Turning now to the provision of J. M. Smith's will, by virtue of which the amount of £400 before and £100 since Lucy's death have been paid, it must, I think, be taken from the terms of that will and the actings of the parties concerned that an annual income of £800 was required for Alice's support, and it can hardly be doubted that if Lucy in her lifetime had not given her a home Alice might fairly have looked to the trustees for an allotment yearly of the whole £800. It was, however, evidently contemplated by the testator that Lucy and her brother Vincent would share equally the burden of Alice's maintenance, accordingly any portion of the £800 not applied in any year for that purpose goes into residue where it is equally divided between them. In accordance with that view the brother and sister acted. Lucy gave Alice a home, £400 was applied by the trustees for her maintenance, and the remaining £400 went into residue benefitting Lucy and Vincent in equal shares. After Lucy's death Alice continued to live and be maintained at Castlefield as before, her position was in no way altered, except that Lucy's will conferred upon her the right to hold for life the accommodation at Castlefield, which Lucy in her lifetime had of her own free will allowed her. It is true that Lucy, by her will, empowered her trustees in their discretion to apply a portion of income for Alice's maintenance, but if the equal apportionment of Alice's maintenance between brother and sister were to be continued after the sister's death between the brother and her estate, the allowance of £400 a year from J. M. Smith's estate was just as necessary after Lucy's death as before. Any reduction in that amount imposed on Lucy's estate a larger share than she in her lifetime had borne of Alice's maintenance. However, J. M. Smith's trustees (I assume for the present that they all acted in the matter) determined to alter the incidence of the burden and reduced the allowance to £100. Two consequences necessarily followed. Vincent Smith, himself a trustee under his father's will, benefitted to the extent of £150 each year, the corpus of Lucy's estate gained the other £150, and an additional burden of £300 a year for Alice's maintenance was thrown on Lucy's estate; the last mentioned consequence reducing by that amount the residue of income in Lucy's estate to which the plaintiff is entitled. The trustees of Lucy's estate unfortunately took the view that J. M. Smith's trustees owed no duty to Lucy's estate, and that there was no remedy for this injury to their cestui que trust, and in spite of the plaintiff's strongly expressed wishes they took no action to ensure a fairer distribution of the burden of Alice's maintenance between the estates. Indeed, the ill consequences to the plaintiff did not stop there. Half of the saving of £300 in J. M. Smith's estate coming from that estate as corpus was corpus also in Lucy's estate; but as it was in fact paid out of income in J. M. Smith's estate, the trustees of Lucy's estate treated it as income of her estate when it came to their hands, and as such paid it to the plaintiff. Then came the decision in Cock v. Aitken[25], which determined that these payments must be taken to have come out of corpus in J. M. Smith's estate and must be treated as corpus in Lucy's estate. Since then the trustees of Lucy's estate have ceased to pay these moneys to the plaintiff, have called upon him to refund the amounts previously paid, and are now systematically reducing his income by retaining portion of it each year to effect such refund. As between the plaintiff and his children, the question what is income and what is corpus in Lucy's estate is of course vitally important, and it is the clear duty of the trustees of that estate to insist upon and maintain that distinction for the benefit of the plaintiff's infant children. The greater part, if not the whole, of Lucy's estate consists of her interests in J. M. Smith's estate. The latter is as yet for the most part only notionally converted, but it is vested in the persons entitled according to their interests, the income, to adopt Mr. Hayes' expression, going to each person as fruit of the tree which is his. No sum has been as yet set aside to produce or ensure the production of the £800 per annum, or such portion of it as the trustees may think fit to apportion in each year towards Alice's maintenance. Whether on the true construction of the will the £800 is to come out of corpus or income, or both, it is clear that the portion of it unapplied towards Alice's maintenance in each year falls into residue and becomes corpus. But the payments from J. M. Smith's to Lucy's trustees come in fact from income, and it is impossible, therefore, for Lucy's trustees to observe the necessary distinction in these moneys as they come to hand until J. M. Smith's trustees have ascertained what is income and what is corpus in the proceeds of that