So far, the Legislature has designated only property actually
belonging to the deceased. Long experience, however, has disclosed
various expedients for escaping taxation of this nature by dispositions
which, ex facie real, are sometimes genuine and sometimes colourable,
and, where colourable, the property disposed of is still in truth,
though secretly, the property of the deceased at the time of his
death. To meet these expedients the Legislature has from time to
time framed provisions to treat, for taxation purposes only, the
property nominally, but not really, disposed of as still the property
of the deceased at his death. Difficulties of proof and the necessity
of certainty, both for the Treasury and the individual, have led to
the adoption of more or less rigid standards as simple and definite
and, on the whole, reasonable working tests of genuineness. These
are what we find in sub-sec. 2 of sec. 102, except, of course, as to
property merely appointed. The one important observation of a
general nature is that, since the recognized office of these artificial
standards is as a test of genuineness of disposition, the basic notions
on which the duty is founded are unchanged. They are: (1) the
property in view is only that which formerly belonged to the
deceased, and (2) the point of time looked at for determining the
true ownership of the property is the time of death. Therefore the
property, the subject of sub-sec. 2 of sec. 102 (except merely
appointed property), is in every case property which was originally
property of the deceased and ceased to belong to him by reason of
his disposition referred to; and therefore, also, property not in
existence in New South Wales at the time of the death - and which
for that reason, if still retained by the deceased, would not form
part of his estate - is not intended by the Act to be made part of his
"dutiable estate" merely because he had parted with it. If the
Act did so intend, then, in my opinion, having regard to the persons
described in sec. 101, it would be an invalid intention. If a person
be personally a stranger to New South Wales and outside its jurisdie-
tion, and if property not his be outside that jurisdiction, the mere
fact that at a former time, when the property was his, a transaction,
say of gift or sale by him or by his authority, took place within New