Having proceeded so far, it seems to us that the appellant can succeed here only if there is to be found something in the remedy for which the section provides which is in law inconsistent with that remedy being available to an officer unable to perform the duties of his own classification but capable of performing other duties but refusing or declining to do so. Two elements were relied upon to show such an inconsistency. The first was that the entitlement is to "not less than" the salary payable to the officers specified. We cannot gain any assistance upon the problem under consideration from the words "not less than". We have no doubt that the reason for employing this phrase was to remove any doubt that an officer to whom the section applied but who actually worked in a classification higher than that to which he had been appointed at the time of his injury is entitled to the higher salary of his actual classification. It appears that when the section was amended in 1936 - Government Railways and Transport (Amendment) Act, 1936 - the opportunity was taken to set at rest some of the problems referred to by Ferguson J. in Maher v. Railway Commissioners for New South Wales [1] . The second element relied upon to establish an inconsistency between the remedy provided and the continuance of the salary of a person within the section but who refuses or declines to do work outside his classification but within his capacity is that the remedy is the provision of a "salary" and it is contended that an officer who refuses or declines to do work within his capacity cannot be regarded as entitled to a payment described as a "salary". It is, of course, true that a salary is usually paid in return for work or readiness to work, but the word "salary" in s. 124 cannot be regarded as having such a limited meaning. An officer who is completely incapacitated may nevertheless be entitled to a "salary". Moreover, it was thought necessary in 1936 - Government Railways and Transport (Amendment) Act, 1936 - to provide in express terms that the "salary" for which the section provides shall cease upon retirement from or otherwise leaving the service. This provision would not have been necessary had the word "salary" carried with it, as an essential element, the notion of readiness to work. Another way of importing the limitation upon s. 124 for which the appellant contended, based upon the use of the word "salary", was to take the words "salary for the time being payable to officers with the same classification and with the same length of service" as the injured worker and to argue that, as no salary would be payable to such officers if they refused to work, no salary can be payable to the officer concerned if he refuses to work. In support of this contention, reference was made to the observations of Owen J. in Semlitsky v. Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways [1] and, in particular, to the words: "If, in the particular circumstances, no wage would be payable to an employee in the class by which is set the standard for measuring the plaintiff's rights, then nothing is payable to the plaintiff" [2] . It is to be observed, however, that the standard is set by reference to "officers" of the description, and it seems to us to be assumed that some salary, and a uniform salary, will be payable to such officers. We do not think that the words "the salary for the time being payable to officers with the same classification and with the same length of service as such officer had at the date he received the injury" were intended to do more than to fix the minimum amount payable to an incapacitated officer entitled by the section to a salary. We do not think, for instance, that an injured person, actually working in a lower classification would lose the higher salary for which the section provides simply because the specified officers, by reference to whom the salary is measured, should happen to have been on strike for a period. Nor are we satisfied that any officer is under a duty, upon pain of loss of salary, to do such work within his capacity but outside the classification to which he has been appointed as he may be instructed to do. We have therefore not been able to extract from the word "salary" the limitation that an officer unwilling to do work falling outside the duties of the office to which he has been appointed is not entitled to the payment for which the section would otherwise provide.