estate. Until some settled plan has been adopted by which that can be ascertained, Lucy's trustees cannot put the income which the plaintiff is entitled to enjoy as between himself and his children on any certain or permanent basis. Such being the plaintiff's position under Lucy's will, and the relation of these estates to one another, I find it difficult to escape from the conclusion that the plaintiff has suffered substantial injury by reason of the actings of the trustees in both estates. Whether he must submit without hope of remedy, or whether equity will give him relief, and, if so, whether in the form in which he has claimed it, or in some other and what other form, are matters which this Court is now called upon to determine. There are, it is contended, two irremovable obstacles in the plaintiff's way in these proceedings. The first is that no one but Alice can complain of maladministration of the trust for her annuity. The second is that the plaintiff cannot as cestui que trust be allowed in this litigation to stand in the position of Lucy's trustees. The validity of the first objection depends upon whether J. M. Smith's trustees owe any duty to the other estate. I shall first, therefore, consider the mutual duties and obligations of these two sets of trustees. In this connection certain central facts must be borne in mind. Alice, even though she may be admitted to be of sound mind, appears to have been by reason of her delicate state of health an object of special solicitude to both testators. Her care was treated by J. M. Smith's will as a family obligation to be equally shared by Vincent and Lucy. That position was adopted by them and acted on in the apportionment of the special fund for her maintenance. Eight hundred pounds seems to have been fixed by J. M. Smith's will as the amount reasonably necessary to be expended by all parties in Alice's maintenance. The trustees under both wills were under precisely similar obligations. In fixing the amount of allowance they were bound to exercise their discretion after full inquiries into Alice's financial position and to consider what was fair under all the circumstances. Moreover, the cestuis que trustent under each will were entitled to the exercise of that discretion by their trustees, and to the concurrence of all their trustees in any course determined upon. In Lucy's lifetime three persons were interested in the proper administration of the £800 - Alice, Vincent and Lucy. Any one of them might insist upon the trustees performing their duty. It was urged that no cestui que trust could complain of a breach of trust who was not financially injured thereby. Neither reason nor authority, in my opinion, support that proposition. The apportionment of an unreasonably small sum to Alice, made without the concurrence of all the trustees or without consideration of the essential factors of the question to be determined, would be a breach of trust, and Lucy in her lifetime, even if Alice did not complain, could have insisted on an apportionment in accordance with the trustees' duty even though she might have benefitted by their breach of trust. After Lucy's death the trustees of her will were in the same position. Her estate in each year benefitted to the extent of one half of the unapplied portion of the £800. But if the trustees of J. M. Smith's estate fixed an amount for Alice's maintenance under circumstances which amounted to a breach of trust, it is to my mind clear that, having regard to Alice's position under J. M. Smith's will and her state of health, Lucy's trustees would be entitled to disavow any such unfair advantage to Lucy's estate, and claim that the fund should be administered in accordance with the terms of the trust. Similarly the trustees under Lucy's will were bound to keep before their minds the interests of all their cestuis que trustent. They were bound, in the interest of the plaintiff, to consider that an increase in the amount of their allowance for Alice's maintenance necessarily involved a substantial diminution of his income, and where that increase was rendered necessary by a reduction in the contribution for that purpose from J. M. Smith's estate, they were bound in the interests of their cestuis que trustent to question it if the reduced amount was fixed by J. M. Smith's trustees under circumstances amounting to a breach of trust. Such being the general principles which are in my opinion applicable to the state of facts presented by the plaintiff, his right to adequate relief in a Court of Equity depends upon his establishing a right to have the trusts of both wills in respect of Alice's maintenance administered with due regard to the interests of all parties concerned. In fixing the amount to be applied from their respective estates, each set of trustees purported to exercise the discretion conferred by the will. That will not prevent the Court from inquiring whether there has been any real