and other persons. That provision does not entitle the courts to add a term to contracts made between - the Commonwealth and other persons for the purpose of making the terms of the contracts " just " in the opinion of the court. Thus, - in the present case, the court can, in my opinion, do nothing more 3 than give effect to the contract between the plaintiff and the defen- dant - namely, a contract to pay a fair hire - and that contract is not a contract to pay also interest upon that hire. The contrary - view would bring about the consequence that, whenever the Com- monwealth agreed to purchase any property, it would become subject to an obligation to pay interest which would not have arisen in the case of a contract in identical terms made between other persons. No such result can, in my opinion, be extracted from the constitutional provision which gives to Parliament a power to legis- late for the compulsory acquisition of property. If an owner of property is not prepared to accept terms proposed by the Common- wealth Government for the acquisition of his property (e.g., if he desires to include a provision for the payment of interest to which the Government refuses to agree) then he can refuse to make any agreement, thus compelling the Government to have resort to com- pulsory powers. A law conferring such compulsory powers must provide or allow for just terms of acquisition, but if the owner agrees on the payment to be made no question of " just terms" arises - whether the agreement is for a stated sum or for such payment as may be fair.

[67]

the property of which he has been deprived. If it is paid to him synchronously with the act of deprivation, he receives full recom- pense. If, however, as is invariably the case, the property is taken in the first instance, and a considerable time elapses before any payment of compensation is made, the expropriation involves him in further loss, because he is deprived both of the opportunity of obtaining revenue from the property that once was his and of earning income or getting benefits by the use of the money to which he has become entitled in place of the property. Just terms therefore involve, as a matter of elementary fairness, the payment to him of interest on the money to which he is entitled for the time during which it is withheld from him. In the United States of America, where by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution it is provided that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, it has been said that "the settled and fundamental doctrine is, that government has no right to take private property for public purposes without giving a just compensation ; and it seems to be necessarily implied, that the indemnity should, in cases which will admit of it, be previously and equitably ascertained, and be ready for reception concurrently in point of time with the actual exercise of the right of eminent domain " (Kent's Commentaries, I1., 339, note). "Where," however, "the United States condemns and takes possession of land before ascertaining or paying compensation, the owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time of taking; he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that value, paid contemporaneously with the taking. Interest at a proper rate is a good measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added" (Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. United States (1) ). In such a case, interest is allowed, not by virtue of State statute, but as constituting a part of the just compensation safeguarded by the Constitution ; and the general rule, that, in the absence of agreement to pay or statute allowing it, the United States will not be held liable for interest on unpaid accounts and claims, does not apply. I have no doubt that in this respect there is no difference between the conceptions of justice obtaining in Australia and in the United States. This Court has already so held in Aus- tralian Apple and Pear Marketing Board v. Tonking (2), where, in my reasons, I referred to the Seaboard Case (3), and the Court allowed interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum.

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provided for by Lord Tenterden's Act (3 & 4 Wm. IV., ¢. 42, s, 28) has been generally adopted throughout the British dominions. When the topic was considered by the House of Lords in London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co. v. South Eastern Railway Co. (1), the House applied the common law rule in a common law case, not because it regarded it as just, but because it was a long-estab- lished rule which ought not to be departed from. Their Lordships did not conceal their view that they regarded it as other than just. Lord Herschell expressed dissatisfaction with the reasons given by Lord Tenterden in Page v. Newman (2), for the denial of interest at common law, and said: "I think that when money is owing from one party to another and that other is driven to have recourse to legal proceedings in order to recover the amount due to him, the party who is wrongfully withholding the money from the other ought not in justice to benefit by having that money in his possession and enjoying the use of it, when the money ought to be in the possession of the other party who is entitled to its use" (3). Lord Herschell added that the relaxations of the common law rule provided for by Lord Tenterden's Act seemed to be too narrow for the purposes of justice. Lord Shand said that he regretted that the law of England in regard to the running of interest was not like the law of Scotland where, if money is shown to be due and to have been demanded, interest runs if the demand is not acceded to. He, too, thought Lord Tenterden's Act too narrow, and expressed the opinion that it was desirable that no such strict law as that expressed in the Act should continue to be the rule in England (4). Forty years elapsed before effect was given to these views in England, where a general relaxation of the common law rule is now provided for by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (24 & 25 Geo. V., ¢. 41), s. 3. An instance of what a legislature, though unconstrained by any such provision as placitum 51 (xxxi.), regards as just in this respect is supplied by s. 126 of the Public Works Act 1912 (N.S.W.), which provides that compensation for land acquired by Gazette notification shall bear interest from the time of such notification. The case of Swift & Co. v. Board of Trade (5) is clearly not a decision upon what is just in respect of payment of interest. It decides only that, where a statutory regulation, uncontrolled by any such pro- vision as is contained in the Australian Constitution, provides for the payment of " compensation," but makes no provision for payment of interest, interest cannot be allowed. It throws no light on the question now before us.

