Section 35 (1) (a) of the Judiciary Act Cth gives an appeal from every judgment (an expression covering judgment, decree, order or sentence) which (1) is given or pronounced for or in respect of any sum or matter at issue amounting to or of the value of £1,500; or (2) involves directly or indirectly any claim, demand, or question, to or respecting any property or any civil right amounting to or of the value of £1,500. In support of the objections it is pointed out that the order of the Full Court and not the verdict of the jury or the judgment based on the verdict is the judicial order appealed from and it is that which must fulfil the conditions laid down by s. 35 (1) (a) (1) or (2). It is further pointed out that under par. (1) the order must be given or pronounced for or in respect of a sum or matter at issue, etc. Clearly the Full Court order is not given or pronounced for a sum or matter at issue amounting to or of the value of £1,500. Moreover it is difficult to say that it is given or pronounced in respect of a sum amounting to £1,500. It is after all a refusal of an order for a new trial, at which new trial a sum exceeding £1,322 by at least £1,500 would or might be in contest. As to par. (2) it is urged that the claim to a further amount of damages is not a claim, etc. to a civil right or a claim, etc. respecting a civil right. The position which the Court has taken with reference to these paragraphs is explained in Oertel v. Crocker [1] , in Ballas v. Theophilos [No. 1] [2] and in Ebert v. The Union Trustee Co. of Australia Ltd. [3] . In the lastnamed case the general rule was briefly stated: "It still remains generally true that the plaintiff must show prejudice through the order made which sounds in the required sum of money" [4] . We have not, of course, in any of these cases deserted the literal words of the two paragraphs but the principle upon which the paragraphs proceed has been explained by the Court as being that the appellant must by the order of which he complains have been prejudiced, with respect to the rights he asserts or the liabilities he denies, to an extent which amounts to or may be estimated as involving £1,500. In the present case it is true that what the appellant was denied by the order was a new trial limited to the question of damages. The new trial in itself is a remedy for the recovery of the damages claimed or some damages in respect of the claim. It does not itself amount to a sum of money nor can it be evaluated directly in a sum of money. But to deny a new trial in which it is sought to recover damages or greater damages than already awarded is to deny finally the only remedy for the purpose and therefore does prejudice the plaintiff in respect of his claim for the greater amount of damages. If that claim can be considered to involve £1,500 it should follow that an appeal against the order lies as of right. An order refusing a new trial of a verdict for £1,322 has the double effect of leaving standing a verdict and judgment for £1,322 and denying to the plaintiff any larger amount of damages. Prima facie, therefore, the case falls within the principle regarded by the Court as the basis of pars. (1) and (2), provided, however, that the plaintiff can show a foundation for the allegation that the excess she claims does involve more than £1,322 by at least £1,500. The plaintiff points in the first instance to the claim in her writ of £10,000, but we need not decide in the present case that a claim in a writ should be given any such absolute effect. We may concede that amounts named in writs may be quite unreal. In the present case it is plain enough, however, that what the plaintiff really seeks to establish by a new trial is a bona fide claim to damages which might readily be assessed at £1,500 more than £1,322. We may take it, therefore, that in the present case the plaintiff's initial figure on which she founds her prejudice is susceptible of reasonable support.