Perram J
2 Before the Court are three applications for leave to appeal. The parties have reached an agreement disposing of those applications which have been in each case reduced to proposed short minutes of order. A feature common to all three short minutes is machinery whereby the applications for leave to appeal would be granted, and the corresponding appeal allowed in part, with various orders then being made in substitution for some of those made by the learned primary judge. Section 25(2B)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act (1976) (Cth) provides that a Full Court 'may make an order by consent disposing of an appeal to the Court (including an order for costs)'.
3 A Full Court of this Court held in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (2008) 166 FCR 64 at 77 [51] that a Full Court in such circumstances was under a 'duty to be satisfied, as a condition of the exercise of its power to allow an appeal by consent, that there was an appealable error'.
4 That statement, however, needs to be understood in the context of their later statement at [52]-[54], which appears to proceed on the basis that demonstration of an arguable appealable error is all that is required.
5 This test was applied by a later Full Court in Citigroup Pty Ltd v Mason (2008) 171 FCR 96 at 97 [3] - 99 [7], and it is upon that basis that it seems to me appropriate to proceed. It was not explicitly argued before this Court that it should now depart from the Full Court's reasoning in Telstra, and we have no heard argument as to its correctness. In that circumstance there is no reason to depart from it.
6 Whether Telstra was decided correctly or not and whether the criticisms levelled against it in some obiter dicta in Citigroup Pty Ltd v Mason at 99 [8] - 101 [16] are sound are questions which should await an appropriate occasion for their resolution. In this case, however, I am satisfied that there are at least two arguable appealable errors in the various decisions of the learned primary judge and that these are together sufficient to discharge the requirements of Telstra on the three applications which are before us.
7 One issue on the applications was whether the learned primary judge had dealt with the question of whether the Court had power to vary undertakings inter partes; his Honour noted this issue at [32] of his reasons of 3 February 2012 but it is apparent that he did not later return to resolve it, and that omission will suffice to constitute an arguable appealable error for present purposes.
8 Another issue which arose related to an order for production directed to Mizuho Corporate Bank. No director of that bank was subjected to an examination summons nor was any other officer. The argument was that in those circumstances an order for production of the kind which had been made was not appropriate. It seems to me that it is reasonably arguable that this was an appealable error.
9 In those circumstances I am satisfied that the judgment below is arguably affected by error and the jurisdictional requirement found to exist in Telstra is satisfied. Subject to what follows the Court should make the orders which have been sought. The reservation is this: he short minutes of order propose a notation of an agreement between the parties as to the effect of the suggested orders; in particular, each notes that the orders are without prejudice to the parties' future rights.
10 The parties may so agree, however, if by the notation it is hoped that somehow this Court's support for that view is thereby engendered, then not having heard argument, it is not a view I would wish to express. If the parties do not intend the notation to do more than to record their own agreement then it is of no relevance. In either case there is no occasion for its making. I would propose the Court should make orders in the form of the bank's short minutes of order save that the Court should not note the proposed agreement.