(1) The document embodying the facility agreement should be rectified to reflect the previous agreement of the parties that the facility was to be an interchangeable two year evergreen facility, subject to satisfactory annual review. This pre-agreement is said to have arisen from a conversation on 20 September 1988 and by implication from a number of matters including the terms of the previous facility agreement of July 1987.
(2) Alternatively, there were implied terms of the facility agreement that, absent default:
(a) the Bank would not cancel the overdraft facility until or unless the facility as a whole expired and then only upon notice of cancellation effective on the date of expiration;
(b) the Bank would not cancel the overdraft facility otherwise than upon reasonable notice which, in the circumstances, was one year;
(c) the Bank would not cancel the overdraft facility otherwise than upon an exercise of its discretion reasonably and in good faith;
(d) the facility would be reviewed once only each year by 30 April or soon thereafter and that the Bank would promptly notify the customer in writing if it elected to terminate the facility in one year's time (partly in writing and partly implied);
(e) unless the Bank so notified the customer the facility would automatically be extended for one further year.
The summary calling up of the overdraft facility was a breach of these terms as a result of which CBA was not entitled to demand payment of the overdraft and Renstel was not obliged to make any payment in response. In their Basic Case document, the defendants express this consequence a little differently. The Bank by these breaches is precluded and estopped from relying upon the breaches by the defendants in not meeting the Bank's demands. This preclusion and estoppel arises from the Bank's implied obligation to do all things reasonably necessary to give to its customer the benefit of the facility agreement; from an application of the prevention principle; and from the principle that denies to a contracting party the right to rely upon its own breach of contract.
(3) The Bank is estopped from asserting that the overdraft facility was separate from the bill facility as part of the evergreen facility and that the overdraft was cancellable without notice at the discretion of the Bank. This estoppel is said to arise from the common assumption of the parties to the contrary effect between 14 October 1988 and 30 July 1990. In their Basic Case this assumption was said to be that the overdraft was to be available during the currency of the facility agreement.
(4) The alternative basis for estoppel was that the Bank made certain representations upon which the defendants relied to their detriment. These representations as they appear in paragraph 39I of the defence are as follows:
(a) prior to the defendants signing the 1988 facility agreement the Bank made representations in terms of the pre-October 1988 agreement referred to in (1) above;[1]
(b) on 16 November 1988 Jeffrey Ewen Franklin, the SBV officer in control of the account, at a cocktail party told Mr Stella that the overdraft was only cancellable on default;
(c) by letter dated 19 March 1990 the Bank represented that the facility agreement was for a two year $13M interchangeable facility which was on an evergreen basis.