7 The second type of order is what has come to be called statutory injunction. They are authorised by s65 of the Fair Trading Act. The third type of order relates to the destruction of now intercepted mail, the volume of which is considerable. One group is said to amount to 198,000 items and another group some 5,000 items.
8 The fourth type of order sought is for costs.
9 I have hesitated about making orders of the second and third types, by reason of the absence of the defendants from the jurisdiction and the unlikelihood of their coming within it.
10 In response to my inquiry about precedent, attention was drawn to Director General, Department of Fair Trading v Boss Communications Corp & Ors (File S11146/2001) where Canadian corporations and residents were involved. The issues were somewhat different but injunctions were ordered against the foreign corporation pursuant to s65. The defendants did not appear and orders were made in accordance with short minutes contended for by the plaintiff. No reasons for judgment were recorded.
11 I am persuaded that making orders is not futile, for the reason that disobedience potentially could be the subject of proceedings to punish for civil contempt, and one of the remedies available would be the imposition of a fine.
12 A fine, pursuant to various legislative and regulatory structures can be converted into a judgment for the sum involved, and there are complementary facilities between courts of nations such as Australia and Canada whereby such judgments can be enforced. I am therefore persuaded that it is appropriate to make the injunctive orders.
13 There is specific power under s 72(1) vested in the Court to make orders where there is a finding that there is a likely sustaining by some person of loss or damage, and it is appropriate as against the person, in this case the three defendants, who engaged in the conduct, to make orders to reduce loss or damage to the firstmentioned person. Such would potentially be sustained by response to invitations in the mailed material to forward sums of money to the despatcher.
14 The proposal is that I order them to destroy the unsolicited material currently held in New South Wales. The practicalities against them so doing are obvious, but there is no reason to expect that they cannot appoint agents for this purpose, and indeed counsel for the plaintiff has indicated that his client would be willing to assist in achieving that aim.
15 I should observe that the mail is presently under the control of the plaintiff, having been passed to it by Australia Post authorities. I also observe that the occasions on which the Australia Post can destroy intercepted mail are circumscribed by statute, and the present circumstances are not within the scope of them.
16 Given the nature of the misleading and deceptive conduct, and the range of it, which is broadly described in some circles as a mail scam, I am persuaded not only of the misleading and deceptive conduct in the material to date, but that injunctive orders should be made with a view to preventing further conduct of that nature.
17 Accordingly, I make orders in accordance with the short minutes attached to Mr Renehan's submission, viz: