Clark v State of NSW [2017] NSWSC 1414 | Case summary

Application to amend

The present application is made by Mr Clark in an amended notice of motion filed 18 August 2017. The notice of motion seeks five sets of orders. The first set of orders is a referral for pro bono assistance and the last three concern access to materials and documents. I deferred argument and giving judgment on those matters pending determination of the second order by which Mr Clark seeks leave under the FCPA to add certain new causes of action to the 2002 proceedings and otherwise seeks leave to file a third further amended statement of claim, the current draft of which is dated 18 August 2017 ("3FASOC"). I did so because a consideration of the balance of the claims in the notice of motion can only truly be undertaken when the scope of these proceedings is ascertained.
The premise of Mr Clark's motion, which I accept, is that to the extent that he seeks to add a new cause of action in these proceedings then he is in effect "institut[ing]" a proceeding for the purposes of s 5 of the FCPA. In that regard, ss 4, 5 and 7 of the FCPA provide: "4 Leave to sue required for persons convicted of serious indictable offences A person who is in custody as a result of having been convicted of, or found to have committed, a serious indictable offence may not institute any civil proceedings in any court except by the leave of that court granted on application. 5 Grant of leave A court shall not, under section 4, grant leave to a person to institute proceedings unless the court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of process and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings. 7 Right of appearance At the hearing or determination of an application or appeal under this Act, except by the leave of the court to which the application or appeal is made: (a) the applicant or appellant, as the case may be, is not entitled to appear in person, and (b) the person who would, if the proceedings to the institution of which the application or appeal relates were instituted, be the defendant in those proceedings, is not entitled to appear or be represented."
Mr Clark clearly falls within s 4 of the FCPA (see PFC at [9]). Further, given the complexity of the proceedings, I determined that leave should be granted under s 7 to the State to be heard on the application.
For present purposes, two matters should be noted about s 5. First, there is an onus of persuasion upon Mr Clark to satisfy the Court that the proceedings are not an abuse of process. Second, if that is determined, he also must establish that there is a "prima facie ground" for the proceedings.
In relation to this latter requirement, in Re Application of Potier [2012] NSWCA 222 at [17], Allsop P and Basten JA stated that at this point the Court is not "required to embark upon a detailed analysis of the claims or the evidence which might support them but rather is to form a broad impression of whether a claim enjoys a realistic prospect of success and is thus not quite hopeless" or "unarguable". Otherwise in determining whether Mr Clark can amend both to add new causes of action and expand upon other ones, he must generally satisfy the various provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, governing whether an amendment will be allowed.
The proposed 3FASOC can only be addressed by dividing it into portions that relate to the bringing of particular charges against Mr Clark.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 are introductory. I will pass over paragraph 2 because it names various persons who were either police officers or who were a Crown Prosecutor, who were said to have one way or another committed the various torts and then, says that the State is vicariously liable for them. It is likely that, given the fate of some of the amendments, that part of that paragraph will not be allowed because it refers to persons whose only involvement is with charges, in respect of which leave to plead will not be granted.
Paragraphs 4 to 6 concern the 2000 false instrument charge. Leave is not required under the FCPA as they are already in the existing statement of claim. Those paragraphs can proceed.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 now seek to introduce an allegation that, following Mr Clark's acquittal on the charges referred to in paragraphs 4 to 6, back-up charges were presented against him, in respect of which he was initially convicted but then was partially successful on appeal. The proceedings seek to make out a claim for malicious prosecution in relation to those charges.
It is an interesting question as to whether leave is in fact required under the FCPA to brings in these matters. However, in the end result it is not necessary to resolve that. The State raised an issue as to whether this cause of action was statute barred. It raised that contention in relation to a number of amendments in the proposed third further amended statement of claim. Mr Clark's response to all of those matters was to contend that, by reason of the various terms of imprisonment he has served, he was under a relevant "disability" for the purposes of s 52 of the Limitation Act 1969 such that time did not run. In the end result, the determination of that contention appears to involve a factual issue, which it is not appropriate to determine on this application. Otherwise Mr Clark submitted that, even if time did run, these amendments could be supported under subsection 65(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act as they, so he contends, arise out of the facts that gave rise to the already pleaded causes of action concerning the 2000 false instrument charge.