[104]

Tn the present case there is evidence that the ship Mongana was chartered at the outbreak of the present war for a period of eight weeks at £25 per week and there was also evidence of a Hobart ferry manager who deposed that £5 per day for each ship was a fair charge. And there was the evidence of the secretary of the Naval Charter Rates Board, who said that market value usually worked out at 9 per cent on capital value. But apparently this evidence did not afford the trial judge a satisfactory basis for estimating the recompense that should be made to the respondent for the use of the ships, and he turned to the earnings of the ships themselves. The respondent had a fleet of small ships, ranging in tonnage from 85 to 194 tons, which it used in its trade in and about the port of Hobart. And it had kept full and accurate accounts. It had a working account for each ship, an expenses of management account, a trading account, and also a general profit and loss account and balance-sheet. And the trial judge worked out an average from these accounts whereby he estimated the earnings of the requisitioned ships at £25 10s. per week. He did not, however, average the earnings of the whole fleet, but he selected five ships and averaged their earnings. He found that the earnings of each of the five vessels, from 1936 to 1939 inclusive, was £21 18s. 10d. a calendar week and that the average earnings of three of these vessels from 1940 to 1942 was £33 17s. 1]d. And he said that, assuming all the ships could have replaced each other with equal profit to the respondent, the average weekly earnings over seven years was approximately £27, apparently £21 18s. 10d. plus £33 17s. 11d. divided by two, and from this weekly sum of £27 was deducted a sum of £1 10s. for what was called shore charges. It is, of course, possible that earnings of a number of ships must in some cases be averaged if any estimate at all is to be made of the earnings of a particular ship. But it is plain that the method adopted by the trial judge in this case does not give a true average and also that the average is heavily weighted in favour of the Marana and Mongana, which, on the figures adopted by the judge, averaged per week £7.27 in the case of the Marana and £15.64 in the case of the Mongana. The judge's method of ascertaining the recompense that should be paid to the respondent for the use of the ships during the period of requisition cannot, therefore, be supported and should be set aside. But it is possible to make an approximation of the

[120]

The amount of compensation which the Naval Board caused to be paid to the plaintiff was in fact referred to and settled by the Naval Charter Rates Board established under the National Security (Naval Charter Rates) Regulations. But the Commonwealth has taken the view that the case does not fall within those Regulations because the requisition was not "by the Minister': See reg. 3. Accordingly no objection is taken under reg. 10 to the maintenance of the present action. Nor is it contended that it is not maintain- able in the Supreme Court under Part IX. of the Judiciary Act. The duty of the Naval Charter Rates Board under reg. 6 of the Naval Charter Rates Regulations is to inquire into and fix the charter rates which ought fairly to be paid by the Commonwealth in respect of the use or services of ships and craft requisitioned for naval pur- poses, and the amount or rates (if any) which ought to be paid to the owner of every such ship or craft on account of establishment charges. This being its duty, not unnaturally the Board conformed to the distinction between charter rates and rates on account of establishment charges in approaching the task of saying what the plaintiff should receive by way of recompense. It is a well-under- stood distinction and in most cases where there is a requisitioning for a fixed or indefinite time, and, under the terms of the requisition, the shore establishment of the shipowner is not employed in relation to the ship at a remuneration, as it normally is not in a hull or bare- boat requisitioning, it is probably sounder to separate the two heads of compensation, and it certainly tends to greater clearness. To separate them recognizes that usually, though not invariably, the shipowner from whom a vessel is taken is conducting a business employing a number of ships the earnings of each of which contribute to the support of his establishment ashore, which is essential not only to the direction and control of the fleet but to the manning, victualling, employment, berthing, loading, discharge, docking, servicing and maintenance of the ships. The cost of the shore establishment is made necessary by the ownership of all the ships considered in the aggregate, but though it is borne by the earnings

