APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES
10 The parties agree, and I accept, that the Court should inform itself of the facts relevant to the grant of declaratory relief by reference to the statement of agreed facts, the admissions contained in Australia Post's Defence, and the parties' consent to the granting of the declaratory relief. This is consistent with the approach taken in other cases involving clause 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the OHS Act: see Comcare v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 198 IR 160 ("Linfox") at 167 [35] and Comcare v Post Logistics Australasia Pty Ltd (2008) 107 ALD 578 ("Post Logistics") at 583 [24].
11 A summary of the guiding principles where the parties have agreed on penalty is contained in the Full Court's judgment in Minister for Industry, Tourism & Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72 ('Mobil') at [51], where the Court in substance said:
(a) it is the responsibility of the court to determine the appropriate penalty;
(b) determining the amount of penalty is not an exact science;
(c) within a permissible range, the courts have acknowledged that a particular figure cannot necessarily be said to be more appropriate than another;
(d) there is public interest in promoting settlement of litigation, particularly where it is likely to be lengthy;
(e) the view of the regulator, as a specialist body, is a relevant, but not determinative, consideration;
(f) in determining whether the proposed penalty is appropriate, the court examines all of the circumstances of the case; and
(g) where the parties have jointly proposed a penalty, it will not be useful to investigate whether the court would have arrived at that precise figure in the absence of agreement. The question is whether that figure, in the court's view, is appropriate in the circumstances of the case. In answering that question, the court will not reject the agreed figure simply because it would have been disposed to select some other figure. It will be appropriate if it is within the permissible range.
Mobil was under different legislation from that with which I am presently concerned. Nonetheless, Mobil provides some guidance in a case such as this, where the parties have agreed upon the appropriate penalty.
12 Courts exercising the current jurisdiction have identified numerous factors that may be relevant in assessing the appropriate penalty: see, for example, Comcare v Commonwealth (2007) 163 FCR 207 at 228-229 [120]-[123]; Comcare v Commonwealth (2009) 184 IR 441 at 461 [71]; Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (2009) 188 IR 415 at 428-429 [136]-[142]; Comcare v National Gallery of Australia (2007) 98 ALD 67 at 68-69 [5]-[7]; and Linfox at 168 [40]. Compare too DPP v Amcor Packaging Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 11 VR 557 at 565 [35]. To quote Flick J in Post Logistics at 585-8 [32]-[39]:
[32] In the statutory context of the present legislation, Madgwick J has focussed attention upon those considerations relevant to the imposition of a penalty in Comcare v Commonwealth (2007) 163 FCR 207 … . A member of the Australian Defence Force had there died in November 1994 as a result of heat stress sustained during an army training exercise. His Honour there observed (at [120]):
[120] Decisions under the cognate New South Wales Act refer to the following considerations among others:
(i) the penalty must be such as to compel attention to occupational health and safety generally, to ensure that workers whilst at work will not be exposed to risks to their health and safety;
(ii) it is a significant aggravating factor that the risk of injury was foreseeable even if the precise cause or circumstances of exposure to the risk were not foreseeable;
(iii) the offence may be further aggravated if the risk of injury is not only foreseeable but actually foreseen and an adequate response to that risk is not taken by the employer;
(iv) the gravity of the consequences of an accident does not of itself dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of the penalty. However the occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest the degree of the seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety;
(v) a systemic failure by an employer to appropriately address a known or foreseeable risk is likely to be viewed more seriously than a risk to which an employee was exposed because of a combination of inadvertence on the part of an employee and a momentary lapse of supervision;
(vi) general deterrence and specific deterrence are particularly relevant factors in light of the objects and terms of the Act;
(vii) employers are required to take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace. This implies constant vigilance. Employers must adopt an approach to safety which is proactive and not merely reactive. In view of the scope of those obligations, in most cases it will be necessary to have regard to the need to encourage a sufficient level of diligence by the employer in the future. This is particularly so where the employer conducts a large enterprise which involves inherent risks to safety;
(viii) regard should be had to the levels of maximum penalty set by the legislature as indicative of the seriousness of the breach under consideration;
(ix) the neglect of simple, well-known precautions to deal with an evident and great risk of injury, take a matter towards the worst case category;
(x) the objective seriousness of the offence, without more may call for the imposition of a very substantial penalty to vindicate the social and industrial policies of the legislation and its regime of penalties.
These considerations, it was concluded, "provide[d] useful, analogical, general guidance as to the approach to be taken in consideration of penalties under the Commonwealth Act".
…
[36] In the statutory context of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), French J … has attempted to summarise some of these considerations: Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076. When assessing the penalty to be imposed pursuant to s 76(1) of the 1974 Act his Honour observed (at 52,152-3):
The assessment of a penalty of appropriate deterrent value will have regard to a number of factors which have been canvassed in the cases. These include the following:
1. The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.
2. The amount of loss and damage caused.
3. The circumstances in which the conduct took place.
4. The size of the contravening company.
5. The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.
6. The deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended.
7. Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.
8. Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention.
9. Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention.
…
[37] These considerations may also be applied to the task of assessing the penalty to be imposed under the current legislation. To some extent the considerations set forth by Madgwick J overlap with those set forth by French J; to some extent they do not.
[38] Care must be taken to ensure that any listing of potentially relevant considerations do not themselves become an impermissible substitute for considering the terms of the legislation in issue or an unnecessary constraint upon a discretion conferred in otherwise unconfined terms. …
[39] … It is inappropriate to fix a penalty simply by reference to the quantum of a penalty imposed in another case.
13 In its written submissions and at the hearing, Australia Post submitted that the Court should be cautious about relying on cases from another jurisdiction where the legislation imposes an "absolute liability" to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of its employees. Its counsel contrasted the terms of s 16(1) of the OHS Act with the language of ss 8 and 28 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW), submitting that the differences should be borne in mind when reading the NSW cases to which Madgwick J referred in Comcare v Commonwealth (2007) 163 FCR 207 and also in considering items (ii), (iii) and (ix) in his list at 228. Referring to Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Limited (1990) 170 CLR 249 at 263, Australia Post observed that, unlike this State legislation, under the OHS Act, "it is more likely that the construction of section 16 requires the Regulator to prove that the employer did not take a reasonably practicable step to protect the health and safety of its employees, rather than the employer prove this question of fact in its defence": see also Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531 at 553-555 [14]-[19]. Australia Post submitted that "the Court should be careful to ensure that it does not cause the facts underpinning the element of the offence to also constitute an aggravation of the offence".
14 Without the benefit of full argument, it would be inappropriate for me to make any definitive statements about these submissions. As I indicated at the hearing, however, it seemed to me that these submissions had merit. I accept that the facts underpinning the elements of the offence should not also be treated as an aggravation of the offence. I doubt, however, that, in this particular case, acceptance of this principle affects the outcome.
15 In the end, as Buchanan J said in Australian Opthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560 at 580, "the task of the Court is to fix a penalty which pays appropriate regard to the circumstances in which the contraventions have occurred and the need to sustain public confidence in the statutory regime which imposes the obligations".