There is much to be said for that but even if that is right Mr Clark still needs to demonstrate that, as a matter of discretion, leave should be allowed to raise these matters. The factors governing the exercise of that discretion are articulated in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2007] HCA 27 and find statutory expression in ss 56 and following of the Civil Procedure Act.
In circumstances where the history as I have described is such that Mr Clark has, despite his imprisonment, been litigating for a long period of time over a vast number of charges, the Court is entitled to expect some particularly persuasive explanation to be put forward at this point as to why these matters are now being raised for the first time.
From the Bar table Mr Clark referred to some injuries he had suffered in custody and the difficulties he has had with access to documents. The detailed "submissions/affidavits" he filed in support of his application also make reference to these matters. Nevertheless I do not accept that explains the long delay before the bringing in of these matters. There was a period in 2004 when Mr Clark was represented and his solicitors filed pleadings on his behalf. Access to documents is not really required to plead these matters as there is no suggestion that he was not at least aware of his conviction and partial success on appeal in relation to these convictions. Mr Clark is in no different position from any other litigant, albeit that he suffers from the undoubted impediment that he is incarcerated. The bringing of a totally fresh matter some 15 years later needs extremely cogent explanation and it has not been given. Leave to plead these matters is refused.
Paragraphs 9 to 12 of the proposed 3FASOC allege the particular matters said to warrant a conclusion that he was maliciously prosecuted for the offences referred to in paragraphs 4 to 6. They are already in the existing statement of claim. They can go forward.
Paragraphs 13 to 21 plead the events surrounding his arrest and prosecution and ultimate success in relation to the 2000 pervert the course of justice charge. Given that they are in the existing statement of claim they can proceed.
Proposed paragraphs 22 to 33 plead a cause of action in malicious prosecution in respect of his arrest and charging on 27 January 2005 on the charge of committing an act of indecency towards a person under the age of 16, assaulting a police officer and goods in custody. They also plead that on a subsequent date he was charged with having child pornography in his possession that was seized on 22 January 2015.
The 2005 statement of claim pleaded, at paragraphs 33 to 38, the facts surrounding the search of Mr Clark's premises on 27 January 2005 and the laying of four charges against him, although the charge of indecent assault is instead referred to as having procured a child for pornographic purposes. That section of the pleading was headed "Trespass 27 January 2005".
Paragraph 52 of the 2005 statement of claim alleges that the various police officers referred to in the pleading embarked on the "above prosecutions in a vicious and vexatious campaign of intimidation and conspiracy against the plaintiff". Those "prosecutions" included the prosecution of the four charges that I have just referred to.
Paragraph 62 of the 2005 statement of claim alleges that the search warrant used at his home on 27 January 2005 was "bogus".
Paragraphs 74 and 75 of the 2005 statement of claim purported to provide particulars of the "collateral and/or improper purposes" of the various police officers who took action against him, including alleging that the officers misconducted themselves in relation to the prosecutions and that the prosecutions were "instituted, maintained and continued to justify the unlawful and improper conduct of the said police officers".
Although the 2005 statement of claim was held to be bad in form, there was in my view no doubt that it involved an attempt to bring an action in respect of what was alleged to be a vexation prosecution of him arising from the search on 27 January 2015. Thus, in substance, paragraphs 27 to 33 of the proposed 3FASOC are a reformulation of those allegations.
When he was asked to address why this did not amount to an abuse of process, Mr Clark pointed to s 91 of the Civil Procedure Act, which provides that a dismissal does not of its own force operate as a bar to further proceedings. He also submitted that, in considering whether it was an abuse of process, the Court could have regard to the various restrictions he was labouring under when he was attempting to plead the 2005 proceedings, including his being assaulted in prison and his not having access to various documents.
The State submitted, inter alia, that any attempt to re-agitate this matter constitutes an abuse of process in that the further pursuit of the matter was fully considered and rejected by Hidden J and it is truly an abuse of process to attempt to resurrect something that had already been dealt with over many years. The State also referred to the fact that Mr Clark sought the leave of Schmidt J to bring these allegations in the version of the statement of claim known as MFI #4 but her Honour refused leave under the FCPA (see [2016] NSWSC 808 at [115] to [131]).
