Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v Collins [1925] HCA 25

Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v Collins [1925] HCA 25 - HCA 1925 case summary — Zoe

[29]

as and when the Committee of Direction shall so direct, either generally or in any particular case or class of cases, all fruit shall be tendered for sale, transported by railway or otherwise, and handled at water fronts, railway stations or sidings, or fruit or vegetable markets or exchanges, wholesale depots, shops, stalls, barrows, or otherwise, or elsewhere in the State of Queensland only, under the authority of the Committee of Direction." Sec. 6 (5) provides that "Subject to this Act the Committee of Direction shall have power to purchase, sell, exchange, lease, and hold land, goods, chattels, securities, and any other property whatsoever, and May appoint agents, enter into agreements and contracts, issue debentures (on such terms and conditions as may be approved by the Council of Agriculture) engage and pay officers, servants, and employees, impose levies on fruit marketed, and do all such other acts, matters, or things as may be prescribed." By sec. 2 of the Act "marketing" is defined as including everything involved in the transmission of fruit from the producer to the consumer. If this meaning be given to the word " marketing " in sec. 7 (1) - and it was not suggested that there was any indication to the contrary __ inthe context - I think the expression " take control of the marketing of all fruit" imports that the Committee is invested with power to direct when, how and by whom each operation involved in the _ transmission of fruit from the grower to the consumer shall be _ conducted. The ordinary meaning of the word " control " is to exercise power or authority over, and the provision contained in the section _ that, when the Committee shall so direct, the particular operations _ therein mentioned shall be carried out under the authority of the Committee does not seem to me to place any limitation on the natural meaning of the words by which the general power of control _ is conferred. It was argued that the provisions of the Wheat Pool Act of 1920 and of the Primary Products Pools Act of 1922 showed that, if the : Legislature had intended to confer on the appellant the powers _ which it claims, different words would have been used. I think, however, that, where the words used in an Act are reasonably clear and unambiguous, as the words in this Act in my opinion are,

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'construed - or none. 'To declare invalid the inter-State part and to maintain as operative the intra-State part, though not contrary to the Constitution, would be, nevertheless, as a matter of struction, so subversive of the scheme of the Queensland Act that it would not represent the will of its Legislature. To eliminate very extensive part and leave it free from State regulation, and et to maintain the State regulation of the remainder, would give ise to a situation so diverse in operation as to be incompatible with e generality of the words actually used by Parliament and with unity of its scheme, and, therefore, outside its contemplation gathered from its own all-inclusive enactment. There is, consequently, the " necessary implication" (1) that the whole field

whatever it may be - or none of that field, is effectively covered. (1) " Lake control of the marketing."' - This is a composite phrase, d needs careful examination. There is no statutory definition of e words " take control," and they must therefore be interpreted teference to the Act as a whole; particularly, I would add, by light of the subsequent words of sec. 7 (1), of sec. 8 (2), of sec. }(1), sec. 12, and pars. (iii.), (vi.), (vii.) and (ix.) of sec. 15 (1). So d, the words "take control"' do not mean "take possession " "personally perform." There is not a word I can find indicating monopoly of sale by the Committee itself, or a transfer of the erty in the fruit from the growers or any intermediate owner to the Committee. No reference is made as to the Committee 2 ing to the owners for the value of the fruit, or for the of its sale. There is much to the contrary. The word " in sec. 7 (1) is used only of transport and handling. The hrase "under the authority of the Committee" indicates that ne one else is doing or causing to be done the acts in question. _ 8 (2) enumerates functions of the Provisional Committee, but s the enumeration is " without limiting the powers or status of h Provisional Committee as the Committee of Direction." (J) (1920) 28 C.L.R., at p. 559.

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his view of the Act. The Parliament of Queensland has not defined what it means by " control," and prima facie we must take the word in its ordinary sense. But we may find some clue to the meaning in the classes of action allowed by sec. 8 to the first - the Provisional

Committee of Direction. By sec. 8 (2) (without limiting the powers or status of that Committee), the following powers are conferred: (i.) Requiring (sic) the co-operation of local associations with a view to having one channel of receipt and despatch at station siding or outport; (ii.) encouraging the provision of packing sheds where conditions are suitable; establishing a system of inspection of fruit; (iii.) arranging for transportation of fruit; also cartage and handling at destination points; (iv.) arranging for supervision at the markets; (v.) making agreements with fruit commission agents, fruit canners and other persons; (vi.) taking preliminary steps in the direction of extension of markets ; (vii.) prohibiting or regulating the use and management of fruit barrows, fruit stalls at railway stations, and fruitgrowers' retail shops; (viii.) entering into agreements and contracts, engaging and paying officers, servants and employees; (ix.) imposing levies on fruit marketed; (x.) arranging for financing the operations of local associations and of sectional group committees ; (xi.) engaging in such other activities as may be approved by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Council of Agriculture. There is nothing in all these clauses to indicate any power for the Committee to sell fruit, or to prevent growers or produce agents from selling, consigning, &c. ; on the contrary, (v.) suggests that fruit commission agents may continue their business subject to any voluntary agreements. It may be that (xi.) was intended to enable the Committee to do many other things ; but what other things it is unnecessary to determine, for it is not alleged that the Governor in Council has approved of, or that the Council of Agriculture has recommended, anything further.

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Judgment (99 paragraphs)