exercise of discretion, and by all the trustees, and whether the exercise of discretion has been honest in the sense in which the Court uses that expression. In Colton v. Colton[26] Matthews J. concisely states the true principle. "In the case of Constabadie v. Constabadie26 Ha., 410, at p. 414. Vice-Chancellor Sir James Wigram said: If the gift be subject to the discretion of another person, so long as that person exercises a sound and honest discretion, I am not aware of any principle or any authority upon which the Court should deprive the party of that discretionary power. Where a proper and honest discretion is exercised, the legatee takes all that the testator gave or intended that he should have - that is, so much as in the honest and reasonable exercise of that discretion he is entitled to. That is the measure of the legacy. But it is always for the Court eventually to say, when called upon, whether the discretion has been either exercised at all, or exercised honestly and in good faith: In re Hodges; Davey v. Ward37 Ch. D., 754.. Plainly, if the trustee refuses altogether to exercise the discretion with which he is invested, the trust must not on that account be defeated, unless by its terms it is made dependent upon the will of the trustee himself." It must, I think, be conceded that the plaintiff's right to bring his claim into Court depends upon two conditions. He must, in the first place, show circumstances entitling him to proceed against his own trustees - that is the trustees under Lucy's will. Secondly, in so far as the trustees under J. M. Smith's estate are concerned, he must show a breach of trust by those trustees against the trustees of Lucy's estate. As to the first there is, I think, quite sufficient evidence. Lucy's trustees, deeming that they had no right to influence or to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trustees of J. M. Smith's will, refused to recognize any duty to the plaintiff in that respect. Such refusal would not of itself be sufficient to entitle a cestui que trust to take proceedings in lieu of his trustee; but there are, it seems to me, special circumstances in the case which would justify the Court in permitting the plaintiff as cestui que trust to demand that the trustees shall discharge their duty, and that he should take their place in proceedings for the assertion of his rights. In Yeatman v. Yeatman[29] Vice-Chancellor Hall, in discussing the principles applicable in such a case, says: "Notwithstanding the view that I have taken of this case with reference to the right to sue, my impression rather is that it would be a correct holding to say that if the circumstances of any given case are such that upon an inquiry directed as to whether any and what proceedings should be taken, the Court upon the materials before it would come to the conclusion that it was a proper case for proceedings to be taken, although not necessarily and absolutely certain that they would be successful, there it would be a proper case to allow a party to sue in his own name." Besides the strong case made out for taking proceedings on behalf of Lucy's estate, one circumstance alone, apparent with respect to Aitken, is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's claim to directly invoke the aid of the Court. Aitken was an active trustee in both estates, and could hardly be expected to sue himself. This seems to me sufficient to dispose of the objection which was strongly urged against the taking action in his own right and against the trustees of J. M. Smith's will. As to the necessity of joining Noall as a party plaintiff, I agree with the observations of the learned Chief Justice that no difficulty of form in that respect should be permitted to stand in the way of doing justice between all the parties interested. As to the breaches of trust by J. M. Smith's trustees against the trustees of Lucy's estate several grounds have been relied on. Charges of being influenced in the exercise of their discretion by indirect motives are made against all three trustees. As to Emmerton and Aitken the evidence on this head is exceedingly vague and inconclusive, but as against Vincent Smith there is certainly a case for further inquiry. He stands in a delicate position, and although the testator has empowered him to exercise his discretion in respect of matters which necessarily involve his own interests, as well as the interests of others, that does not relieve him from the necessity of acting with the utmost good faith in all dealings with trust property which may result to his personal advantage. Upon the evidence before us it is difficult to discover any reason other than self-interest for the reduction of the allowance for Alice's maintenance. On full inquiry some other reason may be disclosed, but as the evidence stands at present the inference which the plaintiff asks the Court to draw against his bona fides is not unreasonable.