In that judgment her Honour referred to the attempt by Mr Clark to plead causes of action which were the subject of the 2005 proceedings and found that they "involved obvious abuse" (at [128] and [129]). Mr Clark contends that that conclusion was only reached because, at the time that her Honour made that judgment, the 2005 proceedings still had some life in that he was pursuing his appeal of Hidden J's judgment in the Court of Appeal, and that, in effect, her Honour was commenting on the legitimacy of him pursuing the same matter in two proceedings simultaneously.
I do not accept that. There was no reason for Schmidt J to take any view other than the fact that Hidden J's order dismissing the 2005 proceedings was final unless and until it was set aside by the Court of Appeal (which it was not). In any event, it is hard to see how Mr Clark's position is in any way strengthened by his defeat in the Court of Appeal in attempting to appeal Hidden J's judgment. At most it means that the abuse of process has a different character, namely, instead of pursuing the same cause of action in two proceedings, he is attempting to re-agitate a cause of action which was dismissed because he could not properly pursue it previously.
However, even leaving aside the effect of Schmidt J's judgment, I am satisfied that leave under s 5 of the FCPA to raise this matter must be refused because I am certainly not satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of process. Whatever be the limitations that Mr Clark experienced from time to time, the fact is that over a number of years he had ample opportunity to bring forward and pursue proceedings in respect of this matter but has simply proved unable to do so. The proposition that now, 12 years after the various events the subject of his pleadings and three years after Hidden J brought them to an end, he can now seek to re-agitate them, in my view must be rejected.
Accordingly, leave to raise paragraphs 22 to 33 of the proposed 3FASOC is refused.
Paragraphs 34 and 35 of the proposed 3FASOC seek to plead a cause of action in civil conspiracy against the various officers who took part in the events of 27 January 2005. It appears to be the case that Mr Clark has not previously attempted to plead a civil conspiracy in relation to those events but otherwise these matters arise out of precisely the same facts, matters and circumstances as were pleaded in the 2005 statement of claim.
Mr Clark submits that, even if I was to conclude that he should not be allowed to pursue paragraphs 22 to 33 of the proposed 3FASOC, he should nevertheless be able to continue with his conspiracy action given it has not previously been pleaded. I do not accept that. The considerations that prevent the re-agitation of such matters from a litigant who has previously had ample opportunity to do so but failed and had their proceedings dismissed apply equally to an attempt to put a different legal label on the same facts, matters and circumstances. Leave under s 5 of the FCPA in respect of proposed paragraphs 34 to 35 is refused.
Paragraphs 36 to 39 of the proposed 3FASOC are prefaced by the heading "27 January 2005 Trespass to Goods". The paragraphs then refer to the events surrounding the execution of the search warrant on 27 January 2005. Paragraph 36 repeats the precise allegation made in the 2005 statement of claim that the search warrant was bogus. This is all put forward in support of an allegation that the removal of the various items was unlawful. It follows from my earlier analysis that, in substance, this does not raise anything that was not previously raised in the 2005 statement of claim. Leave under s 5 of the FCPA to raise these matters is refused.
Paragraphs 40 to 47 of the proposed 3FASOC seek to bring actions for an alleged tort called "false arrest", as well as for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution arising from Mr Clark's arrest in November 2006 for various sexual offences involving a child said to be under the age of 18 years as well as an offence of making a false statement with intent to pervert the course of justice.
Paragraphs 39 to 41 of the 2005 statement of claim referred to his arrest and prosecution for at least some of those offences. The only difference in substance between that allegation and the proposed 3FASOC is that Mr Clark has now added some further particulars of the charges that he was ultimately acquitted on.
In its written submissions the State contended that that matter was addressed by Fagan J in PFC where his Honour refused Mr Clark leave under s 5 of the FCPA. However, Mr Clark pointed out that Fagan J refused leave because the form of pleading presented to his Honour included a charge in respect of which he had ultimately been convicted and unsuccessfully appealed but those charges were deleted from the paragraphs 39 to 41 of the proposed 3FASOC. That appears to be correct. Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that these parts of the pleadings are not an abuse of process, given that in substance they are simply re-agitating parts of the 2005 proceedings which have already been dismissed. For the reasons that I have already stated, leave to raise these matters under s 5 of the FCPA is refused.
