111 Clark-Ugle submits that by 1 December 2014 the oppression had ceased and the respondents were restored to the position they would have been in had the oppressive conduct not occurred. In particular, the order declaring that the purported annual general meeting of the Trust on 16 December 2013 was 'conducted in a manner oppressive to one or more members of the Trust (including the plaintiffs)'[164] is relied upon as having provided any necessary relief. Clark-Ugle maintains that Sifris J, when he made his orders on 16 December 2014, was not acting in an ancillary capacity to ensure that the Robson J orders were not frustrated. Rather, he contends, Sifris J was purporting to exercise the power under s 27 independently of the earlier oppressive conduct, or the declaratory relief issued by Robson J. He submits that the decision of resident members not to attend the 10 November 2014 meeting was not a continuation of the earlier oppressive conduct, but rather an exercise of their power, at their choosing, not to satisfy the quorum requirement under s 23(4) of the Act. He claims that there is no suggestion in the Robson J orders that his Honour intended to remove or alter the ordinary rights that residential members of the Trust enjoy in relation to the election of members of the Committee through the processes and conduct of general meetings. When the sequence of court processes is seen in that light, Clark-Ugle submits, the orders made by Sifris J on 16 December 2014 were designed to deal solely with the lack of compliance with his own orders made on 1 October 2014, and not to give effect to the Robson J orders. In other words, Sifris J was intending to correct the absence of a quorum at the 10 November 2014 meeting, and not the absence of a quorum at the 24 September 2014 meeting. Clark-Ugle argues that while the power under s 27 may have been enlivened before Robson J, it was not enlivened before Sifris J either on 1 October 2014 or on 16 December 2014.