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of all of them, the temporary withdrawal of one or a few of them will not reduce the cost of maintaining the establishment. Recurrent shore expenditure directly incurred by a ship is, of course, clearly referable to her and does not form part of the establishment charges to which I refer. Such expenditure follows the ship, so to speak. In fixing the hire or charter rate for the hull, an attempt is made to ascertain for what the ship could have been chartered commer- cially. As the hypothetical charterer would in all probability himself be a shipowner with a shore establishment to the support of which the earnings of the chartered ship in his hands would be expected to contribute, he would be unlikely to pay a charter rate sufficient to cover the owner's establishment charges as well as the working value of the ship. He would probably be prepared to undertake the charges that follow the ship, so to speak, and pay a charter rate sufficient to cover depreciation and give a proper return to the owner, having proper regard to the capital value of the ship, its efficiency, its profit-earning capabilities, and the prevailing demand for tonnage, if that were uncontrolled. But, beyond that, the reasoning of the hypothetical charterer ought not to be supposed to take him. In practice, and in theory too perhaps, the question whether the owner would part with his ship at a rate so arrived at would depend on what other employment he had for his ship, and, in many cases, that would be only another way of saying that he would consider whether the volume and nature of the trade he had was such that it could be carried by his other ships, so that there would be no important reduction in the total revenue from freights and charter moneys by which the expenses of his business, including those of his shore establishment, were borne and a profit returned. But, in the case of a requisition, he cannot make this choice. He is compelled to hand over his ship, and so, to recom- pense him, the basal hire rate must be increased to include some appropriate substitute for the ship's proper contribution to the con- tinuing charges of the shore establishment, that is, of course, if the ship actually did make such a contribution and its withdrawal means the loss to the owner of the amount contributed. To do this is not to award anything for loss of profits. The establishment charges run on as an incident of the continued ownership of the ship as part of the undertaking. So, in a collision case, where the criterion is, in a sense, loss of profits, loss of what the ship would have earned during the period of detention but for the casualty, crews' wages properly running on are added and management charges are allowed for, that is not deducted, in making up the account of net earnings :

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In the present case the Naval Charter Rates Board fixed a hire or charter rate for the Marana of 18s. 6d. a day and a rate on account of establishment charges of 13s. a day. For the Mongana, the Board fixed 17s. 6d. a day as the charter rate and 12s. a day as the rate on account of establishment charges. In doing so, they are said to have taken into account the market value of the vessels, their condition at the time of requisition, depreciation, the use to which the Navy put the vessels, viz., examination service and transport, the profits of the company and the charges for the com- pany's shore establishment. The capital value of neither vessel is disputed. That of the Mongana is fixed at £3,500 and for the Marana a figure of £4,000 is put forward by the plaintiff and accepted by the defendant. The charter rates were obtained by applying 9 per cent per annum of those values. This percentage is apparently meant to cover both depreciation and the owners' net return. There is, I think, some confusion about marine and war risk insurance. The plaintiff and, it would seem, the owners behind the plaintiff, did not insure the vessels against marine or war risks. The fact that they bore the marine risk themselves would not, however, telieve the Commonwealth from taking the cost of insurance into account in the hire rate. But the evidence, as it appears in the rather imperfect record before us, is open to the construction that the Commonwealth itself assumed the liability for marine risk as well as for war risks as part of the conditions of requisition, and I think we should assume this to be so. At all events, no point was made on the subject by the plaintiff appellant. Upon what basis the Naval Charter Rates Board adopted 9 per cent per annum on value as the rate which would furnish a fair hire or charter rate does not appear from the evidence. Doubtless it is the product of their own experience and practice. No attempt was made to prove either the foundation, or the correctness, of this practice, if it be a practice. Indeed, once the Commonwealth adopted the view that the Board's assessment or fixation of the rates had no binding force, the course pursued by the Board became no more than part of the narrative explaining the case. It fell to the court to determine whether the plaintiff should have any and what amount, in excess of the sum named by the Board and already paid, in other words, to assess the recompense for the requisition under s. 67 of the Defence Act.

[200]

