CONSIDERATION
14 The principles applicable to the operation of s 424A may be summarised as follows:
(1) the operation of the section is to be determined 'in advance - and independently - of the Tribunal's particular reasoning of the facts of the case' (SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190 ('SZBYR') at [17]);
(2) in order for the section to be engaged in respect of particular information, the information should contain 'in [its] terms a rejection, denial or undermining' of the visa applicant's claims to satisfy the criteria for a visa (SZBYR at [17]);
(3) the relevant 'information' in the context of the section must be 'related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence' (SZBYR at [18]) - information that 'merely [goes] to credibility is not within the section' (MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483 at [29]); and
(4) 'information', within the meaning of the section, does not encompass 'intermediate findings of fact' and 'any process of comparison between the applicant's answers and the factual statements [of third parties] with which those answers were compared', and nor do such 'factual statements' of third parties themselves, 'shorn of the analytical context in which they played their part', necessarily constitute 'information' for the purposes of the section (SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 FCR 109 at [104] (Buchanan J, with whom Perram J agreed)).
15 Further, in a similar case, Judge Driver of the Federal Circuit Court identified in SZVSP v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1339 that:
[a] useful test for distinguishing the claims material and the mere credibility material is to ask whether, if the information were believed and looked at in isolation (i.e. apart from any inconsistencies or comparisons with other material), would it harm the applicant's case? If the answer is no, it is not "s 424A information".
16 Applying that test, and considering AB's evidence 'in isolation' and 'apart from any inconsistencies or comparisons' with the First Applicant's own evidence, it becomes apparent that it did not 'harm' the Applicants' case. Indeed, AB's evidence tended to in fact support the view that the First Applicant's ex-husband's family had a history of causing harm to others (and therefore may harm the Applicants).
17 The Tribunal's recording of the 'discrepancy' between the accounts of the First Applicant and AB of the ex-husband's previous wife's death merely went to the credibility of their respective evidence. In other words, AB's evidence was not therefore information that, in its terms, would be the reason (or part of the reason) for affirming the decision under review.
18 Accordingly, the Tribunal did not fail to comply with s 424A(1) of the Act by not inviting the Applicants to comment on the evidence of AB, and the primary judge was correct to so conclude.