THE TRIBUNAL'S DECISION
9 The Tribunal's decision concerned four schemes which the Commissioner considered to be dividend stripping operations within the meaning of Div 207-F of the ITAA 1997. The applicants (the respondents on this appeal) were four corporate trustees of public trading trusts (the Trading Trusts), each controlled by one of four brothers, and each settled on 24 February 2010:
Michael John Hayes Trading Pty Ltd as trustee of the MJH Trading Trust;
John Hayes Trading Pty Ltd as trustee of the JPH Trading Trust;
Paul Hayes Trading Pty Ltd as trustee of the PAH Trading Trust; and
Bryan Hayes Trading Pty Ltd as trustee of the BGH Trading Trust.
10 The four trustee companies were acquired in February 2010 by members of the Hayes family. Shortly thereafter, they became trustees of trusts that were formed with particular features so as to attract the "trading trust" rules in Div 6C of the ITAA 1936. The Trading Trusts were formed to participate as trading trusts in a reorganisation of the Hayes Group in the 2010 income year. Trading trusts are treated as companies for some tax purposes. Trading trusts are public trading trusts and not subject to Div 7A of the ITAA 1936.
11 The Hayes Group included four "Operating Companies": Malacorp Pty Ltd, Fuentes Pty Ltd, MJB&P Pty Ltd and MBJP Hayes Investments Pty Ltd. Each of these Operating Companies had profits available for distribution to shareholders.
12 On 7 May 2010, after the existing shareholders had declined an offer to acquire Z class shares:
two of the respondents (the MJH Trading Trust and the PAH Trading Trust) each acquired 10 Z class shares for $1 per share in three of the four Operating Companies;
two of the respondents (the BGH Trading Trust and the JPH Trading Trust) each acquired 10 Z class shares for $1 per share in each of the four Operating Companies.
13 On the day the respondents acquired the Z class shares, the four Operating Companies declared and paid fully franked dividends totalling $8,008,459.72 to the respondents, as holders of the Z class shares. The dividends represented almost all of the retained earnings of the Operating Companies, being $8,393,036.59.
14 The proceeds of the dividends were lent by the Trading Trusts either to the Operating Companies or to the original (existing) shareholders (set out in Tables 12 and 13 of the Tribunal's reasons).
15 The Tribunal observed that the "transactions entered into to pay the … dividends … and to use the funds representing those dividends after the dividends were paid were of a kind that would naturally attract curiosity": at [9]. The transactions had been "designed" or "formulated" by solicitors (Cleary Hoare) "having particular regard to various [ITAA 1936] rules that are not of common application" in order "to pass corporate wealth to an unexpected new owner in an unusual way", being "effected by executing documents, entering accounting journals, and executing and passing BPNs [bearer promissory notes]". The transactions were "executed in a short space of time, and in a choreographed manner and order".
16 In each of its 2010 income tax returns, each respondent included the franked dividends and the associated franking credits in its assessable income and claimed tax offsets under s 207-20 of the ITAA 1997. The Commissioner considered that the respondents were not entitled to the tax offsets on the basis that the dividends were distributions made as part of a dividend stripping operation because those dividends were paid pursuant to a scheme that was by way of, or in the nature of, dividend stripping or had substantially the effect of a scheme by way of, or in the nature of, dividend stripping: s 207-145(1)(d); s 207-155.
17 According to the Commissioner, the result was that:
the dividends were included in the respondents' assessable incomes;
the franking credits were not included in assessable income: s 207-145(1)(e); and
the respondents were not entitled to tax offsets for those amounts: s 207-145(1)(f).
18 At the core of the dispute before the Tribunal was the question of whether the relevant purpose in carrying out the reorganisation was tax avoidance: at [7]. The respondents contended that it was not, and "that the purpose was to secure better asset protection features of the asset ownership arrangements within a group of family entities, and to streamline those arrangements": at [7]. The Commissioner contended that the purpose was to avoid tax.
19 The Tribunal described the matters which were not in dispute in the following way at [11]:
The parties do not dispute the transactions that were entered into or carried out. Further, they agree that those transactions and the circumstances in which they were entered into or carried out mean that at least some elements of what is necessary to constitute a dividend stripping operation are satisfied. The parties agree:
(a) the four … Operating Companies had retained profits …;
(b) had those profits been distributed without changes to shareholding structures, tax liabilities would have arisen;
(c) new shares in the … Operating Companies were acquired by new shareholders (the [Trading Trusts, being the applicants before the Tribunal]);
(d) dividends were paid to the new shareholders shortly after the [Trading Trusts] acquired the new shares;
(e) the dividends were paid following external advice, careful planning of the steps taken with all relevant parties acting in concert; and
(f) if the requisite tax avoidance purpose is not present then neither of the s 207-155(a) (first limb) or (b) (second limb) tests apply.
20 The Tribunal described matters in dispute in the following way at [12]:
The parties dispute the proper answers to three questions.
(a) Whether the [Trading Trusts] received the dividends free of tax (in the relevant sense)?
(b) Whether the pre-existing shareholders received non-taxable or capital amounts in full or sufficiently partial substitution for the dividends paid to the new shareholders?
(c) Whether the required sole or dominant purpose was to avoid tax?