Paragraphs 48 to 53 of the proposed 3FASOC seek to plead causes of action for malicious prosecution in respect of various charges that were said to have been laid on "3 July 2007 and/or 28 August 2007 and/or 4 March 2008". They are all of a sexual nature involving young persons.
Paragraphs 42 to 44 of the 2005 statement of claim pleaded that on 28 August 2007 Mr Clark was arrested and charged by certain police officers with sexual assault upon the same two alleged victims. Paragraph 43 of the 2005 statement of claim lists a significant number of charges laid in respect of them, which generally appear to correspond with paragraph 48 of the proposed 3FASOC.
The only apparent difference in substance between the two pleadings is that paragraph 48 of the proposed 3FASOC identifies two extra possible dates when the charges were laid, namely 3 July 2007 and 4 March 2008. Mr Clark submitted that this was significant because charges were laid and then withdrawn and re-laid again and for the purposes of the tort of malicious prosecution this means different prosecutions were undertaken from time to time.
It must be remembered that the distinctive feature of this type of application is that the onus is upon Mr Clark to persuade the Court that the proceedings are not an abuse of process. To the extent that it might be said that there is some basis for distinguishing the two pleadings because the prosecution took the course that Mr Clark contends, then that is a matter that he must demonstrate and not a matter for anyone else to speculate upon, much less prove.
On their face the two pleadings appear to be raising in substance the very same matters. There does not seem to be anything that would truly suggest that what the Court is being given in the proposed 3FASOC is in reality any different from that which was sought to be agitated by the 2005 statement of claim.
The end result is that for the purposes of s 5 of the FCPA I am not satisfied that this part of the proposed 3FASOC is not an abuse of process. I am not satisfied that they are not an attempt to re-agitate that which was previously dismissed in the 2005 proceedings.
Accordingly, leave under s 4 of the FCPA to raise paragraphs 48 to 53 of the proposed 3FASOC is refused.
Paragraphs 54 to 60 of the proposed 3FASOC plead causes of action for an alleged tort of "false arrest" and also for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in respect of charges that were laid against Mr Clark following his arrest on 5 August 2008. The charges are said to involve an indecent assault of a young girl and the procuring of her for "pornographic purposes".
Paragraph 45 of the 2005 statement of claim pleaded that Mr Clark had been charged with those offences on 5 August 2008. They did not plead the outcome of those prosecutions, which was that on 16 March 2012 the charges were withdrawn. This would appear to be so because at the time the 2005 statement of claim was drafted, that fact may not have been known. As I said, after Harrison J's judgment in 2010, the proceedings were stayed for a period. However, by the time the proposed consolidated statement of claim was brought before Hidden J, it was known what the outcome of those charges were and that document pleaded that outcome. Nevertheless, despite that, Hidden J determined that the 2005 proceedings were to be dismissed for a want of prosecution.
There is nothing in his Honour's judgment to indicate that in so concluding his Honour was drawing a distinction between prosecutions that had been pleaded in the 2005 statement of claim that had been terminated in Mr Clark's favour and those which were not.
Mr Clark has pointed to an exchange in oral submissions before Hidden J in which his Honour made reference to the possibility that Mr Clarke may be able to bring "new claims" in the 2002 proceedings. This has two problems. First, an exchange between a judicial officer and a litigant is not in the ordinary course a matter that can qualify their judgment. Second, these matters were not in any event "new claims". They were simply claims made in the 2005 proceedings that were not properly pleaded.
In his judgment, Hidden J noted that there were some matters raised in the consolidated pleadings which were "new claims not previously pleaded" which were not authorised by Harrison J's grant of leave (at [95]). These claims do not answer that description. The end result is that Mr Clark raised this matter in his 2005 statement of claim, sought to clarify a defect in that pleading in the consolidated statement of claim but nevertheless had the 2005 proceedings dismissed for want of a prosecution, an order that was not disturbed on appeal. In those circumstances I am not satisfied that the further attempt to re-agitate this matter in these proceedings is not an abuse of process.
