RELIEF
34 Clause 2 of the Sch 2 to the OHS Act provides:
2 Declarations of contravention
(1) If a court considers that a person has breached one of the following provisions, or was involved in such a breach, it must make a declaration that the person has contravened this subclause:
(a) subsection 16(1) (duties of employers in relation to their employees etc.);
…
35 The parties have submitted that it is appropriate for the Court to inform itself of the facts necessary for the granting of declaratory relief by reference to the statement of agreed facts, the agreed statement of claim and the consent of the parties to the granting of the declaratory relief (see Comcare v Post Logistics Australasia Pty Ltd (2008) 107 ALD 578 (at [24]).
36 Where a declaration is made under subcl 2(1), the Court may also order the person to pay to the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty which must not exceed the amount stated in the table to the maximum penalty to be the maximum penalty in relation to the provisions concerned.
37 The maximum penalty prescribed for a contravention of s 16(1) (in cl 2) is 2,200 penalty units. At the relevant time, a penalty unit was defined by s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as being $110. It follows that the maximum penalty for a breach of s 16(1) of the OHS Act is $242,000.
38 The view taken by Gyles J in Comcare v National Gallery of Australia (2007) 98 ALD 67 was that the approach to be taken for the Court when parties have reached agreement as to the quantum of a pecuniary penalty was not so much a matter of the Court deciding what figure should be proposed. His Honour said (at [8]) 'a commonsense approach is to take the agreed figure and give consideration to whether it is within the range of appropriate figures …' But the role of the Court is, by no means, one of mere rubber stamping.
39 As French J said in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute (WA) (1999) 95 FCR 114 (at [37]-[39]:
[37] As I observed in the reasons for judgment in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Inc (1999) 161 ALR 79 there is a general principle of judicial restraint in the scrutiny of proposed settlements which was enunciated early in the history of the Trade Practices Act. It is not the function of the Court to impede settlements between parties legally represented and able to understand and evaluate the desirability of agreeing to a settlement nor to refuse to give effect to terms of settlement by refusing to make orders or accept undertakings where they are within the Court's jurisdiction and are otherwise unobjectionable. The Court will not substitute its own view of the orders or undertakings which it would have made if those proffered fall within the range of an appropriate disposition in the case.
[38] Nevertheless, in the making of consent orders and the acceptance of undertakings the Court must not exceed its power. The limitations affecting jurisdiction or power to grant the relief sought must be observed. The Court cannot put itself in the position of enforcing conduct which it has no capacity to command or compel. Parties cannot by consent confer power on the Court to make orders which the Court lacks power to make. Moreover the power of the Court to make orders is an exercise of power defined and conferred by public law. The Court, in exercising that power, does not merely give effect to the wishes of the parties. It exercises a public function and must have regard to the public interest in doing so. In consideration of the public interest, however, it must also weigh the desirability of non-litigious resolution of enforcement proceedings.
[39] I respectfully accept, as I did previously, the observations of Merkel J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Z-Tek Computer Pty Ltd (1997) 78 FCR 197 at 202; 148 ALR 339 at 343 that there must be a nexus between the conduct alleged or found to constitute the relevant contraventions and the injunctions granted. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Office Link (Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 19 ATPR 41-598. Whether there is a sufficient nexus between the orders sought and the contravention alleged involves an evaluative judgment.
40 In Comcare v Commonwealth of Australia (2007) 163 FCR 207, Madgwick J considered (at [123]) that the following matters 'provided useful and logical general guidance as to the approach to be taken in consideration of penalties under the OHS Act:
(i) the penalty must be such as to compel attention to occupational health and safety generally, to ensure that workers whilst at work will not be exposed to risks to their health and safety;
(ii) it is a significant aggravating factor that the risk of injury was foreseeable even if the precise cause or circumstances of exposure to the risk were not foreseeable;
(iii) the offence may be further aggravated if the risk of injury is not only foreseeable but actually foreseen and an adequate response to that risk is not taken by the employer;
(iv) the gravity of the consequences of an accident does not of itself dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of penalty. However the occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest the degree of the seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety;
(v) a systemic failure by an employer to appropriately address a known or foreseeable risk is likely to be viewed more seriously than a risk to which an employee was exposed because of a combination of inadvertence on the part of an employee and a momentary lapse of supervision;
(vi) general deterrence and specific deterrence are particularly relevant factors in light of the objects and terms of the Act;
(vii) employers are required to take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace. This implies constant vigilance. Employers must adopt an approach to safety which is proactive and not merely reactive. In view of the scope of those obligations, in most cases it will be necessary to have regard to the need to encourage a sufficient level of diligence by the employer in the future. This is particularly so where the employer conducts a large enterprise which involves inherent risks to safety;
(viii) regard should be had to the levels of maximum penalty set by the legislature as indicative of the seriousness of the breach under consideration;
(xi) the neglect of simple, well-known precautions to deal with an evident and great risk of injury, take a matter towards the worst case category;
(x) the objective seriousness of the offence, without more may call for the imposition of a very substantial penalty to vindicate the social and industrial policies of the legislation and its regime of penalties.