21 As to the first matter, the Tribunal concluded that the dividends received by the Trading Trusts did not bear tax in the relevant sense, satisfying the fourth characteristic of the paradigm example of a dividend stripping scheme: at [90] - [93].
22 As to the second matter, the Tribunal observed that 30.46% of the dividends made their way to the original shareholders in the form of loans and concluded that, even if loan funds could be regarded as a substitute for capital, it was well short of the substitute required to be a dividend stripping operation and therefore the fifth characteristic was not satisfied. The Tribunal reasoned at [94] - [95]:
The proportion of the dividends that made their way to the Hayes brothers in the form of loans was 30.46% as noted above. Even if loan funds could be regarded as a substituted receipt of capital, 30.46% is well short of the extent of the substitute required to be a dividend stripping operation.
In the present matters:
(a) the majority of what was paid in the form of a dividend to the [Trading Trusts] was returned to the original source of the dividend (the Operating Companies) by way of inter-entity loan. The dividends formed part of the system of continuing finance provided to trusts and companies in the Hayes Group. The majority of the money did not make its way back to the original shareholders who maintained substantially the same economic interests in the Hayes Group both before and after the 2010 reorganisation; and
(b) a minority of the dividend money passed to the Hayes brothers (either individually or jointly) and was then used to retire or repay existing debt. That minority of the dividend money could be seen to be a refinancing of pre-existing debt. The Hayes brothers either individually or jointly assumed new liabilities in substitution for earlier liabilities owed to Hayes Group entities. They did not in any relevant sense receive any capital. They assumed dollar-for-dollar debt obligations in substitution of pre-existing debt obligations.
23 As to the third matter, the Tribunal concluded that the schemes lacked the requisite tax avoidance purpose because tax was not avoided: at [96] - [104]. At [96(d)], the Tribunal stated that the transactions "did not release profits from the target companies in a manner that eliminated future taxation burdens arising in respect of those profits". At [96(f)], the Tribunal stated that the transactions "preserved within the same family group … the same partly taxed profits … and the same latent future tax liability in respect of the accrued pre transaction profits, such that when those profits are released to the Hayes Group owners of the [Trading Trusts] beyond a corporate tax setting, the same or substantially equivalent tax liability will be attracted as would have been attracted had those profits been distributed to those Hayes Group owners directly". At [98], the Tribunal stated that "the relevant profits were not transformed to become non-taxable amounts, or moved beyond the Hayes family". At [103], the Tribunal stated:
In the present circumstances, most of the amounts of the dividends paid by the Operating Companies to the [Trading Trusts] was returned by way of loan by the [Trading Trusts] to the Operating Companies or trusts connected with them and were not made available to the pre-scheme shareholders in the Operating Companies or their associates. Further the profits underlying the dividends paid to the [Trading Trusts], being corporate entities, remain profits of a company owned within the same family group available and liable to tax upon distribution to the ultimate owners thereof namely the same Hayes families with the same tax effect. The profits were not removed from the Australian income tax system at all.
24 The Tribunal's conclusion was that the dividends paid to the respondents "were not part of either a dividend stripping operation or a scheme of that nature or effect": at [105]. The Tribunal stated at [105]:
When regard is had to:
(a) the Consolidated Press predication test;
(b) the focus on the vendor, or original, shareholders;
(c) the absence of:
(i) transformation of taxable profits;
(ii) relocation of those taxable profits beyond the Hayes family; and
(iii) any compensating non-taxable receipt, usually found in dividend stripping operations; and
(d) the setting in which the transactions occurred including the 2007 transactions,
the conclusion that follows is that the sole or dominant purpose of the transactions was not to avoid tax on the dividends paid, and that the dividends paid to the [Trading Trusts] by the Hayes Group Operating Companies were not part of either a dividend stripping operation or a scheme of that nature or effect.
25 The Tribunal reached no definitive conclusions concerning what it described (at [99]) as "motivators" (which was presumably a reference to what the Hayes family contended were its subjective motivations), namely asset protection and "better and simpler organisation of asset and loan arrangements within a family group". As to "asset protection", Cleary Hoare's fee of over $200,000 for its advice apparently came as a surprise to the Hayes family and their accountant, Mr Miller, but was said to be 70% tax deductible as tax advice: at [45] - [46]. The Tribunal's reasons do not contain findings of fact or conclusions from which it would be easy to conclude that the transactions had a dominant asset protection purpose.
26 As to "simpler organisation of asset and loan arrangements", the Tribunal stated at [88]:
Mr Miller's evidence was that the 2010 steps laid a foundation for further rationalisation of the Hayes Group structure in later years, and it was beneficial from an organisational sense. Whether organisational arrangements are complex or not calls for a degree of subjective opinion. Those working with and managing structures may have a perception that differs from others looking in from the outside. And it is possible that additional entities may well make organisation and understanding easier for those with that need just as organisation of an office or warehouse may be improved by having additional containers to house things that need a home. Given the subjective nature of opinion on topics like the present, no material weight is to be afforded to the contention that the February and May 2010 steps simplified the structure. It was open to Mr Miller to have the view that it did, and there is no reason to conclude that his view was not honestly held. The Tribunal does not reject the contention, as the Commissioner has sought, but Mr Miller's view is not of material weight in the analysis required.