Accordingly, leave under s 4 of the FCPA to plead the matters in paragraphs 54 to 60 of the proposed 3FASOC is refused.
Paragraphs 61 to 66 of the proposed 3FASOC are prefaced by the heading "26 March 2009 Malicious Prosecutions". Paragraph 61 recites that on 26 March 2009 an indictment was filed on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, which bore the signature of a Crown Prosecutor who is now a judge of this Court, which alleged the commission of various offences by Mr Clark, all of which he contends he was later acquitted of. These are the subject matter of the claim of malicious prosecution.
Paragraph 67 of the proposed 3FASOC pleads that on 18 May 2009 during his trial when the charges referred to in paragraph 61 had been withdrawn, a further set of charges were laid against him, presumably by indictment, and he achieved a successful outcome on those charges and pleads a malicious prosecution in respect of those matters.
Paragraph 75 of the proposed 3FASOC also pleads that another charge was laid by way of indictment against him on 18 May 2009, which was also resolved in his favour, and pleads an action in malicious prosecution based on that.
By way of explanation from the Bar table, Mr Clark explained that what had occurred was that a trial took place in the District Court involving a substantial number of charges against him. It seems that on the first day of the trial, which appears to have been 26 March 2009, an indictment was laid against him, that during the course of the trial some charges were withdrawn and a further indictment was presented. It seems the end result of that trial was that Mr Clark was convicted on other charges, which were not disturbed on appeal and which he accepts that he cannot make the subject of this action.
In the 2005 statement of claim it was pleaded at paragraph 48 that Mr Clark was arraigned in the District Court on 18 May 2009 and a number of charges were listed. This is of course a reference to what appears to have been the amended indictment that was filed during the course of his trial.
In the proposed consolidated statement of claim at paragraph 117, Mr Clark again referred to his arraignment on 18 May 2009 and sets out what appears to have been all the charges included in the indictment at that point in time, his plea and the ultimate result.
The only real difference between the entirety of paragraphs 61 to 80 of the proposed 3FASOC on the one hand and the 2005 statement of claim and the proposed consolidated statement of claim on the other, is the inclusion of some of the charges included in the initial indictment when he was arraigned on 26 March 2009. In the scheme of things, I am not persuaded that there is in substance any real difference between them. It appears that Mr Clark is just seeking to re-agitate the various causes of action that he was ultimately shut out from pursuing by Hidden J in 2014. The judgment was not disturbed on appeal. It follows that I am not satisfied that these parts of the pleadings are not an abuse of process. Accordingly, leave under s 4 of the FCPA to raise them is refused.
The results of these determinations is that paragraph 2 of the proposed 3 FASOC and paragraph 81 onwards will need to be reconsidered to conform with my findings.
Accordingly, I order: 1. The plaintiff is to file and serve a statement of claim within 28 days that gives effect to these reasons and specifically that only pleads the facts, matters, circumstances and causes of action referred to in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 to12 and 13 to 21 of his proposed Third Further Amended Statement of Claim. [Further submissions on the prayers of relief]
I have just heard argument on the balance of the orders sought in Mr Clark's notice of motion. They can be dealt with in order.

Discovery

A claim made by Mr Clark that is not specifically raised in the notice of motion is for the production of documents from the State by way of a notice to produce. The State submitted that these being personal injury proceedings, some special reason for, in effect, a form of discovery needed to be established by Mr Clark and that has not been done. However, at least in a malicious prosecution case, it can be expected that a great deal of material relevant to the plaintiff's case is exclusively within the possession of the State. In those circumstances, I can at least see a basis for allowing Mr Clark access to the files that specifically concern the charges that are the subject of his pleading. I will come to that shortly.
In making an order to give effect to that assessment, I do not mean to foreclose the possibility that Mr Clark would never be able to seek an order for production of further materials. As I explained to him, it is to be ordinarily expected that any such application would be very narrowly focussed and the basis on which the material was sought would be clearly identified. In that regard, I will indicate some initial views about the paragraphs of his notice to produce.
