Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Tjongosutiono
[2020] NSWSC 1815
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2020-11-27
Before
Harrison J, Davies J, Adams J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (17 paragraphs)
Judgment
- HIS HONOUR: By notice of motion filed on 19 October 2018, Johannes Tjongosutiono seeks an order pursuant to sections 29 and 31 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 that certain property be excluded from restraining orders, made under s 19 by Davies J on 8 October 2015, on the basis that the restrained property has ceased to be the proceeds of crime.
- As a preliminary, but practically significant, matter I note that N Adams J published reasons for judgment in these proceedings dealing with an earlier application by Mr Tjongosutiono in which he sought unsuccessfully to set aside the restraining orders made by Davies J: see The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Tjongosutiono [2018] NSWSC 48. Her Honour's reasons are extensive and detailed and very helpfully inform the important issues that arise for consideration by me. A familiarity with her Honour's decision will therefore be assumed for present purposes.
- The issue before me turns in large part upon the terms of s 330(4)(a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act, which provides relevantly as follows: (4) Property only ceases to be proceeds of an offence or an instrument of an offence: (a) if it is acquired by a third party for sufficient consideration without the third party knowing, and in circumstances that would not arouse a reasonable suspicion, that the property was proceeds of an offence or an instrument of an offence (as the case requires);…
- "Sufficient consideration" is defined in s 338 to mean "an acquisition or disposal of property…for a consideration that is sufficient and that reflects the value of the property, having regard solely to commercial considerations". If I am satisfied that the property in question has ceased to be the proceeds of an offence or an instrument of an offence, I have no discretion and I am obliged by s 29(1) to exclude the specified interest in the property from the restraining order.