41 The view taken by Madgwick J in that case (at [125]) was that the maximum penalty would be appropriate where there had been a 'conscious decision to flout the law'. That approach was followed by North J in Comcare v Commonwealth (2009) 184 IR 441 (at [69]-[71]).
42 Similarly in Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (2009) 188 IR 415, Barker J said (at [135]-[136]) speaking of the OHS Act:
[135] Object (g) anticipates that where obligations are not met, effective remedies may be imposed through both the use of civil remedies and, in serious cases, criminal sanctions. To put the matter directly, the inclusion of Sch 2 in the OHS Act emphasises a legislative intention that contravention of the occupational, health and safety principles and duties created by the Act should be sanctioned, in appropriate cases, by civil or criminal orders.
[136] In the present case, the purpose of a civil pecuniary penalty, if imposed, is to deter the particular offender from offending again, as well as having the effect of generally deterring other employers from acting in a similar way. The imposition of a pecuniary penalty may be considered to have the advantage of reminding a particular employer of the importance of complying with the duties imposed on them by the OHS Act, as well as reminding other employers of the potential consequences should they fail to comply with the requirements of the Act. The imposition of an appropriate penalty is also calculated to give the community, and in particular relevant employees, confidence that the OHS Act is taken seriously.
43 His Honour continued on the topic of assessing the quantity of a pecuniary penalty (at [137] and [141]-[143]) to say:
[137] When it comes to assessing what level of pecuniary penalty should be imposed, the courts have over a number of years, in a number of different regulatory settings, developed criteria that are considered relevant to the formulation of the quantum of a civil pecuniary penalty. Accordingly, in Comcare v Commonwealth (2007) 163 FCR 207, 162 IR 407, Madgwick J at [116] emphasised that the overriding principle in assessing penalty is that the amount of the penalty should reflect the Court's view of the seriousness of the offending conduct in all the relevant circumstances.
…
[141] With respect, like North J, I agree with the observations of Magdwick J and consider these are all relevant criteria to the assessment of a civil pecuniary penalty under the OHS Act.
[142] However, I also concur with North J, in his emphasis of the overriding caution expressed by Flick J in Comcare v Post Logistics Australasia Pty Ltd (2008) 178 IR 200, where His Honour said that care must be taken to ensure that any listing of potentially relevant considerations do not themselves become an impermissible substitute for considering the terms of the legislation in issue or an unnecessary constraint upon a discretion conferred in otherwise unconfined terms.
[143] I should also add that I consider it is relevant to the assessment of a pecuniary penalty to acknowledge, where it is the case, an admission of contravention and particularly an early admission by a respondent of its liability to the imposition of a remedy under the OHS Act. Where, for example, a respondent in a proceeding such as these early on acknowledges fault and willingness to accept a declaration of contravention, then the respondent will ordinarily be entitled to additional consideration in the assessment of the penalty. In some contexts this process is termed giving credit or "discount" on penalty. There is no statutory entitlements to such credit or a discount but it serves public policy in that it encourages a respondent to act responsibly, and may achieve a reduction in the public resources that would otherwise be required to prosecute the proceedings against the respondent.
44 Finally, it is to be noted (as Barker J did) that Flick J observed in Post Logistics Australasia Pty Ltd (at [39]) that penalties are not imposed by reference to penalties in other cases being considered a benchmark. His Honour said:
[39] A final matter of principle should also be noted. It is inappropriate to fix a penalty simply by reference to the quantum of a penalty imposed in another case. It was thus understood to be common ground between the parties to the present proceeding that it was not appropriate to regard (in particular) the penalty of $198,000 in Comcare v Commonwealth as itself fixing a "benchmark" against which other penalties are to be determined in cases involving death. In NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285, Burchett and Kiefel JJ observed (at 295):
A hallmark of justice is equality before the law, and, other things being equal, corporations guilty of similar contraventions should incur similar penalties: Trade Practices Commission v Axive Pty Ltd [(1994) ATPR 41-368] (at 42,795). There should not be such an inequality as would suggest that the treatment meted out has not been even-handed: cf the criminal law case Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606. However, other things are rarely equal where contraventions of the Trade Practices Act are concerned. In the present case, differing circumstances, size, market power and responsibility for the contraventions, as well as other factors, complicate any attempt to compare the penalties imposed on the appellant with those imposed on the other corporations.
Another form of comparison is not appropriate. The facts of the instant case should not be compared with a particular reported case in order to derive therefrom the amount of the penalty to be fixed. Cases are authorities for matters of principle; but the penalty found to be appropriate, as a matter of fact, in the circumstances of one case cannot dictate the appropriate penalty in the different circumstances of another case. The point was well made by Spender J in Trade Practices Commission v Annand and Thompson Pty Ltd [(1987) ATPR 40-772] (at 48,394) when he said:
Each case must, of course, be viewed on its own facts and facts may be infinite in their variety.
It follows, as his Honour also said, that "[t]he quantum of penalties imposed in other cases can seldom be of very much direct assistance".
A comparison of the facts in Comcare v Commonwealth and the facts in the present proceeding only serves to underline the point there being made by Burchett and Kiefell JJ (and by Spender J) -- namely that the facts and circumstances of individual cases are infinitely diverse. The quantum of any penalty to be imposed must necessarily be fixed by reference to the peculiar facts arising in each case as and when they arise.