Paragraph 1 sought the production of a number of statements provided by various persons said to be the victims of his sexual offences over a number of years. With the exception of the first known person who is said to be the victim of a 1997 offence that I referred to earlier and which Mr Clark says is the genesis of all his misfortune, the balances of the statements do not appear to have any obvious relevance to these proceedings. The State submitted that the production of the material is prevented by section 113 of the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013. It is not necessary to determine that submission.
Paragraph 2 seeks police files relating to those victims. The observations I have just made apply with equal force to this paragraph.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 relate to the police and prosecution files concerning the 1997 offence that I referred to earlier. In light of what I have stated, I am not in a position to assess the relevance of this material. Mr Clark will need to demonstrate the precise reason why he should be given access.
The same observations relate to paragraphs 5 and 6, which concern some charges of goods in custody that were laid against Mr Clark in 1999. Mr Clark stated that they do have relevance to his pleaded cause of action because it was in the course of defending himself on those charges that he had cause to issue the subpoenas, which the police allege to be bogus and which founds the 2000 false instruments charge.
Paragraphs 7 and 10 relate to charges laid against his son. Mr Clark says that they may reveal material indicating that the vendetta against him extended to his son. Again, the observations I have made about him needing to demonstrate something more specific about that assertion apply.
Paragraphs 8 and 9 specifically concern the files in relation to the pleaded counts of the malicious prosecution. I shall shortly make orders in respect of them.
Paragraph 11 relates to the back-up charges of creating unauthorised documents. I did not give Mr Clark permission to plead a case of malicious prosecution in respect of them. The observations I made about him having to demonstrate something specific to obtain access apply in relation to those documents.
Paragraph 12 concerns the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions' file concerning the appeal against his conviction on the 2000 pervert the course of justice charge. I shall shortly make orders in respect of that.
Paragraphs 13 and 14 seek documents about events that well and truly post-date the pleaded causes of action, as do paragraphs 19, 20 and 23.
Paragraph 15 simply seeks copies of his own answers to requests for further particulars. I will address that.
Paragraph 16 seeks an order for production of copies of everything previously produced by Mr Clark or his former solicitors in the proceedings. The only sensible way to deal with that is to note that Mr Clark can access the Court file.
Paragraph 17 seeks every document in the possession of the police, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Solicitor in relation to the victims named in prayer 1. On its face that is far too wide. The Court would never grant an order for production of material of that kind.
Paragraph 18 seeks a copy of any and all correspondence between the plaintiff and the Commander of the Manning Great Lakes Area concerning the events that gave rise to the 2000 use false instrument charges and the 2000 pervert the course of justice charges. I will shortly make an order about this request.
Paragraph 21 seeks more material in relation to the victims referred to in paragraph 1. That is covered by what I have just stated. Paragraph 22 seeks access to material seized in a search of his premises on 4 April 1999. The comments I have made about the necessity to bring a focussed application seeking specific material applies in respect of that.
I make the following orders: (2) On or before 10 December 2017, the defendant is to file and serve an affidavit setting out the enquiries made of the whereabouts of the material referred to in paragraph 3 of the plaintiff's notice of motion dated 18 August 2017 so far as that is known and, to the extent that material has been located, whether it contains materials that relate to the charging and prosecution of the plaintiff for the offence of using false instruments laid on 21 February 2000 and perverting the course of justice laid on 29 February 2000. (3) On or before 10 December 2017, the defendant provide discovery in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules of the police files and the files of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions in relation to the charging, prosecution and any appeal from a conviction of the plaintiff on the following charges: 1. seven counts of making and/or using false instruments laid on 21 February 2000; and 2. one count of pervert the course of justice laid on 29 February 2000. (4) On or before 10 December 2017, the defendant provide discovery in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules of any correspondence between the plaintiff and the police officer in charge of the Manning Great Lakes Area Command between 10 June 1997 and 31 December 2000. (5) On or before 10 December 2017, the defendant provide to the plaintiff copies of any previous requests made for further and better particulars of any statement of claim in these proceedings and any response to that request. (6) The notice of motion filed 18 August 2017 is otherwise dismissed. (7) Proceedings adjourned to a directions hearing before the Registrar by telephone at 11am on 21 November 2017.

Clark v State of NSW

At a glance

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Judgment (9 paragraphs)

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Cases Cited (11)

Cited By (3)