I have read the judgments of the Chief Justice and my brother Dixon, and I agree with them that the compensation awarded by the learned trial judge was excessive. I also agree with them that it is advisable for this Court, in order to bring the proceedings to finality, to endeavour to assess the compensation itself in lieu of remitting the action to the Supreme Court for that purpose. The correct basis of assessment is, in my opinion, that the owner is entitled to be compensated for the value to him of the property taken. See the authorities collected in James Patrick & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Minister of State for the Navy (1). Here the ships were acquired for a temporary purpose, the acquisition resembling, so far as a statutory title can resemble one at common law, a demise of the ships. In order to determine the compensation in such a case it is necessary to assume that the owner was, at the date of requisition, willing to demise the ships for a fair and reasonable hire, having regard to the value of the ships to him, and that the requisitioning authority was willing to pay such hire as a prudent charterer would have been willing to give for the ships sooner than fail to obtain them. If there had been a recognized market rate for charters for small ships like the subject ships engaged in the coastal trade in Tasmania at the date of the requisition, this rate would have given an obvious starting point and would probably have provided an adequate hire, because the ships do not appear to have had a particular value to the owner. On the contrary, the plaintiff appears to have had more ships than were required for its business, so that some of the fleet were generally standing by. But the evidence on this point and also the expert evidence as to what would have been a fair market rate of hire was meagre and scanty and quite insufficient for his Honour to act upon. I will not refer to this evidence as it has already been discussed in the judgments of the Chief Justice and my brother Dizon. His Honour was therefore forced, I think, to examine the previous earnings of the ships to see if that would provide any assistance. But his Honour, instead of confining his attention to the Mongana and the Marana, took two periods, and in the first "period ascertained the average earnings of five ships comprising these two ships, the Cartela of 194 gross tons, the Dover of 115 gross tons, and the Hzcella of 174 gross tons, and in the second period took the average of the three last-mentioned ships, the resulting figures for the first period being £21 18s. 10d. per week and for the second

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period £33 17s. 11d. per week. He then averaged the two average; which resulted in the figure of £27 per week. The accounts of th plaintiff have been kept on the basis that there is a working acco for each ship, showing the revenue earned by and the expense specifically referable to that ship; a trading account to whieh is' debited such items as cartage, sundry ships' stores, sundry wages and wharfage which are not specifically attributable to any ship; and an expenses of management account to which is debited such - items as country agencies, insurance, office rent, printing and adver- tising, and salaries. In the first period his Honour took the four years 1936 to 1939 inclusive of 208 calendar weeks, for the Cartela, - Dover and Excella, and 191 calendar weeks, being the period up to the date of requisition, for the Mongana and Marana. In the second period his Honour took the three years 1940 to 1942 inclusive of - 156 calendar weeks for the Cartela and Excella: and 121 weeks for - the Dover, which was sold on 30th April 1942. His Honour appears to have taken these three other ships into account in addition to the two requisitioned ships because, to quote from his judgment, " at the period of acquisition both ships were being used in conjunction - with three others engaged in a similar class of trade and for efficient working there were periods in each year when one or more ships were acting as relief or standby vessels." But the accounts show quite clearly, to my mind, that, although the five ships were engaged in the same trade, the earning capacity of the other three ships, particularly the Cartela and Dover, was considerably in excess of - that of the Mongana and Marana. Further, in the first period, the Marana only worked for 88 weeks out of the 191 weeks, so that her earnings per calendar week appear to me to be of little value to ascertain what would be a fair rate for a continuous hiring. Iam unable to agree with his Honour that it was proper to ascertain the earnings of the ships on the basis of a calendar week and to reject the figures for a working week. The latter are, to my mind, the important weeks. In the first period the Marana worked for 88 weeks, which is quite sufficient to estimate her earning capacity when at work. When these weeks are taken, in the first period the net earnings of the respective ships aré as follows : - Cartela £36 2s. 1d., Dover £39 4s., Excella £18 10s. 1d., Mongana £15 16s. 11d., Marana £15 15s. 11d. In the second period the figures are as follows :

Cartela £60 1s. 6d., Dover £20 15s. 24., Excella £22 5s. 9d. I have on several previous occasions expressed the opinion that the method of averaging sales of land or shares alleged to have elements of com- parability to arrive at the value of the subject land or shares leads to unsound conclusions, and the present instance is still another

[204]

excessive rate for the requisitioned ships, just as it would have caused his Honour to reach too low a rate for the Cartela if she had been requisitioned. But the net earnings for the working weeks of the Mongana and Marana in the first period are useful. They show that the two ships had approximately the same earning capacity at the date of requisition. I agree with his Honour that from the net earnings there should be deducted a share of the expenses debited to the trading account. This amount was worked out on a tonnage basis at £1 7s. 10d., and his Honour in his judgment used the figure of 30s. Accepting this figure (it would be approximately the same on a revenue basis) the net contribution to the revenue of the company of each ship when at work, after deducting the expenses specifically attributable to that ship and her share of the expenses debited to the trading account, was approximately £14 5s. per week. If this was their full earning capacity the plaintiff could not have reasonably expected a charterer in 1939 to pay this rate of hire for the ships upon a time charter. The latter could only have been reasonably expected to pay a rate which would allow some profit for himself. But a charterer would have hired the ships for some definite period, whereas the defendant was entitled to redeliver them at any time. There is also evidence that at a period subsequent to that of the requisition the Mongana was chartered for a period of eight weeks at £25 per week, and that in a period of five months she showed net earnings in her working account of over £30 per week. As the requisitions were for an indefinite period and there is evidence that the plaintiff was unable to make any savings in its management expenses, I agree with his Honour that no deduction should be made on this account. It is admitted that the ships were returned to the plaintiff in as good condition as when they were taken over, so that in fixing a fair rate of hire no allowance need be made for depreciation. Further, I agree with my brother Dixon that no allowance should in the circumstances be made for marine insurance. On the whole, giving the best consideration to the matter that I can upon evidence which is in many respects incomplete, I agree that a fair weekly tate of hire for each ship would be £14 per week.

