The taxpayer contends that the agreement of November 1922 _
resulted in a pooling of assets for mutual advantage. In one sense _
this is a reasonably accurate description. But, under the agreement,
the taxpayer retained no control over the totalisator company it
respect of its exploitation of the combined patents outside Australia
and New Zealand. In the nature of things, complete exploitation
might cover a period of many years, and so, as and when the -
totalisator company decided to sell or operate the patents in other
countries throughout the world, moneys would become payable to
the taxpayer. So far as the taxpayer was concerned, the result of
the Sydney agreement was to make the situation of the places where,
and the territories in respect of which, the totalisator company might -
enter into arrangements to sell or exploit the patents, matters of
pure accident and complete indifference. As the totalisator company -
carried on business partly within the State of New South Wales, it
was, as a matter of mere probability, as likely that it would make its
arrangements within, as without, New South Wales. Whilst the
terms of all such arrangements would become a matter of great
financial importance to the taxpayer, it was not concerned with
them in the sense that it could control any of their terms. I do
not agree with the suggestion that cl. 5 of the Sydney agreement -
gave the taxpayer a right to veto any proposed sale of the combined -
patents by the totalisator company. No doubt, the taxpayer di
under cl. 5, retain the right to choose one method of payment as
against another, and for this purpose, if for no other, it was necessary
for it to remain in business, After the Sydney agreement, indeed
because of its terms, it might be said that, for all practical purposes,
the taxpayer denuded itself of capacity to carry on any effective -
business outside of New South Wales.