Disposition of the appeal
25 I do not accept the applicant's contention that he had a tenable argument that he satisfied the English language proficiency requirements under the relevant scheme because Item 5 of IMMI 12/097 should be construed as simply requiring that the Authority be satisfied that an applicant possess English proficiency to a standard which is reflected in Items 5(a)(ii) and (iii), but is not confined by the tests specified in those provisions. The applicant contended that the standard of English language proficiency could also be established in other ways, including by the fact that he had successfully completed secondary studies as well as various tertiary courses.
26 First, and most tellingly, the applicant's position is inconsistent with the explicit text of the relevant provisions. In particular:
(a) it is made clear in the terms of s 289A that the Authority is prohibited from registering an applicant unless it is satisfied that the applicant has inter alia passed a prescribed exam within the prescribed period. This prohibition operates by specific reference to the question whether or not an applicant has passed a prescribed exam and not merely by having attained a more general and less specific standard of English language proficiency;
(b) reg 5(3) of the Regulations is equally clear in providing that, if reg 5(2) does not apply (as is the case here), the prescribed exam is the combination of an exam specified by the Minister and an exam in English language proficiency specified by the Minister. Accordingly, the two relevant exams are as specified by the Minister in an instrument in writing made for this particular purpose, an approach which leaves little room for doubt as to whether or not a particular exam is prescribed or not. It is also notable that reg 5(3)(b) explicitly refers to an exam in English language proficiency as specified by the Minister, which serves to underline the very specific nature of the relevant prescription as opposed to a more nebulous and evaluative standard of the sort advanced by the applicant. This detailed prescriptive approach is further reflected in the terms of reg 5(4) and the specification by the Minister of minimum scores; and
(c) that detailed specificity is also carried through into the relevant text of IMMI 12/097, where the second element of the exam which is prescribed for the purposes of reg 5(3) involves clearly defined minimum scores to test scores in respect of two alternative and clearly defined tests.
27 These matters, both individually and in combination, are inconsistent with the applicant's position which seeks to introduce into the scheme the more nebulous concept of "a standard", the content of which is said to be partly informed by the two tests specified in Item 5(a)(ii) and (iii), but where the exact content of that standard is otherwise left obscure. I accept the Authority's submission that the applicant's preferred construction cannot be reconciled with the unambiguous language in the relevant provisions of the regulatory scheme, including the detailed prescription in Item 5. I also accept that the applicant's construction could give rise to serious impracticalities because the Authority would have no clear objective benchmark or guidance in determining whether what is put forward by an applicant as demonstrating English proficiency is to a standard that is said to be the equivalent of passing either of the two exams which are specified.
28 Secondly, I do not consider that the applicant's position is advanced by his contention that that position is to be preferred because it is consistent "with the broad purposes of the Act and the Regulations". By virtue of s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and s 13 of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth), in interpreting a provision of an Act or Regulation, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the particular legislation is to be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. The applicant contended that the purpose of object was "to ensure those who are licenced (sic) as migration agents should possess adequate proficiency in the English language". Even if it be accepted that this is the central purpose or object, it does not mean that a construction should be adopted which is at odds with the evident intent which is manifest in the text that the determination of whether an applicant possesses adequate English language proficiency falls to be determined by reference to an applicant having passed at a specified level one of only two specified exams. The applicant's contention that those specified exams merely operate to provide general and non-exhaustive guidance as to the requisite standard of English language proficiency cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the relevant texts.
29 The AAT's construction of the relevant provisions, which gives effect to their plain terms, is also one which promotes the relevant purpose or object. The following observations of Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1990] HCA 41; 170 CLR 249 at [21], although directed to s 35(a) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) (which was based on the original form of s 15AA of the Commonwealth legislation), are also apposite to the current form of s 15AA:
The choice directed by s 35(a)… is not as to a construction that "will best achieve" the object of the Act. Rather, it is a limited choice between "a construction that would promote the purpose or object (of the Act)" and one "that would not promote that purpose or object".
30 In my view, the AAT was correct to proceed on the basis that the applicant's preferred construction is untenable.
31 Nor am I persuaded that the applicant has established any relevant error for the purposes of s 44 of the AAT Act in respect of the AAT's rejection as untenable of his contention that Item 5 is capable of a directory construction and attracts a test of substantial, as opposed to strict, compliance.
32 The applicant relied on relevant principles established in Hunter Resources and in State of Victoria v The Commonwealth and Connor [1975] HCA 39; 134 CLR 81 (State of Victoria). In Hunter Resources a requirement was imposed by s 105(1) of the Mining Act 1978 (WA) that, before making a mining licence application, an applicant had to mark out "in a prescribed manner and in the prescribed shape the land in respect of which the mining tenement is sought". The relevant regulations prescribed that pegs or cairns be fixed at intervals not exceeding 300 metres. An application was refused by the mining warden because the applicant had marked out a tenement at intervals which did not comply with the requirement that the intervals not exceed 300 metres. The applicant's argument that it was sufficient that there be substantial compliance with that requirement was rejected by a majority of the High Court. That rejection was based upon the majority's view that the nature of the particular requirement was inconsistent with the notion of substantial compliance being sufficient. As Wilson J observed at 245, it was not possible to speak of substantial compliance with a requirement which was expressed in the particular terms of the relevant legislation there. The marking out of the mining tenement was either in accordance with the requirement in the regulations or it was not, i.e. the pegs either exceeded 300 metres or they did not.
33 Dawson J said at 248 (footnotes omitted):
When substantial compliance is held to be a sufficient observance of a statutory requirement it is because the statutory provision containing the requirement is regarded as directory rather than mandatory. Thus in Woodward v Sarsons, Lord Coleridge CJ said that "the general rule is, that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially". One of the difficulties of putting the matter in that way is that there are some statutory requirement with which there cannot be substantial compliance - either they are complied with or are not - which have nevertheless been required as directory only.
34 In Hunter Resources at 249, Dawson J also observed that this was a case where substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement was not possible because there either was compliance with the requirement concerning the maximum length of intervals or there was not.
35 To similar effect, Toohey J (the third member of the majority) stated at 256 that the words of the relevant regulation meant what they said and there was no room for reading them in any other way than that pegs or cairns must be at intervals not exceeding 300 metres. In my view, the same may be said of Items 5(a)(ii) and (iii).
36 The applicant also relied upon Stephen J's judgment in State of Victoria and, in particular, his Honour's observations at 179:
A directory construction will not assist in securing validity unless, despite the non-compliance which is the occasion for invoking that construction, there may nevertheless be seen to be substantial compliance with the general object at which the statutory provision aims.
37 I understand his Honour to be saying there that there is no scope for substantial compliance to suffice in respect of a directory provision unless the substantial compliance is consistent with the general object to which the relevant legislative provision is directed. I respectfully accept that proposition but it does not assist the applicant here having regard to the specificity and particularity of the language of the various relevant provisions of the regulatory scheme in the Migration Act, Regulations and IMMI 12/097. I respectfully agree with the AAT's conclusion that the English language proficiency requirement has a level of prescription or specificity that tells against the possibility of substantial compliance. This is reinforced by the prohibitive terms of s 289A of the Migration Act.