[214]

In International Railway Co. v. Niagara Parks Commission (1), Tuamoore L.J., delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, pointed out that the equitable practice is not confined to cases of the sale and purchase of land but applies to all contracts of which the court of equity can grant specific performance. It is clear, therefore, that if there is a compulsory purchase of property of such a nature that, if it had been purchased under a contract, the court of equity could have ordered specific performance, then the court, in assessing compensation can, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, by analogy to the equitable practice, without any statutory authority, order the payment of interest on the amount awarded from the date that the resuming authority entered into possession. Section 51, placitum xxxi., of the Constitution, if it is not taken from, has at least a close affinity in language to that portion of the Fifth Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States of America, which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It has been frequently held by the Supreme Court of that country that the words " just compensation " were intended to provide that when a subject was deprived of his property by compulsory process he was entitled to be placed, so far as money could do so, in exactly the same position as though he had not been dispossessed. In both England and the United States of America, therefore, it is recognized that in the case of the acquisi- tion of the absolute ownership of property the compensation, to be fair and adequate, requires that the owner should be constructively placed in possession, as from the date of dispossession, of a sum of money representing the capital value of the property of which he has been deprived ; so that, if there is any delay, either because the amount is disputed and has to be assessed, or because, although the amount is agreed upon, it is not immediately paid, it is necessary, if he is to be fully compensated, that he should be paid interest from the date of dispossession until he receives the principal sum. The attitude of the courts is well stated by Bacon V.C. in Rhys v. Dare Valley Railway Co. (2) in a judgment which was cited with approval by Buckley J. (as he then was) in Fletcher v. Lancashire and York- shire Railway Co. (3). He there said: "If I were to withhold payment of interest I should not only be going against the cases

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accordance with the equitable practice because a contract for the sale of a ship would be specifically enforceable in equity. Assuming that the orders could be justified on these grounds, they were in fact based on the broader ground that the payment of interest was required to make the compensation just. The reason why interest was only allowed in Tonking's Case (2) from 31st January 1941, although the plaintiff's fruit was acquired early in 1940, was because, in order to convert the plaintifi's fruit into money which could earn interest or, in other words, into income-producing property, it was necessary that the fruit should be sold. If the plaintiff had not been dispossessed he would have been engaged in selling it throughout the marketing season, or in other words during the period between the date when the fruit was acquired and the end of the year 1940. No doubt he would have sold some of the fruit and received the proceeds of sale from time to time during this period, but it was impossible to estimate when these sales would have taken place, so that the order only provided that interest should run from a date when it was clear that the whole of the fruit should have been sold and the compensation determined. Placitum xxxi., as one would expect, makes no distinction in the condition that the terms must be just whether the legislation authorizes the acquisition of real or personal property or both. "It requires that just terms should be available by law " (per Isaacs J. in The Commonwealth v. New South Wales (3)). Each Act must be judged on its merits (Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel (4) ). The words are even wider than "just compensation." They bear, like the words of any other statute, their ordinary natural grammatical meaning; but they should not be construed "in a narrow and pedantic sense " (per Lord Wright when delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in James y. The Commonwealth (5) ). The question does not arise on the present appeal whether legislation for the acquisition of property could in any circumstances be just which forbade the allowance of interest. The Court is here construing the meaning of the word "recompense" in s, 67 of the Defence Act on the supposition that the section provides just terms for the acquisition of all or any chattels to which it applies, " because in each case the Constitution is the ultimate basis of title " (per Isaacs J. in Commonwealth v. New South Wales (6) ). It is sufficient to say, therefore, that in the absence of a clear statutory prohibition it is proper to construe a word intended to

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (228 paragraphs)

1945,